July 7, 2003	Monday	Jumadi-ul-Awwal 6,1424

The ongoing dispute about Greater Thal Canal is the culmination of the deep distrust with which Sindh perceives all water-related projects initiated by the Punjab and the federal governments.

Its experience is that major decisions are taken without taking Sindh into confidence which always results in reduced water share for the province.

For example, a most harmful decision was taken by the West Punjab government immediately after partition when its secretary—cum-chief engineer (irrigation), agreed to the removal of irrigation assets from the agenda of Division of Assets Committee. When the life of the committee ended, India shutdown water flowing into Punjab canals.

In a rush of panic, the then finance minister Ghulam Muhammed, along with two ministers from Punjab, Shaukat Hayat Khan and Mumtaz Daultana, dashed to India and committed the second, and much bigger, mistake of agreeing to pay money to get the water released, establishing India’s right to the rivers Sutlej, Beas and Ravi.

Chaudry Muhammed Ali, in his book, ‘The Emergence of Pakistan’ on page 319 says: “Despite the fact that the Radcliffe Award had placed the control of the head works vital for Pakistan in the hands of India, the West Punjab government remained content because of the agreement reached by Committee B and the Punjab Partition Committee, that the pre-partition shares of water would not be varied. No formal document specifying the precise shares of East Punjab and West Punjab in irrigation waters was drawn up and signed.

The West Punjab ministers and officials felt assured by the repeated declarations of their counterparts in East Punjab that there was no question of any change in the pre-partition arrangements for canal waters. Actually, as events showed, East Punjab ministers and officials were planning a deadly blow against Pakistan. They were waiting for the day when the life of the Arbitral Tribunal (AT) would come to an end. On the side of East Punjab there was Machiavellian duplicity, on the part of West Punjab there was neglect of duty, complacency, and lack of common prudence - which had disastrous consequences for Pakistan.

On April 1,1948, the day after the Arbitral Tribunal ceased to exist, the East Punjab government cut off water supplies in every canal crossing into Pakistan. These consisted of the Central Bari Doab canal system, the Dipalpur canal system, and the Bahawalpur state distributary. Of this action, Sir Patrick Spens, Chairman of the AT, said on February 23, 1955:

‘I remember very well suggesting whether it was not desirable that some order should be made about the continued flow of water. But we were invited by both the Attorney-Generals [of India and Pakistan] to come to our decision on the basis that there would be no interference whatsoever with the then existing flow of water. I am going to say nothing more about it except that I was very much upset that almost within a day or two there was grave interference with the flow of water on the basis of which our awards had been made.”

In fact, the politicians and officials of Punjab had already decided to sell Sutlej, Beas and Ravi to India. Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan, in his book The Nation that lost its soul, confesses to this dreadful crime. On page 203 he says that as a member of the Division of Assets Committee, they (himself, Sheikh Abdul Hameed, and Chief Secretary Punjab Hafiz Abdul Majeed) discussed the division of water among themselves and “came to the conclusion that even if we took this problem to the AT and got a favourable decision, how were we going to get it implemented when the head works had been unfairly allotted to India. Therefore we decided that we should find a via media to share the expenses of running the Head Works and part of the canal system located in East Punjab.”. Much later, in 1960, this enormous crime was regularized through Indus Water Treaty, when the three rivers were sold to India for $475 million.

From perpetrator of the grave mistake, the government of Punjab turned victim when it bitterly complained before Fazle Akbar Commission, in 1971, that India only had 6 per cent canal irrigated area of Indus Basin but was given 20 per cent (33 MAF) water of the three eastern rivers in the Treaty.

A few things should be carefully noted in this ghastly affair. 1) For inexplicable reasons irrigation assets were removed from the agenda of Division of Assets Committee and the Arbitral tribunal. 2) Strangely, no formal document specifying the precise shares of East and West Punjab in irrigation waters was drawn and signed. Everything was kept verbal. 3) The West Punjab team felt that they had a strong case but chose to pay rather than fight. At what level was this decision taken? 4) No stay order was obtained even when offered by the Chief Justice of India. 5) No one was penalized for “neglect of duty, complacency and lack of common prudence”. In fact, Sheikh Abdul Hameed went on to become the senior member of the seven member delegation, all from Punjab, who signed the disastrous Indus Water Treaty . 6) Not one representative from the other two riparians, Sindh and Bahawalpur state, were included in any negotiations, anywhere.

