ABDULLAH HAROON, whom the nation remembers today on his sixty-first death anniversary, was a multi-faceted personality. His role, spanning some 28 years of private enterprise and some 29 years of public life, was truly multi-dimensional. Thus, during his chequered career, he was, at one time or another, a successful business magnate, an entrepreneur, a committee man, an organizer, a philanthropist, founder of several educational, religious and social institutions, a visionary and a leader of outstanding merit.

Once he had established himself in business and became involved in social causes calling for immediate attention, he was drawn into politics. In this too his motive was the uplift of the poor, backward masses. This cause led him to take up the cause of the separation of Sindh from Bombay Presidency.

At the All India Muslim League (AIML) session in Aligarh (1925), he demanded a resolution on Sindh’s separation; at the Leaders’ Conference in Delhi (1926), he moved a resolution on the issue; and from 1928 onwards, he argued against the financial solvency requirement for the separation of Sindh stipulated in the Nehru Report (1928). He served as secretary, Sindh Financial Inquiry Committee (1930-35); was a member of Sindh Administrative Committee (1933) and Sindh Delimitation Committee (1935).

He also chaired the reception committee of the second session of the Sindh Azad Conference (1934), an organization set up to counter the continuing Hindu propaganda and pressure against setting up Sindh as a separate province. Of all the Muslim leaders of Sindh, Abdullah Haroon was the foremost in making an impact on the all-India mainstream politics.

Abdullah Haroon’s debut in all-India politics came in 1917 when he joined the National Congress. From 1918, he was closely associated with the Khilafat movement. He was president of the Sindh Provincial Khilafat Committee for five years (1919-24). He made his house available as a centre for Khilafat activities, and for visiting all-India Khilafat leaders, including Maulana Mohammed Ali and Bi Amma. He contributed generously to Khilafat coffers. In recognition of his services, he was elected president of the All-India Central Khilafat Committee in 1928.

The 1920s also witnessed his entry into electoral politics and mainstream Muslim politics. In 1923 he contested and won a seat in the Bombay Legislative Council, and in 1926 in the Indian Legislative Assembly, which he retained till his death in 1942. In 1920, he was elected president of the Sindh provincial Muslim League, and from 1925 onwards he was active in the AIML. Beginning with 1929, he was also prominent in the All India Muslim Conference which was set up as an umbrella organization to counter the Nehru Report; he became its secretary, and later president in 1925. All through these years he worked tirelessly for its amalgamation with the AIML, with a view to bringing about solidarity in Muslim ranks.

The most remarkable thing about Abdullah Haroon was that he had the vision and the imagination to see the problems of Sindhi Muslims in an all-India context and to establish a linkage between the Sindhi Muslims and the wider Indian Muslim community. The only other Sindhi leader who shared this honour with him was Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, who had participated in the Cawnpore mosque agitation (1913), and the Khilafat movement.

Not only in the provincial context but also in the wider regional context, Abdullah Haroon’s impact on all-India politics was impressive. Indeed, in the region now constituting Pakistan, his contacts with all-India leaders and his involvement with all-India Muslim politics were only next to that of Mian Muhammad Shafi, who was involved in Muslim politics since the days of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. Abdullah Haroon was president of at least six all-India conferences and bodies — All India central Khilafat Committee (1928), all-India Tanzim Conference, Allahabad, (1930); all-India Postal and RMS Union (1931); all-India Memon Conference (1935); all-India Muslim Conference (1935), and all-India Seerat Conference, Allahabad (1942).

However, his role in the Muslim League from 1937 onwards surpassed everything else he did in his entire political career. In that year, he undertook the task of organizing the League in the province. In 1938, he organized the First Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference in Karachi, with himself as chairman, reception committee. In 1939, he was elected president of the Sindh Provincial Muslim League, and also became chairman, AIML Foreign Sub-Committee; in 1940 he was nominated member of the AIML Working Committee; in 1941 he presided over the Punjab Muslim Students Conference at Lyallpur (now Faisalabad); in the same year he secured the Manzilgah Mosque in Sukkur on behalf of the Muslim League as its president.

