Drafting Iraqi constitution

AT long last the deed has been done. The committee set up to draft a new constitution has presented the document it finalized to the Iraqi parliament, not for approval but for information. In accordance with the specified procedure, this constitution will now be circulated to the Iraqi people whose approval will be sought in a referendum.

Only time will tell how foul the deed will prove to be. Already it is evident that many of the hopes and expectations tied to the finalization of the constitution have been belied. In the short term this constitution will give new impetus to the insurgency rather than reducing it. In the medium term it will make it more difficult for the American forces to withdraw or even to reduce in any substantial manner the current deployment. It will retard rather than hasten the process of recruiting and training a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian Iraqi force to take over the security duties currently being performed by the Americans and the few coalition partners who continue to be part of the coalition of the willing.

Much has been said, either explicitly or implicitly, in the official statements emanating from Baghdad and Washington that the failure to reach an accord owed to the intransigence of the Sunni representatives on the constitution committee. It has been implied that the Sunnis were obstructive because they were not truly representative of the Sunni sentiment in the country and because many of them were former Baathists who owed their loyalty to the defunct party rather than the Sunni constituency they theoretically represented.

The fact, however, is that since the Sunni boycott had led to very few Sunnis being elected, the Sunni representatives were chosen by the Americans in consultation with the Shia and Kurdish representatives who came to power in the recent elections. Even in these circumstances, the Sunnis agreed to participate in the constitution-making process, only after they were assured that decisions would not be taken by majority but by consensus, thus giving them a more important voice than their limited representation on the committee would have otherwise have given them. In the event, the American/Kurdish/Shia responsibility for the selection of the Sunni representatives was forgotten and, of course, the agreement on consensus was broken.

US ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad and others implied or stated explicitly that the Sunni opposition was driven not by principle but by fear of retaliation by insurgents who had killed two of the Sunni representatives on the constitution committee and had threatened a similar fate for those who voted for the constitution. Ambassador Khalilzad who participated openly in bringing pressure to bear on the Sunnis to accept the compromises offered by the Shias said he had given up his efforts to bring about a compromise because the Sunnis kept coming up with new demands.

There is probably some truth in the charge that the Sunnis could not ignore the threats of the insurgents but it does seem that there is a large measure of exaggeration that the Sunnis kept making new demands. The truth is that the Sunnis were sincerely and rightly worried about what the proposed federalism would mean for a united Iraq. They were also rightly worried about what the “debaathification” provisions in the constitution would mean for the Sunnis most of whom had become members of the Baath party because that was the only way to retain government jobs or government patronage.

On federalism, the original proposal was that the central government would have the right to exploit only existing oil resources. It was subsequently modified to call for joint exploitation by the centre and the region with the revenues being distributed in accordance with demography but making special provision for funding development in regions that had been ignored in the past. To placate the Sunnis it was further modified with the Iraqi parliament being given the authority to decide by a simple majority on the rules for establishing the regions which would form part of the federation.

The concession probably did not impress the Sunnis since the Shias would have a majority in parliament and the Sunnis feared quite rightly that the rules would be such as would permit the regions to monopolize the oil wealth in their regions. This would mean that the Sunni region, the four provinces in central Iraq, which have no oil resources, would be dependent on such charity as the Kurds and the Shias were willing to offer. Also provisions such as having representatives of each region in each of Iraq’s embassies abroad suggested that the groundwork was being laid for the regions to break away.

On “debaathification”, a modification was made to placate the Sunnis by changing the italicized phrase in Article 7 of the constitution “Entities or trends that advocate, instigate, justify or propagate racism, terrorism, ‘takfir’ (declaring someone an infidel), sectarian cleansing, are banned, especially the Saddamist Baath Party in Iraq and its symbols, under any name. It will not be allowed to be part of the multilateral political system in Iraq, which should be defined according to the law”, to ‘especially the Saddamist Baath (the term ‘party’ was struck out) in Iraq and its symbols, under any name.” The Sunnis were asked to believe that this permitted even the recreation of a Baath party. The fact, however, is that this is sufficiently ambiguous to permit the banning of participation by anyone regarded as a former Baathist because there was little distinction that could be made in Saddam’s Iraq between a Baathist and a Saddam Baathist.

