Pyongyang’s talks offer is a trap

WHILE the nation is preparing itself for war with Iraq, a potentially even graver crisis is evolving on the Korean peninsula. The North Korean regime — arguably among the most brutal and repressive in the world — used the occasion of a visit to Pyongyang by the U.S. assistant secretary of State to inform him that it had built a uranium-enrichment plant, betraying an agreement of 1994 to freeze its nuclear programme.

Since that day last October, Pyongyang has renounced its membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and evicted the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It has restarted the plutonium-reprocessing plant at Yongbyon and will within months be able to produce weapons-grade material for a score or more of plutonium weapons a year for its own arsenal and to transfer plutonium to other rogue states or to terrorist groups.

It has coupled these measures with demands for bilateral negotiations with the United States and the United States only. Overtures from the South Korean government have been rejected, and other states have been discouraged from proposing multilateral forums.

Pyongyang is seeking a replay of two sets of negotiations of more than a decade ago. In January, 1991, the first Bush administration brokered a three-cornered arrangement among Seoul, Pyongyang and Washington. Seoul and Pyongyang agreed not to possess, manufacture or use nuclear weapons or engage in plutonium reprocessing and to negotiate a system of North-South nuclear inspections. In January, 1992, the United States withdrew its tactical nuclear weapons from Korea.

Despite this demonstration of goodwill, the negotiated arrangements fell apart almost immediately. Pyongyang refused to admit South Korean inspectors, and it confined international inspectors to admitted nuclear facilities, neatly leaving out the reprocessing plant at Yongbyon, which was the core of our concern. By the end of 1992, North Korea began to harass the IAEA inspectors and, in March, 1993, refused any further IAEA inspections.

After another year of unproductive exchanges and American consideration of bombing the reprocessing facilities, a so-called “framework agreement” was negotiated by the Clinton administration. North Korea was to shut down but not dismantle its plutonium production under international supervision. In return the United States pledged not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea, to build together with Japan and South Korea two light water nuclear plants, and to supply heavy oil for North Korea’s heating and conventional power plants. Pyongyang set out to break the agreement almost immediately with its covert uranium-enrichment programme in 1998. And it maintained its threat of weapons of mass destruction by flying a test missile over Japan.

Given this history, it is difficult to understand why so many nations — even doughty Australia — are urging another round of bilateral U.S.-North Korean negotiations to “solve” a crisis entirely of Pyongyang’s creation.

What Pyongyang says it wants from the United States in return for selling us a standstill agreement a second time is a non-aggression treaty plus demands to be unveiled in the course of the negotiation. The proposal is deceptive on its face. Such a treaty would represent an admission by the United States that it constitutes a special threat requiring a special arrangement.

Pyongyang clearly calculates that, having stigmatized the United States by the fact of the treaty, it can then use it to charge us with violating its provisions. Any American deployment in nearby countries, such as Japan or Korea, any normal troop rotation, or whatever other policies ingenious North Korean diplomacy decides to challenge will become fair game that triggers another round of nuclear blackmail.

A bilateral U.S.-North Korean negotiation involves two further traps. Given the growing nationalism in South Korea, any deadlock will be blamed on the United States, further poisoning South Korean-American relationships. Or else Pyongyang can use bilateral negotiations to emerge as the spokesman of Korean nationalism and to marginalize South Korea as a puppet of the United States.

Tempting the United States into bilateral negotiations would enhance North Korea’s political standing while legitimizing its nuclear status, providing Pyongyang with maximum flexibility with a minimum of obligation. It would create incentives for nuclear proliferation elsewhere; it would bring about a situation where the enforcement of any agreement would be America’s responsibility with none of the neighbouring countries having undertaken any obligation with respect to development that profoundly affects them.

The fundamental fact is that no compromise is possible between a North Korea armed with nuclear weapons and a non-nuclear one. If Pyongyang emerges from this crisis with an unimpaired nuclear and missile capability enhanced by its demonstrated capability of evasion, the door will have been opened to nearly unrestrained global proliferation and to a major challenge to the balance of power in North Asia. The goal of policy must be a non-nuclear Korea.

