| 13 November 2004 | Saturday | 29 Ramazan 1425 |
A Middle East opening
India's flawed foreign policy
Some changes likely in US policies
President Bush's decisive victory in the presidential election should be seen as more than a mere electoral triumph - it indicates that the US is moving steadily to the right.
This time Mr Bush did what he had failed to do four years ago: win the popular vote, and that too by a 3.5 million margin. Actually, he achieved what no one had managed to do since his father's election in 1988, winning more than 50 per cent of the vote. The scope of his victory and its implications for both America and the world should not be underestimated.
Under his leadership, the Republican Party has gained clear control of both the legislative and executive branches of US government. During his second term, President Bush will have a much firmer base in the Congress, with a comfortable majority in the House of Representatives as well as the Senate.
Bush's comprehensive victory is all the more surprising because he won it despite setbacks in Iraq, despite the death of more than 1,000 US soldiers and countless Iraqis, and despite the absence of weapons of mass destruction and human rights violations in Abu Ghraib prison. His victory signals a clear shift of America to the right.
Now, the all important question is: what will Mr Bush do with his historic victory and how will the rest of the world, which had been praying for a Kerry victory, react? Will he take his re-election as an endorsement of his first term and see it as a national mandate to pursue his policies, goals and strong-arm methods in the second term? Will he continue to pursue a policy of unilateralism, displaying a sort of contemptuous attitude towards the UN and "old Europe"?
In short, will he continue to pursue the "Bush doctrine" which asserts the right of the United States to intervene wherever and whenever it perceives that a threat of terrorism or mass destruction exists? With imperialist overtones, it gives the United States the right to not only decide who is a terrorist and which state is supporting terrorist activities, but also the right to launch unilateral preventive strikes without even waiting for the go-ahead from the UN Security Council.
But many perceptive analysts believe Mr Bush will be more careful and pragmatic in his second term as he would like to make it more successful than the first one.
As he contemplates his second term he will realize that he faces far more difficult challenges than he did in 2000. Not only are there a host of problems (Iraq, Iran, Middle East and North Korea), his own country, though the world's sole superpower, is stretched both militarily and financially.
His aim will be not only to secure his own place, but also America's, in history. For that it will be necessary for him to adopt a new tone and new tactics and to secure broad support at home and around the world. His cabinet appointments will give some clue about his thinking, and the goals and policies he intends to pursue during his second term in office.
Mr Bush must be aware that America's global power has never been greater than it is today and rarely has what the US president decides mattered so much to so many people in the world. No one knows better than Mr Bush that ever since 9/11 America's global leadership has never been under such sustained pressure and challenges as it is now.
The issue that will, or should, receive his prompt attention in the second term is the surge in the anti-American sentiment around the world, particularly in the Arab, Muslim and European countries.
Never in American history has the US been so unpopular, mistrusted, feared and even hated. This phenomenon has undermined US influence across the globe, making it difficult for Washington to persuade others to support American policies.
The war against terrorism will, of course, continue to be the top priority of the Bush administration. The original membership of Al Qaeda may have diminished but there has been no lack of new recruits.
The International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, in a recent report, has estimated that Al Qaeda can potentially draw on 18,000 operatives in 60 countries and the organization has been galvanized by the Iraq war.
The former chief of the CIA's Osama bin Laden unit, Michael Scheuer, in a recent interview with the New York Times, said that Al Qaeda was now "a global Islamic insurgency" rather than a terrorist organization and charged that the Bush administration had failed to recognize that it posed a much different threat than previously believed.
One of the principal reasons for the anti-American sentiment in the Islamic world is the pro-Israeli policies followed by the United States. As a second-term president, Mr Bush can afford not to take a one-sided approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict and hold Ariel Sharon to his commitment to help create a Palestinian state.
Failure to follow a policy based on justice and equity will make it almost impossible for the United States to promote democratic reforms in the Arab world, nor be able to succeed in the war against terrorism.
The biggest challenge of his second term may lie in North Korea and Iran. North Korea reportedly possesses between six to 10 nuclear bombs or the fuel to make them. Iran is believed to have made substantial progress on uranium enrichment.
Washington fears these regimes may pass on some fissile material to terrorists. With 135,000 troops in Iraq, another 15,000 in Afghanistan and reserve-call-ups being extended, the US is already stretched militarily. Preventive strikes on a would-be nuclear state are one thing, but Washington would prefer to avoid a full-scale war even with a medium power at this point.