In my view, the Sunnis are right in opposing the current draft. It does lay, as the Sunnis have claimed, the foundation for the disintegration of Iraq. But even if this is wrong, it is clear that this constitution does nothing to advance the cause of the sort of democracy that the Americans said they wished to promote in Iraq. It does nothing to reduce the influence of Iran which will certainly grow at least in the Shia region that is going to be created in southern Iraq.

It does nothing to reassure the Turks that the Kurds may not start entertaining ambitions about a larger Kurdistan once they have control of the oil resources of Kirkuk. It does nothing to reassure such Sunni neighbours of Iraq as Jordan, Syria, and most importantly, Saudi Arabia that the interests of the Sunni minority in Iraq have been protected.

It does nothing to suggest to the insurgents, both foreign and indigenous, that there will be a diminution in support for them among the general populace in the Sunni areas. They will, in fact, have drawn particular comfort from the demonstrations against the constitution in such Sunni cities as Fallujah and Tikrit.

How has this situation come about? The principal cause, it would seem, has been the unseemly haste demonstrated by the Americans. President Bush under the pressure of growing public disenchantment with the war and a sharp decline in his approval ratings is anxious to declare victory and get out of Iraq. It was his hope that the finalization of the constitution would reduce the insurgency and give him an opportunity to start pulling out American forces from Iraq. Even now American planners have been discussing with Iraqi leaders a timetable for the phased withdrawal of US forces. This now seems a forlorn hope.

President Bush has over the last week been making speeches repeatedly affirming his determination to stay the course in Iraq. He has asked for and received a limited amount of support for his effort to neutralize the impact of gathering anti-war demonstrations galvanized by Cindy Sheehan, the mother of a soldier killed in Iraq.

Ms Sheehan has set up camp near President Bush’s Texas ranch and her vigil has attracted enormous media attention and popular support. Meanwhile Republican congressmen and Senators faced with the prospect of public disapproval of continued involvement in Iraq are beginning to rebel against Bush and to call for setting a timetable for withdrawal. Had the Americans not compounded the errors of the past — the disbanding of the Iraqi army was a major blunder and a principal cause of Sunni ire — by pressuring the Iraqis to finalize the constitution in a hurry and had they not abandoned the goal of insisting on a constitution that was truly democratic the present mess could possibly have been avoided. Secretary Condoleezza Rice in her congratulatory message maintained that she saw in the draft “a foundation for a democratic system in which all voices may be heard, human rights are protected, rule of law is respected, and women are full political partners”.

But every observer reading the draft agrees that now Islamic law shall apply with regard to the rights of women and what these laws will be can be gleaned from the answers to questions provided on the website of Ayatollah Sistani: Question: “Can a man marry without the permission of a woman’s parents? A. Neither permanent nor temporary marriage can be carried out without the satisfaction of her father or grandfather”. Even in Pakistan where our judiciary has often been intimidated by religious extremists this sort of interpretation of the injunctions of Islam has been rejected.

Will this constitution be rejected as it can be if two thirds of the electorate in three provinces vote against it? Theoretically it could happen. The Sunnis are said to be in a majority in four of Iraq’s 18 provinces. There is also a possibility that Baghdad province will vote against the constitution because Moqtada Al-Sadr, the fiery Shia leader who commands the loyalty of most Shias in Baghdad province, notably the Shia inhabited slum now known as Sadr City, also opposes the draft constitution and its federating principles.

In practice, however, it seems unlikely that this will happen. In only one province — Anbar — is the majority such as could ensure a two-thirds “no” vote. Secondly, the Sunni population of Iraq has been consistently understated as being 20 per cent and presumably voter lists will also reflect this underestimation. Combine this with the fact that the best efforts of Sunni leaders, none of whom have a particularly high standing, will not be able to galvanize the Sunni vote and you have a situation where the constitution is likely to be adopted.