Among these, however, the first Sindh provincial Muslim League Conference in October 1938 represented his most important contribution in channelling the course of Indo-Muslim politics. though a provincial moot, it was not only presided over by Jinnah, but was participated in by a galaxy of Muslim leaders, including the premiers of Bengal and Punjab, Liaquat Ali Khan, Bahadur Yar Jung, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Begum Mohammed Ali, Raja of Mahmudabad, Raja of Pirpur, Maulana Jamal Mian of Farangi Mahal, Syed Ghulam Bhik Nairang, Maulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni, and Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani. Haroon’s welcome address set the tone for the conference: it was radical and militant; it commended an ideological goal. Unless adequate safeguards and protection for minorities were duly provided, he argued, the Muslims would have no alternative but “to seek their salvation in their own way in an independent federation of Muslim states.”

He drew a parallel with Czechoslovakia which had been partitioned to provide safeguards to Sudetan Germans, and warned that the same might happen in India should the majority community persist in its “present course”, saying, “We have nearly arrived at the parting of the ways and until and unless this problem is solved to the satisfaction of all, it will be impossible to save India from being divided into Hindu India and Muslim India, both placed under separate federations.

The tone was as radical as the perception was penetrating. No one had spoken from the League’s platform in such a strain before. In contrast, Jinnah, who spoke next, was characteristically mild and moderate. Yet he could not help getting infected by Haroon’s tone and tenor. At two different places, he made somewhat vague references to the Sudetan German case, and to the Congress trying to create “a serious situation which will break India vertically and horizontally”, warning the Congress to “mark, learn and inwardly digest” the lessons provided by Sudetan German. Fazlul Haq and Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, who followed Jinnah, also made fighting speeches.

In a more pronounced way was the main resolution at the conference cast in the Haroon’s mould. Though diluted in the subjects committee deliberations at the insistence of Jinnah himself who was characteristically not too keen to show his hand prematurely before Muslims were fully organized and public opinion galvanized behind the ideological goal, the resolution yet retained enough of its clout to become a pace-setter and a forerunner of 1940 Pakistan Resolution.

For one thing, as against the Lucknow (1937) League resolution, it outlined a common position by Muslim leadership in the majority and minority provinces. The Lucknow League had lambasted the Congress for its totalitarianism — for exclusion of Muslims from the portals of power in the Hindu-majority provinces — and for its blatant Hindu bias in administration, in its education, social, cultural and linguistic policies, but it was silent on the Congress’ machinations in the Muslim majority provinces.

This the Sindh Conference focused on, along with the Congress’ conduct in the Hindu provinces. Thus, the resolution charged that the Congress “has in open defiance of the democratic principles persistently endeavoured to render the power of the Muslim majorities ineffective and impotent in the North Western Provinces, Bengal, the Punjab and Sindh by trying to bring into power or by supporting coalition ministries not enjoying the confidence of the majority of Muslim members and the Muslim masses of these provinces.”

This conjunction of interests of the Muslim majority and minority provinces represents a milestone in evolving a common goal for the entire Muslim community and towards enunciating the concept of Muslim nationhood. The resolution argued the case of separate Muslim nationhood, not merely in terms of transient factors as “the caste-ridden mentality and anti-Muslim policy of the majority community”, but, more importantly, in terms of durable factors such as “the acute differences of religion, language, script, culture, social laws and outlook on the life of the two major communities and even of race in certain parts.”

Thus, the concept of separate Muslim nationhood was spelled out not merely in political and immediate terms, but on an intellectual plane, setting out the basic constituents of that nationhood. Equally significant, this was also the first time that the Hindus and Muslims were officially pronounced by the Muslim League as two distinct “nations.”

In the historical perspective, this resolution became the precursor of the Lahore Resolution of 1940.

IN an earlier article I had offered the view that Mr Nawaz Sharif’s exclusion from politics might work out well both for him and for the country. The same does not, however, hold for his brother, Shahbaz Sharif.