Owing to the spending spree of the first term, the US is also stretched financially. Four years ago, when Mr Bush began his term, the budget had a surplus of $236 billion; now the annual deficit is more than $400 billion.
The current account deficit is expected to be more than $600 billion or about 5.5 per cent of the GDP. The deficit has grown partly because of the defence and homeland security and partly because of troops deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some sort of fiscal discipline may be necessary in the second term.
There is no likelihood of any shift in US policy towards South Asia. The "strategic partnership" between Washington and New Delhi will continue to grow because their relationship, in the words of National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice, "goes beyond security, proliferation or regional issues." Pakistan will continue to be important to the US because it is a key ally in the war against terrorism and Al Qaeda.
An indication of how relieved and comfortable Islamabad is feeling after Bush's victory has been provided by the Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman. During his press briefing on November 8, the spokesman observed that Pakistan's "concerns and apprehensions" about the continuity of Washington's relations with Islamabad were allayed after President Bush's re-election. But is Islamabad justified in calling it "a durable and stable" relationship if its future becomes uncertain and doubtful after every four years?
US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage, during his recent visit, assured Pakistan of "continuity and expansion" of bilateral ties in all spheres, particularly economic and security matters.
He is also reported to have assured a "sympathetic review" of the F-16s issue which will be the litmus test of American "commitment to build strong ties with Pakistan." The US has not so far supplied the long paid for F-16s to Pakistan because of opposition from India, its "strategic partner". Let us wait and see if the Bush's second term will prove to be more propitious for Pakistan as far as the supply of F-16s are concerned.
The writer is a former ambassador.
A Middle East opening
With a hard-fought election behind us, the United States is now free to refocus its energies on the myriad problems that have a direct impact on its security and destiny. Nowhere do those problems press more insistently on our vital interests than in the Middle East.
The region has been changed forever by the decision to go into Iraq. The debate about the timing and rationale for the war is behind us, but the continued presence of U.S. forces, and changes in the regional balance of power, mean that we no longer have the luxury of treating Middle East policy as a series of unrelated events running on separate calendars.
We face the need for simultaneous actions to avoid failed states while reducing the incentives to violence and instability that threaten America and friendly states throughout the region.
Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Iran and terrorism are parts of a whole and can only be satisfactorily engaged as such. To cut through this Gordian knot will require not only a new approach but the deep, sustained commitment of the United States and a significant investment of the president's attention.
But American resolve will not suffice without the willing engagement of other states, especially those of Europe and the region itself. Our appeal to the Europeans, with whom our differences over the Middle East have been significant, must be based on reaching out to them on the Palestinian peace process and Iran, and soliciting their help on Iraq.
Similarly, we need to ensure that the Arab states are substantive participants in finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and we must engage them more fully in securing Iraq's future.
The goal we seek in Iraq is to create a secure environment in which reconstruction of the economy can vigorously get underway and national reconciliation can proceed.
Unpalatable though it may be, the reality is that providing such an environment in a reasonable time frame will require a larger coalition force than is currently deployed there. This force increment must come either from our own already stretched military or from our friends and allies.
Comfortably reelected, President Bush is in an excellent position to renew his appeal for a greater international presence in Iraq. The leaders of Europe and the Arab world surely recognize - even if their publics may not - that a failed Iraq would affect their countries every bit as seriously as it would the United States.
As evidenced by the Nato deployment in Afghanistan, our allies are also stretched thin. But European willingness to provide even a modest nucleus of troops could provide inducement and cover for other states, especially Muslim ones, to make militarily meaningful contributions.
This would also serve to reduce the profile of the United States in Iraq but, it must be emphasized, would not - and should not - provide any near-term basis for reducing our own forces.
This essential step in Iraq needs to be accompanied by a U.S. undertaking to revitalize the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Yasser Arafat has passed from the scene.
His death represents a sea change in the Palestinian situation and, as the president has remarked, "an opening for peace." Both the United States and Israel have refused to deal with Arafat. The United States must seize this unique opportunity to make a decisive move.
The president should add substance to his commitment to an independent Palestinian state. It must include steps to provide security to Israel and to give the Palestinians the ability and means to construct a viable political entity free from the crushing presence of Israeli troops. The United States should insist that Israel stop construction of its wall on the West Bank and mirror its withdrawal from Gaza with the evacuation of the West Bank.
