WASHINGTON: Hawks in the administration of President George W. Bush may think that they are tough, but their dreams of “regime change” in Iran and North Korea are increasingly deluded, not to say dangerous, according to their hard-edged realist rivals who have become increasingly outspoken in recent weeks.

Their latest broadside comes in the form of an article by Richard Haass, president of the influential Council on Foreign Relations, in the forthcoming edition of the journal Foreign Affairs entitled “The Limits of Regime Change.”

Haass, who served under Bush in a top State Department position, also has just published a new book, ‘The Opportunity: America’s Moment to Alter History’s Course’, one of the central themes of which is that the hawks have over-estimated Washington’s ability to change the world.

Haass’ article and book release follow the publication of a column last week by arch-realist Brent Scowcroft in the Wall Street Journal which argues that the hawks’ rejection of bilateral talks with North Korea in the hopes that the government there will collapse are “irresponsible.”

Yet another realist, former Foreign Affairs editor Fareed Zakaria, made much the same argument in a recent Newsweek column that assailed the White House for what he called a four-year “stalemate” within the administration between hawks who “want to push for regime change” in North Korea and “pragmatists” who “want to end the North’s nuclear programme.”

Common to all three authors is the conviction that the US is not all-powerful; that it must coordinate its policy with other great powers to achieve its ends; that creative diplomacy can be far more constructive than military action; and that, despite the tough rhetoric of administration hawks, US policy towards Iran and North Korea, both members of Bush’s “axis of evil”, effectively is adrift.

The realist offensive comes amid a growing sense that the intra-administration fights between hawks led by Vice President Dick Cheney and realists led by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell have continued unabated nearly six months into Bush’s second term, albeit more recently without Powell and fewer leaks from unhappy State Department and intelligence officers who generally lined up with the realists.

While Washington has persisted in its refusal to directly engage either Iran or North Korea, it has provided nominal, if sceptical, support to negotiations between the so-called EU-3 — Germany, Britain and France — and Iran on Teheran’s nuclear programme while also stating that a military option of one kind or another remains on the table if an agreement is not reached.

Washington also has continued to insist that Pyongyang return to the Six-Party Talks — which also involve China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia — to discuss a possible agreement for dismantling its nuclear programme.

But the administration has rejected entreaties by China and South Korea, in particular, to put on the table what it might be prepared to offer if the North were to strike such a deal. In recent weeks, Washington also has sent 17 Stealth warplanes to South Korea as part of a series of steps to increase pressure on the North and signal the other parties that its patience is running out.

Haass, who, as head of the influential Policy Planning office in the State Department during the first two years of the Bush administration, was a top adviser to Powell, argues in his Foreign Affairs article, that the hawks’ pursuit of regime change is flawed on many counts.

He concedes that regime change appears superficially attractive because it “is less distasteful than diplomacy and less dangerous than living with new nuclear states.”

Haass dismisses the notion that Washington is prepared to invade either country simply due to the “enormous” expense involved, the ability of Pyongyang’s conventional military power to inflict destruction on South Korea and US forces stationed there, and the size and large population of Iran that would make “any occupation costly, miserable, and futile.”

In addition, “regime replacement,” often is far more difficult and expensive than the initial regime ouster, as Washington’s experience in Iraq has demonstrated, according to Haass.

As for the option of carrying out an attack on Pyongyang’s or Tehran’s nuclear sites, as urged by some hardline circles outside the administration, Haass warns that, given the state of US intelligence on the two countries’ nuclear programmes, this is likely to be limited in its effectiveness and would almost certainly prove strategically counterproductive. —Dawn/The InterPress News Service.