General Musharraf, and others speaking for him, have said repeatedly that Shahbaz Sharif cannot be allowed back into Pakistan because he is a party to an agreement that provided for the Sharifs’ residence in Saudi Arabia for a period of ten years. This is apparently not an agreement between the two governments, or one between the government of Pakistan and the Sharifs, but an undertaking given by the Sharifs to the Saudis and signed by Nawaz, Shahbaz, and two younger members of the family.

Nawaz was the only one of the Sharifs who had actually been convicted of a crime. He was granted a presidential pardon (by Rafiq Tarar), released from prison, and sent away. There may have been accusations of wrongdoing against some of the others, but no formal charges were framed and placed before a court of law. These other family members would seem to have been told that in case they did not agree to leave and stay away, Mr Nawaz Sharif would not be pardoned and let out.

On closer scrutiny the transaction will probably be found to have been unlawful. For surely the government of Pakistan had no authority to take away, and Nawaz Sharif had none to barter away, the rights and liberties of those members of the family who were not signatories to any agreement, and against whom no charges, or even accusations, of wrongdoing had been made: for instance, the wives of Nawaz and Shahbaz (Kulsum and Nusrat), their daughters, and minor children. The threat that Nawaz Sharif would not be pardoned and released unless they agreed to accompany him into exile amounted to nothing less than blackmail, a modus operandi wholly unbecoming those who had vowed to uphold the law.

It is clear that any undertaking the Sharifs gave the Saudi authorities can be enforced only in Saudi Arabia, and that it can have no standing in the courts of Pakistan or any other country. If Kulsum, for instance, were to appear at the Lahore airport one morning, and if the government stopped her at the immigration counter, and sent her right back, she could probably sue the government in an appropriate Pakistani court, and I doubt that the government could come up with a maintainable defence of its action. Let us now come to the issue of Shahbaz Sharif’s exclusion from politics. He has neither been convicted, nor is he currently charged with, any crime.

General Musharraf says he won’t let Shahbaz in because his declarations of intent to return are calculated to destabilize the present government. If that is the general’s resolve, the possibility that the man may be innocent of any crime will not be allowed to stand in the way. All of our governments, democratic and dictatorial alike, have been adept at fabricating bogus criminal cases against targeted individuals. But why stoop to such tactics when, given the sad state of Shahbaz Sharif’s own party, he is not really capable of posing a threat to the general’s career or tranquillity.

In a private conversation at a friend’s house on April 5, I asked Mr Shahbaz Sharif how he planned to deal with the general’s opposition to his resumption of an active political role in Pakistan. He said he had no intention of mounting a confrontation with the general. He would pursue the politics of reconciliation; let rancour subside and divisions heal; he would invite all concerned to “forgive and forget,” “live and let live.”

He would work to bring the various PML factions back together; he would promote national solidarity by conciliating ethnic and sectarian groups with one another. He did not say so specifically, but I received the distinct impression from the tenor of his speech that he did not preclude the possibility of working with-rather than against-General Musharraf.

Is this opportunistic rhetoric? That is possible but not likely. If he were allowed to return and rebuild his political base, would he start agitating on behalf of his brother, Nawaz Sharif? He says he is not his brother’s keeper or agent. In case he begins to annoy the general to an unacceptable degree, we can be sure that the present government will find ways of putting him out of commission quickly enough.

Why not let Shahbaz Sharif be where he is? My own tentative assessment is that our political system would profit from his participation. Good political leaders-those who combine personal integrity and professional competence in their political baggage-are clearly in short supply. How does Mr Shahbaz Sharif fare on these scores?

Is he incorruptible? We have not had one of those in our politics since the passing away of Mr Jinnah. Would he make good company, in this regard, with one or more of the prime ministers during our first parliamentary regime-let us say, H.S. Suhrawardy or Firoz Khan Noon, who may have done a favour to a friend or neighbour now and then, bent the rules a bit here and there, but did nothing blatantly corrupt? I think he would, and one may say that in the wider context of probity he would probably rank higher than many of our rulers, past and present. By no manner or means can he be considered lily-white, irreproachable. But nor can it be said that any violations one may place at his door would add up to scandalous breaches of public morality. In plainer language, his record suggests that he is a reasonably decent guy.