In return, the wall and Israeli troops would be replaced by an international force, principally European or perhaps NATO troops. The Palestinians should be pressed to take urgent measures to replace Arafat with political leadership that is both willing and able to undertake responsible negotiations and deliver on its commitments. Arab friends, notably Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco, should provide vital guidance, encouragement and support. -Dawn/Washington Post Service
The writer was national security adviser under presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush.
India's flawed foreign policy
Granted that we should be permanent member of the UN Security Council. Probably we would have if we had been a free country when the world body was constituted. Both former British Prime Minister John Major and former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger pleaded our case at The Hindustan Times Leadership Initiative meet last week.
But the question is what we would have done with that status which gave members the veto power. Our position on Kashmir was protected by the then Soviet Union. Whenever the western powers threatened any action, its veto was there on our side. Moscow also came to our rescue during the Bangladesh war when Pakistan urgently needed a ceasefire to retain its foothold in its eastern wing.
I do not recall any instance when we wished to act at a particular time and we had no veto. Instead, we preferred to stay silent when Hungary demonstrated that the desire for national freedom was stronger than any ideology. So was our equivocal stand at the time when the Russian troops marched into Afghanistan.
Frankly speaking, veto would have given us importance but not commitment. That has been mainly lacking in our foreign policy since the death of Jawaharlal Nehru (1964). He spelled out his stand at the joint session of America's two houses: If aggression takes place anywhere and if sovereignty of a country is threatened, we cannot and shall not remain neutral. He challenged both the UK and France when they wanted to capture the Suez in 1956, although he needed the assistance of both for building India economically.
What has India done since Nehru's death? It has not been able to keep even good relations with its neighbouring countries. This happens when nations lose their way in a thicket of convenience. Nehru was dead set against military dictators.
I recall sitting in the Lok Sabha press gallery some 46 years ago when I saw him reading a note, which an aide had handed him over to inform that Ayub Khan had taken over the administration in Pakistan. Nehru interrupted the proceedings to announce the advent of "naked military dictatorship" in the neighbouring country.
In comparison, Foreign Minister K. Natwar Singh was in attendance when General Than Shew, heading the military junta, visited India at the invitation of the Manmohan Singh government.
Coincidence has it that when Shwe was receiving the guard of honour in New Delhi, the Burmese media hands outside Myanmar were meeting in Thailand to double their efforts to restore democracy in their country. They were rededicating themselves to the leadership of Suu Kyi, who has been under one form of detention or another for the last 15 years.
Natwar Singh was at least frank enough to admit at The Hindustan Times meet that no government had added even a comma to Nehru's policy. New Delhi could have given it another dimension. Natwar Singh joined Indian foreign service in 1953 and had the privilege of serving Nehru for 11 years.
But very little of that has got rubbed on him. Former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee gave a new edge to foreign policy when he took an initiative on Indo-Pakistan relations.
Even the present government concedes the break through which came after the joint statement between Vajpayee and President General Pervez Musharraf on January 6, 2004. But the new government is receding into the same old mould.
Otherwise, President Musharraf's proposals, however limited, would not have been given a cold reception. Making them a basis for the talks on Kashmir may push things forward, particularly when New Delhi is not making any headway in its meeting with the Hurriyat leaders.
New Delhi rationalizes its support to the military regime on the ground that ULFA, the militant Nagas and those from Manipur can be easily smashed by Myanmar in the north where they have taken shelter.
But where our foreign policy is failing the most is in the compromise we are making on principles. A democratic government looks odd when it yields to dictatorships for some crumbs of convenience. Self-interest is understandable but not at the expense of the values we hold dear.
Nehru would have acted differently on the stand India has taken on Myanmar. In fact, the Indians and the Burmese were jointly fighting for independence from the British. Why have we turned our back on Suu Kyi? The betrayal of democratic forces she represents is betrayal of principles.
Seeking help from the military junta in Myanmar may be a weighty consideration from the governance point of view. But it is only the rationalization of an unprincipled foreign policy.
It reflects lack of commitment. If we can make Bangladesh realize through talks the futility of giving shelter to the anti-Indian elements, why can't we deal with Myanmar's military junta in the same manner?
Begum Khalida Zia's government has not responded to our repeated requests not to give shelter to the militants operating in the north-east. Our protest should be not to invite her to Delhi for an official visit. Our foreign policy was stained when we invited the military head of Myanmar to tour India. By offering him technology to upgrade his country's obsolete air fleet, we would be seen suppressing the pro-democratic forces.