Some Sunni leaders are, therefore, talking of abandoning efforts to defeat the constitution and to accept that in the referendum due on October 15 the constitution will be adopted. They propose that Sunni efforts should focus on getting a massive Sunni turnout for the elections to be held in December. This is a wise policy but in the intervening period, there is likely to be an intensification of the insurgency which could bring unpredictable consequences in its wake.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.

Helpless villagers

THERE are sound reasons for reformers who have the good of the country at heart to say that Pakistan can never change for the better unless feudalism in its various forms in completely eliminated. The hold of feudalism is not only on politics and the economy; it causes greater devastation to the social fabric, particularly in the villages.

Though how an end to feudalism can be brought about, and who is going to make it happen, is something that I can’t predict. God knows if even my grandchildren will see it in their lifetime. There are no signs of the dreamed-of Salahuddin Ayubi re-emerging but he continues to be seen as the man who will bring about salvation. A noble being and a conqueror and infidel-basher, Pakistanis prefer Ayubi to his countryman Ataturk, the revolutionary reformer, because the latter did not say his prayers and never listened to the ulema.

And how can we be certain that when (and if) the long-awaited Salahuddin Ayubi does come he will not turn out to be a feudal himself? For, after all, he was a king and emperor and not a Sufi or an Abdus Sattar Edhi. Also, if he is a genuine reformer, he may find that it was easier fighting the combined might of Europe during the Crusades than it is to deal with landowners, the World Bank and the IMF at the same time.

That apart, my purpose today is simply to highlight those aspects of feudal culture that spoil rural social life in Pakistan and not go into its political and economic depredations. For this I cite, as an example, the recent news report from Muridke, a small town near Lahore, of how two young boys from a poor family killed their two sisters aged 16 and 18 in desperation and despair. The girls were harassed and mauled by the chaudhries of the village whenever they went out, and the boys and their father could do nothing to prevent it. To them putting away their sisters seemed to be the only way out.

The chaudhries of any village, even if they don’t own the place, consider themselves de facto owners on the basis of their clout with the administration and the police, and any poor man standing up against them must suffer in one way or another. With rare exceptions they are the gangsters of the locality and they know that their opponents are most vulnerable where their women are concerned. This kind of thing is going on all the time in Punjab and Sindh. According to the news report, the Ferozwala police has registered a case of double murder against the brothers who, incidentally, told newspaper correspondents that the guardians of the law knew what was going on but chose to act as helpless spectators, made helpless either by their fear of the influential chaudhries or being the latter’s “eating and drinking companions.” This too is going on all the time in our villages.

There is another aspect of the current feudal scene which came to my notice when I was writing this piece. President Pervez Musharraf was reported to have addressed a letter to the provincial governors warning them to beware of the activities of the feudal gentry (who have monopolized politics in the past) about whose intentions he had received alarming reports in connection with the elections at the local government level.

It is widely believed that feudal landlords in Punjab and Sindh were bent upon ensuring that a new leadership should not be allowed to emerge from the people through these elections and weaken their own hold on public affairs. They were said to be colluding with local bureaucrats and the police to get false cases registered against qualified prospective candidates with good reputation who were likely to offer themselves for election. This is a political matter but it can have far-reaching social implications.

I have mentioned the vulnerability of the rural poor. In the tragic case of the two brothers and their two sisters, only teasing and harassment were alleged by the boys, but God knows in what other ways the chaudhries have been satisfying their macho manhood through helpless women. Another favourite ploy is to make the women of their opponents parade naked in the village.

I always have grave doubts about the statements of ulema when they claim that the people of Pakistan want the Shariat to control their lives. How can that be? How can people with no morals, no sense of decency, and no scruples, demand the Shariat which is opposed to everything bad and evil?