Let us now turn to the other ingredient of good leadership, namely, competence. His formal education has been satisfactory: high school from the Sacred Heart (a private mission school in Lahore), B.A. in economics and political science from the Government College in Lahore, and a year of post-graduate study in economics. But he seems to have learned a lot beyond his formal education. I found him to be fluent and exceedingly well-spoken in English, Urdu, and Punjabi. Talking with me, he recalled several verses from Iqbal and Ghalib pertinent to the subject under discussion.

I have spoken with scores of Pakistani politicians during the last thirty or more years but I can’t think of any, other than Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, who possessed this kind of proficiency. I don’t know how effective an orator he would be before a crowd of two hundred thousand outside the Mochi Gate in Lahore. But he was probably a forceful and effective speaker on the floor of the Punjab assembly.

Education is relevant, but it does not, ipso facto, make a person a good politician, administrator, or ruler. Let us then take a quick look at his record as the chief minister of Punjab (1997-99). He is generally believed to have been a good handler of men and situations, a firm and capable “captain” in his dealings with his cabinet colleagues, politicians and bureaucrats. Beyond improvements in the infrastructure (parks, roads, bridges, monuments) made in Lahore and some of the other major cities in the province, Shahbaz Sharif is also remembered for other significant accomplishments. At this point I shall limit myself to two departments, namely, education and police.

His government identified and removed from the books many thousands of “ghost” schools, that is, schools which did not exist on the ground but for the construction, maintenance, and operation of which the education department paid out tens of millions of rupees. It fought and disbanded the mafias that had been engineering massive cheating in the intermediate and secondary-level examinations. It introduced a system of entry examinations for admission to medical colleges, advertised the new system on the TV to familiarize potential students with it, abolished the admission quotas for the children of doctors and military officers, stopped the emerging custom of offering admission in exchange for “donations” to the institution concerned.

In the area of law and order, his government increased the monthly salary of the ordinary police constable from Rs. 2,500 to Rs. 4,000 as a step toward eliminating his “need” for bribes to meet his basic needs. Recruitment to the police service on the basis of political considerations was stopped, and a few hundred of the serving political appointees were taken out of the field and posted as “officers on special duty,” with no real work, and therefore no opportunity to do evil.

A couple of measures taken to modernize the police may also be mentioned. A number of forensic and finger-printing labs were established to reduce reliance on crude methods of investigation. An elite force was established, consisting of selected constables and head constables, who were provided with modern weapons. A programme for training them in the use of these weapons was begun at the Sihala police academy.

These were good and solid measures, even if they were not spectacular. They were needed, but neglected by the preceding governments. Shahbaz Sharif deserves to be commended for devising and implementing them.

We in Pakistan are likely to encounter wrong wherever we look in the public domain. Rarely indeed do we have the choice between unblemished good and unmitigated evil. In our world of imperfections we must deal with shades of gray and go with the one that is the least unappealing. We are terribly short of politicians who have even a modicum of competence and probity. Viewed in this context, Shahbaz Sharif may be an asset that we cannot afford to cast away. His readmission to active politics will probably promote the good of the order. General Musharraf urges us to place the national interest above all else. He should re-consider his opposition to Shahbaz Sharif in the larger national interest.

The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA.

E-mail: syed.anwar@attbi.com

THE parliament may weather the current crisis through a give- and-take deal on the Legal Framework Order but the parliamentary system, it seems certain, will remain fragile and its future bleak in the country. The construction of a new political order may be hazardous but now looks inevitable.

The military interventions may be blamed for weakening and corrupting the democratic tradition but the fact remains that the rights of the people, their safety and prosperity were no better protected or guaranteed under free, uninhibited political governments than they were under military regimes or the controlled democracy they introduced.