Nepal is yet another example of our preference for authoritarianism. We support monarchy against democracy. One need not agree with all that the Maoists are doing but they are waging a struggle aimed at ending the kingship and establishing a genuine democracy. New Delhi can play a role but not until it is seen as honest broker by the opponents of monarchy.
Understandably, Natwar Singh is not a visionary like Nehru. But he can at least take a principled stand which befits a democratic country like India. It cannot ride two horses at the same time. One thing that India can do to revive the confidence in its policy is to resurrect the Non-Aligned Movement and redefine its role.
And this could be to develop NAM into a force against hostilities anywhere, in any shape. If one were to look back one would realize that the cold war was a corollary to the maintenance of the status quo between the two blocs. NAM was a help.
The revived NAM will have to emphasize that violence cannot possibly lead to a solution of any major problems because violence has become much too terrible and destructive.
If the society we aim at cannot be brought about by big-scale violence, will small-size violence help? Surely it will not, partly because that itself may lead to a big-scale violence and partly because it produces an atmosphere of conflict and disruption.
It is absurd to imagine that out of conflict the socially progressive forces will emerge as victorious. In Germany, both the communist party and the social democracy policy were swept away by Hitler.
This may well happen again if violence is not outlawed. The victory of President Bush in America is ominous. But if he were to pursue a policy of peace and conciliation - something not in line with his style of functioning - people all over the world can look forward to a secure and peaceful future.
The basic thing for India, I believe, is that wrong means will not lead to right results. Helping the military regime in Myanmar and monarchy in Nepal are palpably wrong.
The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.
Some changes likely in US policies
The re-election of President George W. Bush for a second term has not gone down well internationally, since his arrogance, and unilateralism, on the basis of America's military predominance had alienated informed public opinion in most parts of the world. It is necessary, however, to look into the causes of his victory, when most of the intellectual establishment in the US also disapproved of his style and direction.
In the assessments made immediately after his re-election, his success has been attributed to two factors. First, he had exploited the trauma that has persisted in the US since the 9/11 attack, which was the first major aggression against the US mainland. Bush and the neocons around him continued to play on the fear factor, by painting a scary picture of the threat posed by Islamic extremists.
The terrorist incidents that punctuated the three years since 9/11 confirmed the fears, and public opinion within the US remained supportive of Bush as a leader who had performed well in the war against terrorism. The security alerts announced from time to time helped to maintain the scare, and the average American gave Bush a high rating in his handling of the war against terror.
The second factor, which was perhaps decisive in his election, was the support he enjoyed from hard-core Christians. During his first term, he had adopted positions on some key issues that polarized opinion within the country. His position on the question of abortion was based on the Christian dogma of right to life.
On the issue of gay marriages, he took a firm stand against same sex marriage, as well as on the amendment the liberals advocated in the Constitution, to legalize gay marriages. On the first issue, he won the firm support of evangelical Christians, while there was widespread support from the Catholics on the issue of gay marriages.
In his post-election press conference, he claimed that the electorate had given him a vote of confidence on his domestic and foreign policies. Does this mean that his policies during the second term would be a continuation of those he had followed during his first term? If he has registered the strength of popular feeling against the war on Iraq, or taken cognizance of the growing isolation of a unilateralist America in the world, he may well make some adjustments in his policies during his second term.
There are likely to be some far-reaching changes in his domestic policy that would show recognition of certain weaknesses during the first term. For instance, efforts to bring down the budgetary deficit and to prevent outsourcing of jobs to other countries are likely to have a high priority.
Though the latest figures for job creation, 337,000 additional openings, are considered to be highly encouraging, the jobless rate went up, as a much larger number of candidates for employment entered the job market.
Similarly, a stricter watch will be kept over the budget, one means to affect economies being to reduce the number of troops deployed abroad. This also may mean lower recourse to pre-emption.
For the rest of the world, the subject of direct interest will be his foreign policy. By now, he has had four years of experience, and maybe ready to make some changes of style, if not of substance.
He has already announced his intention of communicating with friends and allies before taking decisions that affect them. One would hope that the influence of neo-conservatives, who are guiding American foreign policy, will gradually go down.
One would have to wait for the changes he makes in his cabinet to see whom he leaves out. Defence Secretary Rumsfeld is expected to be a likely dropout, owing to the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq.
