New trends in South Asian diplomacy
By Shaukat Umar
HISTORY may well record India’s vote supporting the IAEA resolution to refer Iran’s case to the Security Council for non-compliance with NPT obligations as an event of great importance. The move signalled a radical break from India’s established nuclear policy which had, for decades, enjoyed complete national consensus and had transcended governments of various political persuasions.
India’s nuclear policy was founded on a set of well-considered principles. The NPT was biased since it divided the world into the nuclear “haves” and “have nots” thus creating an artificial and unjust distinction between states, devoid of any political or legal basis. The security of the globe would be better ensured by launching a time bound process of complete nuclear disarmament.
Unless the recognized nuclear powers committed themselves to this objective and demonstrated this commitment through irreversible and multilaterally negotiated disarmament measures, India would retain the right to develop nuclear weapons. Consequently it voted against the NPT in the General Assembly and embarked upon a clandestine programme of weapon development aided in part by the unsuspecting western powers which had supplied equipment supposedly for peaceful uses.
When India exploded its first nuclear device, ironically dubbed the “Smiling Buddha” to proclaim its peaceful nature, the West failed to act. At the meeting of the IAEA board of directors in 1974, Pakistan warned of the grave implications of India’s nuclear agenda and urged the major powers to intervene to stop it. The Indian representative gave a solemn undertaking that his country would never develop nuclear weapons and that the test was exclusively for peaceful purposes.
The record shows that some western countries had welcomed the Indian assurance deliberately overlooking the fact that there is no such thing as a peaceful nuclear device, a point these very countries are now making to disband Iran’s nuclear programme.
The Indo-US agreement to provide India with equipment and material for its nuclear industry without demanding adherence to the NPT negates the spirit of the treaty. It tacitly accepts India as a nuclear weapon state, thus creating a de facto amendment to the treaty.
The non-proliferation regime that followed the promulgation of the NPT was based on a set of clear and specific principles which expressed themselves in the guidelines laid down by the IAEA, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the MTCR and the Zangger Committee. Pakistan was denied elementary safety equipment for its Karachi Power Plant as that would have infringed the NSG guidelines which forbid the supply of any nuclear related material to a non-NPT state that does not accept full scope safeguards on all its nuclear installations. These guidelines stringently pursued since the inception of the group would be rendered null and void when the Indo- US agreement goes into effect.
The second fundamental pillar of India’s nuclear policy had been unconditional support for the right of states to acquire and use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. At the IAEA, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament and other global fora, India had led the developing world’s demand for uninhibited access to peaceful applications of nuclear power. India’s was a respected and powerful voice for expanding the technical cooperation activities of the IAEA.
It is thus understandable that many, particularly the Iranians, who had appreciated India’s principled position on the nuclear question and counted on its support, were taken aback by that country’s vote in the IAEA. Firstly, concrete evidence is yet to be made available establishing Iran’s non-compliance with its treaty obligations.
True, Iran had attempted to acquire an extensive nuclear infrastructure but had not, so far, engaged in any activity violative of the treaty. Its decision to convert uranium ore into hexafluoride gas does not constitute a breach since this activity would have been conducted under IAEA supervision. Under the NPT, Iran is well within its legal right to pursue a safeguarded peaceful nuclear programme.
Yet India, in the absence of any tangible proof of non-compliance and in contradiction of its time-honoured policy on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, decided to vote in favour of a decision which paves the way for punitive Security Council action against Iran. In doing so, India has abandoned its strongly-held view that all IAEA related disputes should be resolved through negotiations to the exclusion of what is known as the “penalty approach”.
Some might naively assume that Iran could punish India by cancelling the pipeline project. The Iranians are shrewd tacticians and will do nothing of the sort. Given Iran’s current predicament it would be unwise on its part to earn India’s antagonism. In fact, the Iranians may well redouble their efforts to get the project going as quickly as possible in order to acquire some diplomatic space vis-a -vis India.
For India the benefits of supporting the resolution would be many. In the immediate term, these would take the shape of speedy senate approval of the Indo-US nuclear pact. This agreement accepts India as a responsible nuclear power which would use the proffered equipment and technology for peaceful purposes only, even though historical evidence suggests otherwise. As a responsible nuclear power it may no longer be pressed to sign the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and thus feel free to retain and enhance its nuclear capabilities. The well-intentioned Europeans would initially wince but eventually fall in line. A major milestone in India’s quest for great power status would have been reached; a perfect example of diplomacy serving as a powerful tool for advancing the national interest.
It is arguable that India might have drawn inspiration from its neighbourhood. The meeting between the foreign ministers of Israel and Pakistan in Istanbul, the President Musharraf’s pre-arranged accidental handshake which Sharon at a UN reception and his address to the Jewish Congress in New York constitute, subjective factors aside, a truly remarkable diplomatic feat. Historically, Pakistan’s policy towards Israel had been shaped by the Palestinian question.
At every international forum, Pakistan found itself on the frontlines of the Arab-Israeli issue. Occasionally, we would bear the brunt of the verbal duels with the Israeli envoys while many Arab delegations would sit quietly on the sidelines. Initially, our unconditional support for Palestine and aversion for Israel had logical material reason apart from the consideration of Islamic brotherhood enhanced by the justness of the Palestinian cause.
The Arab world, awash with oil, had embarked on a massive programme of development. Millions of Pakistanis found gainful employment in the Gulf and other Arab countries. We also needed allies in our confrontation with India over Kashmir. In due course, several developments created a new set of realities. Egypt, followed by some other Arab countries, made peace with Israel. The Palestinians signed the Oslo accords following prolonged secret negotiations with Israel. While Pakistan was expected to continue to carry the fight to the Israelis, the Palestinians were busy brokering a peace deal with that country.
Secondly, with considerable effort, Pakistan was successful in placing Kashmir on the OIC agenda and piloting strongly-worded resolutions on Kashmir. These were never implemented by the OIC member-states. A glance at the record of the UN General Assembly proceedings during the past 15 years would bear this out. During this period more than 500 statements were made by leaders from the Islamic world in the plenary debates. One would be hard pressed to find even a handful of mild references to the injustices in Kashmir.
Thirdly, Pakistan became a nuclear power whose interests in that capacity coincided with those of Israel, also a non-NPT nuclear capable state. Many would be surprised to learn that at the IAEA general conference, an Arab resolution calling on all states to accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards was opposed by just three countries, India, Israel and Pakistan. A new strategic reality had emerged; Pakistan joining hands with the Jew and the Hindu to oppose an initiative by a group of brotherly Islamic countries. Solidarity with India and Israel on this issue was far more critical for our national interest than the demands of Islamic fraternity because acceptance by us of that resolution would have dangerously compromised our nuclear programme.
This is not intended to suggest a dilution in our close brotherly ties with the Arab and Islamic countries or a shift in our policy of complete support for the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. We are an integral part of the Islamic world and must continue to shoulder our responsibilities as the pre-eminent Muslim state. But, just as the Palestinians and other Arab states maintain cordial relations with India while it continues to occupy and oppress Kashmir, we should at the very least be entitled to keep some channel of communication open with Israel.
These two events — Pakistan’s overture to Israel and India’s vote on the Iranian issue — though unrelated, signal the coming of age of South Asian diplomacy. What would be their long-term implications and whether the pragmatism which had informed these developments would engender enough maturity and self-assurance to facilitate a just and amicable settlement of regional disputes to open new vistas of lasting peace and progress in this region is another story.
The writer is a former ambassador.