The nature of feudalism in Sindh has two characteristics. The destitute agriculture labour binds itself to the landlord, the wadera, for a loan from him for a certain period and till that period is over and the loan is outstanding he is like a bonded serf. There is no escape for him, and if he does try to get away, he and his family are put into private jails that are a special feature of Sindh’s feudal life.

Also, the wadera always has his eyes on growing girls among the agriculture labour, most of whom are Hindus. If any of them is good-looking her fate is sealed. She is abducted and married off to a surrogate after being converted to Islam, but is abused by the feudal chief. To escape victimization the girl is forced to confess that both her conversion and her marriage had taken place of her own accord. Thus, the feudal hold has perpetuated itself in the villages of Punjab and Sindh where it seems that even the fear of God does not move the self-appointed masters of the villagers’ destiny. As for the Muridke horror, what is there left now in the life of the parents whose young daughters have been killed by their brothers and the boys are in jail for the crime?

Economic inequality and health

HERE is some new and very interesting information on the health of people. Professor Richard Wilkinson, an expert in public health and a social epidemiologist, has analyzed widespread public health data from the sociological angle to determine the physical and mental wellbeing of people.

His findings? “However rich a country is, it will still be more dysfunctional, violent, sick and sad if the gap between the social classes grows too wide. Poorer countries with fairer wealth distribution are healthier and happier than richer, more unequal nations.”

This seems quite plausible. Medical science has irrefutably established that many diseases with physical symptoms and also organic causes are rooted in the mental make-up of a person. These are, what psychiatrists term as, psychosomatic illnesses. Stress, which is one most important single factor affecting a person’s physical as well as mental health, is created by psychological factors. It is known to exacerbate nearly every illness and breaks down a person’s resistance to infections.

According to Wilkinson, the stress of living at the lowest rung — economically and socially — is more damaging to a person’s health than many other factors. “The stress of disrespect and lack of esteem” are more killing, Wilkinson believes as he writes in The Impact of Inequality: How to Make Rich Societies Healthier. That is why he says the life expectancy in Bangladesh is higher than in Harlem, New York’s poorest neighbourhood where the blacks lead a demeaning life.

This is to an extent confirmed by casting a cursory glance at the Human Development Report, 2004. Among the rich countries, the United States has the highest Gini index (which measures the inequality of income and consumption in a country — the lower the value the better the equality) — 40 as against 25 for Sweden. The US has the lowest age expectancy in these countries — 77 years as against 80 in Sweden.

The poor countries with an unequal distribution of poverty show the same pattern. Compare the three countries of the subcontinent in South Asia. Pakistan has the greatest inequality of wealth (a Gini index of 33). India and Bangladesh are neck and neck with 32.5 and 31.8 respectively). The life expectancy in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India is 60.8, 61.1 and 63.7 years respectively.

Of course this is a rough measure but it points to another major damaging aspect of unequal wealth distribution — the human aspect. When a person is constantly exposed to the inequalities rampant in society — the proliferation of television channels and their easy accessibility ensures that the luxurious lifestyles of the rich and their ostentation are made visible to the poor — it is but natural that the deprived classes will resent their lot.

The consumer society that is being created in Pakistan as a result of the market oriented economy is also creating stress among the people. The high quantum of advertisements in the media is giving rise to a consumer culture which most people cannot afford. That creates stress especially in people who resort to leasing and bank borrowing to spend on luxury and then fail to repay their loans.

This is not just an economic problem. It is a social problem too. People have come to identify respect and status with money. The old values when knowledge and virtue gave a man public esteem have vanished.

If the government’s policies are such as to perpetuate and exaggerate the inequalities, the resentment of the have-nots will be directed at the authorities as well as at the affluent.

The first manifestation of the negative feelings that come in those who are the deprived lot is in the poor state of their health. Next comes an escalation in the crime rate. And finally a breakdown of the social and political structures. This is something the policymakers should look into carefully.