A key challenge is to determine North Korea’s objectives. Is there some combination of assurance and aid that may induce Pyongyang into a non-nuclear future? Or has North Korea concluded that it must have a nuclear military capability to survive, in which case diplomacy — whether bilateral or multilateral — must fail?

Before drawing such conclusions, it is imperative to involve China, Japan and Russia together with South Korea in an effort to solve the nuclear problem on the peninsula. A denuclearized Korea can be achieved only by confronting Pyongyang with consequences it is unwilling to face. If the United States undertakes this task alone, the likelihood of a military confrontation is magnified because Pyongyang may then count on the opposition of South Korea and the standing aside of China, Japan and Russia to negate our threats.

No country is more directly and perhaps overwhelmingly affected than our ally in South Korea. Through every previous crisis South Korea held fast to the U.S. security alliance and built its own considerable military power in close alliance with ours. But at least since the presidency of Kim Dae Jung starting in 1998, a major change in South Korean priorities has taken place. Seoul went far beyond previous South Korean governments in promoting engagement with the North (the “sunshine policy”). This policy was supported by the Clinton administration. Kim Dae Jung wanted to create a better psychological climate for the security issue by focusing first on so-called soft issues, such as family reunification and economic cooperation.

The new Bush administration analyzed Pyongyang’s strategy correctly, but when it put forward its conclusions bluntly, a rift opened up with the South Korean hopes about the sunshine policy. The recently elected South Korean administration has made this difference explicit and carried it to an extreme. It rejects any hint of military pressure on North Korea by the United States. But in the absence of such a threat, it is difficult to oblige North Korea to act reasonably. Negotiations (bilateral or multilateral) are bound to turn into a catalogue of North Korean demands which, in its present frame of mind, Seoul is likely to embrace at least in part.

Perhaps a majority of South Koreans gives denuclearization of the peninsula a low priority if only because denuclearization of North Korea does not significantly dismiss the threat to Seoul. Leftist groups treat America as the source of tensions; pacifists justify the North Korean programme as a response to American threats; nationalists see in the North Korean programme an affirmation of Korean dignity.

The new South Korean government seems to imagine itself not as an ally but as an intermediary between North Korea and the United States and urges the United States to negotiate a peaceful solution to the North Korean nuclear programme which, coupled with the renunciation of pressure, means acceding to many of Pyongyang’s demands.

But for America and it is hoped the other nations of Asia, non-proliferation is a vital issue. If the South Korean and American objectives prove irreconcilable, the American deployment in Korea becomes a hostage to the North Korean nuclear programme and South Korean politics — a state of affairs incompatible with a healthy U.S.-South Korean security relationship and, in the long run, with American deployment on the Korean peninsula.

A reassessment of the alliance and its strategy is imperative. This requires a more careful analysis of the actual North Korean threat to Seoul. True, Pyongyang has the capacity to do extraordinary damage, but only at the price of its own obliteration. Thus on the Korean peninsula there has been re-created the classic standoff of the cold war. Both sides will shrink from the use of ultimate force. But they will have to find a strategy below this threshold to protect their vital interests. To calculate this threshold correctly becomes one of the tasks of American Korean policy, preferably in alliance with South Korea.

A serious strategy will attempt to counter North Korea’s intransigence and outrageous playing of the nuclear card with a broader multilateral approach addressing the security situation on the Korean peninsula as a whole. Such a course could strive to address the aims of all parties: the nuclear issue, an attempt to end the isolation of North Korea, and economic cooperation. This can only take place within the context of a non-nuclear Korea.

The role of China will be crucial. Beijing cannot be enlisted in this effort by abstract appeals for assistance in a non-proliferation strategy. For China’s interests include the role of North Korea as a buffer on traditional invasion routes and nuclear deployment, not only in Korea but in the rest of Asia.

What is needed is an elaboration of the strategic dialogue that the meetings between the Chinese and American presidents have initiated. The stakes are high.