To any neutral observer it would seem that Sindh, co-owner of the waters of Indus and its tributaries, was condemned unheard. The officials of East and West Punjab ganged up to eliminate Sindh as a party to the dispute and under the opportunity presented by military rule and One Unit, divided the water among themselves.

The $475 million, obtained in the name of replacement works, were all spent in Punjab building Mangla Dam, three barrages, eight link canals crisscrossing entire central Punjab and sinking 15,000 tube wells. Not one penny was spent in Sindh. Only in NWFP Tarbela Dam was constructed.

Hitherto Sindh-Punjab Draft Agreement, 1945, was the basis of water sharing between the two provinces which allocated 48.33 MAF to Punjab and 48.74 MAF to Sindh from 103 MAF total. But now that water was brought nearer to vast tracts of fresh land in Punjab, increased allocations became necessary. Therefore in the 1991 Water Accord a new basis, the actual use of water by each province in the period 1977-82, was fixed and Punjab’s allocation was enhanced to 55.94 MAF while Sindh’s share remained 48.76 MAF. Sindh bitterly complained that it was never given funds to develop water usage like Punjab, but to no avail. It lost its share of water from the sold rivers and in the development through the Indus Water Treaty funds.

Greater Thal Canal is yet another crime against Sindh. The basis of 1991 Water Accord was the 1977-82 actual average usage in 10 daily blocks. There was no Greater Thal Canal in 1977-82. Hence, there could not have been actual usage of the canal in that period. But when Punjab presented its 10 dailies, Greater Thal Canal was sneaked in the list. Sindh objected and, as usual, Punjab prevaricated till opportunity arose under General Musharraf’s military government to regularize the injustice. The canal is being built “on war footing” to present it as fait accompli.

There are recognized international laws governing division of water between riparian states. Even Pakistan’s Constitution accords special guarantees under Article 155 to riparians. One internationally recognized legal point is that on the same river the irrigation projects built first have more right than the ones completed later. Chashma-Jehlum and Taunsa-Punjnad link canals are constantly drawing water away from Indus towards Punjnad and Islam Barrages when Sindh barrages, on Indus Main, face acute shortage of water.

People of Sindh keep complaining about this injustice but, again, to no avail. Another internationally recognized law is that an upper riparian has no right to draw water from a common river until and unless lower riparians give their consent.

The elected representative of the people of Sindh have recently passed unanimous resolutions twice against Greater Thal Canal. Outside the Assembly, whole Sindh is seething. Nine major political parties have recently joined hands in an Anti-Greater Thal Canal Action Committee.

Sindh’s argument against Greater Thal Canal, or any other mega water project, is very simple that there is not enough water in the system for another dam or canal. The quantum of water flowing in Indus River System is very erratic. The highest flow, recorded in 1959-60 was 187 MAF whereas the lowest recorded was 91 MAF in 2001. With such wildly erratic flows, planning mega projects on average flows is either pure deception or yet another mistake of Herculean proportions.

Common sense, international criteria and even Wapda’s recommendations demand 80 per cent, or four out of five years, availability for mega projects. The average for the last 80 years may be about 135 MAF but four out of five years water availability is only 123 MAF. If the 1991 Accord allocates 117.35 MAF to provinces and at least 10 MAF needs to flow downstream Kotri for the health of Indus Delta there is no water for storage or for another canal.

The last four year’s flows best illustrate Sindh’s objections. The total water in the system was 117.5 MAF (1999), 96.5 MAF (2000), 91 MAF (2001) and 111 MAF (2002). If there was a Greater Thal Canal and two million acres were under plough, would the owners sit home for four years or would they force the gates of Greater Thal canal open, much as was done with Chashma-Jehlum? And what will happen if 10 or 20 years from now a dam is built on river Kabul inside Afghanistan, as one day it must? The consequences for Sindh will be horrific.

In the eyes of the people of Sindh the only solution to the dispute is to shift emphasis from development to conservation of water resources. Money should be spent on modernizing Pakistan’s creaking irrigation network and lining all watercourses, minors and canals passing through Sindh and southern Punjab where the underground water is very saline saving enormous quantity of water rather than build a Rs30 billion project that Sindh will never allow.