The fault thus lies not in the generals nor in the politicians but in the parliamentary form of government. The generals are averse to it for, to them, it makes for unstable, irresponsible and intriguing administrations.

The politicians may disagree but, admittedly, they have not been able to cope with its traditions and demands. Torn between the two, the country has been denied the fruits of freedom and economic progress amply reaped by many other countries which became independent at about the same time as Pakistan but enjoyed governments more stable and progressive than Pakistan did. Malaysia and South Korea are just two among them.

The values and traditions of the parliamentary system have reached their nadir in the current phase of the system. Ironically, all the changes General Musharraf made to the Constitution in his three years on the plea of stability and good order have yielded results wholly to the contrary. The parliamentary system foundering from the very beginning now appears close to a collapse.

Musharraf’s motive may not be doubted but his scheme was flawed in its very conception. Piqued by the absolute control he saw Nawaz Sharif exercise as prime minister over the parliament, executive and judiciary, he is seeking to introduce “checks and balances” which are alien to the parliamentary system.

In a parliamentary government the only check on the parliament is exercised by the electorate — the people if they are politically conscious, or by the judiciary if it is independent. If neither is the case (as in fact it is in Pakistan today) the parliamentary democracy cannot work. It cannot be made to work being goaded on by a nominated Security Council or by the sword of dissolution hanging over its head or under the shadow of the army bayonets.

A sad but undeniable fact is that through successive parliamentary governments the parliament in Pakistan has been surrendering its authority to the prime minister, reaching its climax in the second Nawaz Sharif government.

The prime minister made the laws, amended the Constitution, appointed the president of the country for the parliament only to rubberstamp it later. Only a recalcitrant Senate prevented him from becoming the final arbiter of all state actions by refusing to endorse his 15th Amendment (Sharia) Bill. For their safety and advancement the politicians, the public servants and the people looked up not to the Constitution or the courts but to the prime minister.

The absolute dominance of the prime minister signified the failure of the parliamentary institutions. The prime minister is made and sustained by the parliament; instead he became its master. In the cabinet of Pakistan the prime minister was then not the first among equals, as prime ministers are elsewhere in parliamentary governments, but its headmaster.

The unending ruckus in the present parliament and its inability to transact any business or to change the government is also an affirmation of the statement that our legislators, whatever their political or religious persuasion, lack the sophistication and responsibility a parliamentary system requires of them.

All parliamentarians tamely went home or abroad when General Musharraf dissolved the parliament. Many among them abandoned their parties, some even their ideologies, when power was the bait. It is incomprehensible how they disparage the parliament now when they joined it on Musharraf’s terms and still want to remain its part.

The on-going debate on the validity of the Legal Framework Order or more particularly, on the power of the president to dissolve the parliament overlooks the material fact that the parliaments were dissolved even when the president did not have this power. The cause common to all dissolutions, whether perpetrated by the president or the chief of the army, was the impotence of the parliament and the cabinet to restrain an overbearing or adventurous prime minister from becoming a dictator.

The parliament and the cabinet being the pivotal institutions in a parliamentary government, the system cannot be said to be working successfully where both fail to grow and assert their authority.

The remedy therefore lies in making the executive and legislative organs of the government independent of each other and yet exercising effective checks on each other. That can come only through a presidential system.

The president and the governors elected by direct vote of the people — and not dependent on the legislatures for their tenures yet accountable to each other for their actions — would put an end to a relationship of intrigue and mutual blackmail which has marked Pakistan’s parliamentary life all along. To an extent, the presidential system would also satisfy the urge of the provinces to be more autonomous for they would be electing their own chief executives who would be better placed to wrest more rights and powers from the federation than the present nominated or indirectly elected heads.

In this arrangement the president will not have the power nor a reason to dissolve the parliament.

The members of the parliament, in turn, also will not be able to extract a price for their support to sustain him in office. The parliament and the head of government both feeling secure in their tenures should be able to do the job for which they are elected rather than let the army take it over every now and then.