As for public health, the general perception is that the meagre investment in health in the public sector and poverty is the main cause of the poor health indicators. This is true. But it is equally true that many of the diseases have a different underlying cause. At times, the health professionals have found that it is more because of depression and low self-esteem that many people are chronically ill rather than because of malnutrition or lack of treatment for a medical problem. Thus poor health also promotes poverty since it lowers productivity, leads to absenteeism from the workplace as well as from educational institutions. This vicious cycle has to be broken.

It is only government intervention that can help bring about an equal distribution of wealth and break the poverty trap. While policies to create employment, curb inflation, increase the real purchasing power of the people and diversify the economy will certainly help, there is also the need to take the focus away from consumer goods.

A UN report issued last Thursday, titled The World Social Situation: The Inequality Predicament, stated that despite unprecedented economic growth in recent years, the rich have become richer and the poor even poorer. It speaks of “persistent and deepening” inequality and says the “chasm between the formal and the informal economies” is growing while “the gap between skilled and unskilled workers, the disparities in health and education and the inequality in the opportunities for social, economic and political participation” are on the rise.

According to the report the world is more polarized today than it was 10 years ago, when world leaders met at the summit for social development held in Copenhagen in 1995. At that meeting, they had promised to confront profound social challenges and place people at “the centre of development”. That has not been done.

What is worse is that the thrust towards globalization has enhanced the inequality between and within countries. The report confirms that these inequalities have had negative consequences in many areas, including employment, job security and wages.

Once again a summit is to be held in New York in September to address this issue. Coming on the eve of this meeting, the report offers solutions to inequality, by stressing the need to adjust the economic imbalances not just within nations, but also among them, noting that 80 per cent of the world’s domestic product belongs to one billion people living in the industrially developed world, while the remaining 20 per cent is shared by five billion people living in the Third World.

Are we back to square one? In the seventies, the world’s poor led by the Algerian President Houari Boumedienne were asking for a new economic order. The difference is that today their hands are tied tighter than before.

A disaster’s peace dividend

THE tsunami that devastated large swathes of Asia last December also sparked hope that it would force opponents in civil wars to abandon armed struggle in favour of cooperation and rebuilding. That has been true in Indonesia but not in Sri Lanka.

Last week, Indonesia and representatives of rebels in Aceh province signed an agreement in Helsinki to stop fighting after nearly 29 years of conflict. A former Finnish president mediated between the two sides; the rebels gave up their fight for independence, and the government agreed to let Acehnese form local political parties that can field candidates.

In a major concession, the government agreed to give the province 70 per cent of the revenue that Jakarta collects from the substantial oil and gas reserves off Aceh’s shores.

Depriving the central government of so much money is a risky gamble. Indeed, a similar issue has proved to be one of the major stumbling blocks to a draft constitution in Iraq. There, Kurds and Shias want a hefty cut of oil money when a permanent Iraqi government is formed. The refusal of Sunnis to agree was one reason the deadline to write a draft constitution was extended.

Indonesian officials also were reluctant to give up so much revenue. But the tsunami changed things. When the floodwaters killed more than 100,000 people in Aceh, Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s government abandoned its policy of barring nearly all outsiders from the province. Jakarta allowed US troops and relief workers inside and later agreed to reopen peace talks with the rebels. That decision paid dividends.

The tsunami’s death toll far outstripped the number killed in fighting between Acehnese rebels and the government, but in Sri Lanka, the tsunami’s death toll of about 30,000 was less than half the number killed in more than 20 years of fighting.

Five years ago, rebels from the Tamil ethnic group seeking independence for their region agreed to a cease-fire with the Sri Lankan government. But the truce has been fragile.

Leaders of the rebel group, the Tamil Tigers, complained after the tsunami that the government was not letting relief supplies get to their territory in the north and east. Recently, the foreign minister, a Tamil who had campaigned against the Tigers and denounced them as terrorists, was assassinated in his home in Colombo, the capital. The government blamed the Tigers, who denied involvement. The murder prompted a declaration of a state of emergency and threatened to destroy the truce.

—Los Angeles Times