Some US analysts expect the influence of the elder Bush to grow, because a large number of commentators wrote about his restraint and cooperation with allies. Having won a second term, unlike his father, the younger Bush may be more concerned now with his place in history.
He was asked specifically about his reaction to the statement by Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, that the most urgent problem to address was that of Palestine. He reiterated his commitment to a two-state solution, and to create a viable Palestinian state.
Washington would have to exert considerable pressure on Sharon, instead of backing him. The end of the Arafat era may facilitate a more pro-active role by the US to implement the roadmap.
It has been constantly stressed by Muslim intellectuals that the underlying cause of the hostility towards the US in the Islamic world is the total support extended by Washington to Israel, even when extremists like Ariel Sharon have adopted unreasonable and aggressive policies.
Eisenhower was the last president who adopted a fair and principled position, when he disapproved of the 1956 Anglo-French Aggression, together with Israel against Egypt, following Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal.
Since then, the Zionist lobby in the US has established such a firm grip through the America-Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) that there has been total political and military backing to the Jewish state.
The position of the Palestinians has been constantly eroded, and Israel has progressively expanded its settlements, and violated accords reached even with US backing, such as at Madrid in 1993, and Oslo three years later.
The roadmap proposed by Bush in 2002 lies in tatters, as Israel has annexed some 15 per cent of the West Bank by building the so-called security fence. The current Intifada by the Palestinians was a direct consequence of Sharon's arrogant sacrilege of the Al Aqsa mosque in 1999.
The most effective way to fight "terrorism" which for the Palestinians is a struggle for their rights guaranteed in UN resolutions is to enforce a just and fair settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Bush is expected to persevere in pacifying Iraq, to enable elections in January 2005. A major operation has been launched against the forces controlling Fallujah. Some 125,000 Iraqis are being trained to take over the main responsibility for security, and some of them have been utilized in the Fallujah operation.
Bush would like to withdraw the bulk of US forces from Iraq over the next year or so, in the expectation that the UN-supervised elections would be followed by the arrival of forces from Islamic and other countries such as India, to back up reconstruction activity under UN management.
Will the Bush doctrine of pre-emption continue as the main strategy in the war against terror? While he is unlikely to renounce it formally, there is a general expectation that Bush would now use a combination of threats and pressure through the UN, instead of acting unilaterally.
The operations against Al Qaeda will continue, and US involvement in Afghanistan is likely to persist, with increased attention to reconstruction once Karzai is formally installed. Operations against warlords may be stepped up.
What will be the impact of the Bush victory on US-Pakistan relations? During his first term, the government of President Pervez Musharraf has not only established a good equation with his administration, but has won high praise for the resolve displayed in apprehending terrorists, including the operation launched in the tribal area.
Implementation of various agreements will, therefore, continue as before particularly in case of the economic package of three billion dollars and the supply of military equipment. The US role in backing the resumed dialogue between Pakistan and India will also continue.
While there is a bright outlook for government-to-government relations with the US, the popular feeling in Pakistan is following the same pattern as in most other Islamic countries.
There is resentment against the total US support to Israel even in its use of brute force and violation of human rights. If Bush does use his influence to promote a fair settlement in Palestine, the US image will improve. The US role on the Kashmir issue, when it comes up for substantive discussion, will also influence public opinion in Pakistan.
The overall impact of the first four years of Bush was negative, on account of his unilateralism, arrogance and virtual contempt for the UN, on the basis of the overwhelming military superiority and economic clout of the sole superpower.
He is aware that the US has a serious image problem, and even close allies including European countries disown both the style and substance of his administration. Though Tony Blair has remained faithful, over 80 per cent of the British people disapprove of Bush.
The veteran Chinese statesman, and former deputy prime minister, Qien Qichen, was openly critical of the war against Iraq that had adversely affected the global security environment.
Taking all this into account, and the remarks the jubilant victor made in his first press conference after re-election, there is hope that he will seek to project a softer image of the sole superpower.
He pledged to advance the cause of democracy, which he believes is the best antidote to terrorism. He also promised to maintain closer interaction with friends and allies.
While the continuing fear and insecurity created by the 9/11 attack require deterrent action against terrorism, the real antidote to extremism and violence is to address injustice, both political and economic.
The values the US championed after the Second World War, and specially the role envisaged for the UN hold the key to peace and development in the world as a whole. Bush has the challenge, as well as the opportunity, to make a correction in the role of the world's most powerful country.