Greater Thal Canal: way out?

THE growing protest in Sindh against the non-availability of water from the Indus and the Greater Thal Canal — as symbolized in two resolutions by the Sindh Assembly — exposes the government’s inability to resolve an issue that has been simmering between the two federating units for many years.

The dispute over the use of the Indus waters between Sindh and Punjab goes back to the mid-19th century, but the recent flare-up is due to the fact that for many people in Sindh, it has become a matter of life and death. The first signs of the devastating effects of the growing scarcity of water have already appeared in the form of the incursion of the Arabian Sea, which has intruded 140km into the delta region and ruined about 2.1 million acres of fertile land and led to the forced migration of a majority of the delta’s 1.7 million people.

The situation aggravated when in the early 1980s, Punjab began planning to draw most of the Indus water, which, according to it, was flowing unused in huge quantities into the sea downstream of Kotri. In 1985, the Punjab governor asked provincial authorities to carry out the Greater Thal Project. He did not seek the approval of the other provinces, although this was mandatory and was done in 1948 when the BRB Canal was dug. As the move became known, the Sindh government complained to the secretary to the Pakistan government for onward transmission to the World Bank. The complaint hit the right chord and the Punjab government had to apologize from the Sindh government and put the project in cold storage.

But the plan was not abandoned. When the Nawaz Sharif government came to power, the project was brought out again, but by this time the country had been hit by water shortages and Sindh and Punjab had divergent views on it. After the failure of many water commissions to resolve the issue, finally a Water Apportionment Accord was unanimously signed on March 16, 1991, which allocated the total 114.35 million acre feet (maf) of water available among the four provinces. Punjab got 55.96maf, while Sindh was given 46.76maf water. According to this accord, it was agreed that the provinces could undertake new water projects from their share without disturbing the other provinces’ share (clause 8). A clause in the accord also said the allocation for Sindh and NWFP would include water for urban and industrial uses for Karachi Metropolitan (Sindh) and unguaged civil canals above the rim stations of the NWFP.

One clause (clause 7) specially mentioned the needs of downstream Kotri to save the Indus delta and prevent the sea’s incursion. It clearly says: “The need for certain minimum escapages to sea, below Kotri, to check the intrusion was recognized. Sindh held the view that the optimum level was 10maf, which was discussed at length, while other studies indicated lower/higher figures. It was, therefore, decided that further studies should be undertaken to establish the minimal escapage needs downstream Kotri.”

This clause clearly recognized the needs of deltaic life and environment which could be in the vicinity of around 10maf. But the stipulation was flouted from the day it was signed, first by altering the text of the 1991 accord in 1994 through a cabinet meeting held at Lahore and, second, by controlling the source head of Indus water. It was alleged that Sindh’s share was being stolen. The figures of discharge downstream Kotri during the past three years are sufficient to prove the fact. These are: year 2000-01 — 2.7maf; 2001-02 — 1.4maf and 2002-03 — 201maf.

The result is that out of 3.697 million acres of arable land in the Thatta and Badin districts, 1.2 million acres or 33 per cent have been submerged by seawater. In addition, there has been huge environmental damage. Almost all fresh water lakes have turned into ponds of sea water.

In June 2001, when growers raised a hue and cry and staged a protest demonstration on the Sindh-Punjab junction of the national highway, they were fired upon and two growers were killed. Taking a serious view of the situation in March 2002, the president convened a meeting to sort out the issue. At the meeting the president ordered certain remedial measures, but the meeting was told that work on the Greater Thal Canal had already started. This could have been considered a legitimate project if it did not affect the rights of Sindh but it was felt that it was not approved by the appropriate authority. Secondly, it was first said in 1991 that it would be a flood canal with a capacity of 4,700 cusecs and would be operational for 40 days only during inundation season without affecting the needs of Sindh. But after 10 years it was remodelled to carry 8,500 cusecs of water which could be increased to 15,000 cusecs. Its cost of construction is estimated at Rs 30.40 billion and it will be able to irrigate 2.0 million acres.

Keeping in view the past history of over 150 years, this development was bound to create apprehensions in the minds of the people of Sindh who have been witnessing a drought-like situation for over four years. Today, when the flow of water downstream Kotri is zero, the sea has advanced up to Thatta bridge, destroying 18 discharge channels of the Indus delta and pushing the people living on fresh water resources into untold miseries, besides adversely affecting 90 per cent of the ecology.

In the present chaotic situation, there can be more than one solution — technical and political. But one fact has to be borne in mind, that legal obligations have to be fulfilled. Accordingly, construction of the disputed Greater Thal Canal must be stopped and work allowed to resume only after a consortium of neutral legal and technical experts have found it feasible. Then, all provinces should follow the accords they have reached, and an independent and honest mechanism be evolved to oversee the judicious use of water according to the agreements entered into by all the beneficiaries.

However, even if all these requirements are met, the fact remains that we do not have enough water to run the present canal networks. Building the Greater Thal Canal in Punjab or the Renni Canal in Sindh will not make any difference until we have made water available for the existing waterworks. This has to be evaluated judiciously without bias. If the people of Sindh do not get their rightful share of water, they are bound to agitate, and if a unanimously adopted resolution of the Sindh assembly on Thal does not get even a moment’s attention at the federal level, street protests will only gather force.