For if such an understanding proves unachievable, American strategy will inevitably gravitate either to removing the reprocessing plant by force or to a deterrent posture along the periphery of Asia increasingly reliant on nuclear weapons — the kind of world it is in everybody’s interest to avoid.

One way to achieve these goals is by a conference on the security future of the Korean peninsula involving China, Russia, Japan, the two Koreas and the United States. Such a conference could place the North Korean nuclear problem in the context of other concerns by the countries involved. Neither China nor Japan has an interest in a collapse of a North Korean political entity — though the ultimate test of Pyongyang’s survival is to build a more humane set of institutions.

In such a context, all participants could renounce force in changing North Korea’s borders, thereby achieving the non-aggression guarantee Pyongyang professes to seek. It could provide a framework for integrating North Korea into the world economy. It could leave the issue of unification to negotiating between the two Koreas. What it must not do is to ratify nuclear weapons in North Korea.

Time is of the essence. For soon the plutonium production in North Korea will reach a level beyond the capacity of the international system to control by other than military measures.—Dawn/Tribune Media Services

Bush’s Middle East Plan

UNVEILING a bold vision of sweeping changes and restructuring of systems in the region, the US president, George W. Bush, has, for the first time, outlined his plan for a democratic post-war Mideast. Seeking to answer opponents in Europe and the Arab world, who have accused him of rushing to war, Mr Bush, addressing the conservative American Enterprise Institute a few days ago, argued that “a new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom to other nations of the region.”

His message contained an implied warning for the host of the despotic and dynastic Arab governments, including close allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, that unless they changed, they too might be swept away. It is an irony of history that the US president, who once criticized even Mr Clinton’s modest reconstruction efforts in the Balkans, has now come forward with a quixotic reform plan for the Arab world on a scale not witnessed since the Americans rebuilt Japan and Germany after the Second World War.

His critics recall that during his presidential campaign Mr Bush only called for “a humble US foreign policy.” “We must be proud and confident of our values,” he then had stated,” but humble in how we treat nations that are figuring out how to chart their own course”. But all that has changed. The shock of September 11 seems to have brought about a radical transformation. Mr Bush now speaks of remaking the Middle East along the US lines. According to media reports, Washington is of the view that it made a fundamental mistake by putting oil security, the fight against communism and the security of its regional bases over and above the democratic evolution of Middle Eastern countries.

Having arrived at that conclusion, Mr Bush now wants to pursue a wholly new foreign policy in the region that aims at “bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions”, as he put it the other day. This obviously implies changing the political landscape of the whole region. “Bush and his advisers believe they are on the right side of “a growing historical wave”, the Washington Post wrote on February 25, “Within Bush’s inner circle, Iraq represents the intersection of a security threat and a geopolitical opportunity.”

It has not escaped the attention of US policy makers that most of the perpetrators of September 11 tragedy came from a country that has been traditionally friendly towards the United States. The argument is that anti-Americanism has at least partly flourished because of the frustration and resentment that grow when economic opportunity and political freedom do not exist in countries controlled by corrupt and despotic rulers. Washington now reportedly believes that it is not enough to go hunting for “terrorist crocodiles; it must drain the swamp too.”

The Bush critics, however, point out that the Americans have never cared about Middle Eastern democracy before, so why should they take the Bush plan seriously now? To many sceptics Bush’s scheme for a democratic post-war Middle East looks like “outright fantasy”. Also, it is being argued that you cannot impose democracy from above, especially on a society that has no real democratic traditions. The supporters of the plan refer to the democratization of Japan after World War II.

US General Douglas MacArthur successfully built Japan along democratic lines despite the fact that the Japanese society did not have any significant democratic traditions until then. In countries that once gave birth to fascism and militarism, liberty and democracy have found a permanent home.

While explaining his strategy for the post-war Middle East, Mr Bush has interestingly linked the overthrow of Saddam Hussein with the creation of “a truly democratic Palestinian state”. The linkage partly explains the obsession of the Bush administration with the change of regime in Iraq. “The passing of Saddam Hussein’s regime”, argues Mr Bush, “will deprive the terrorist network of a wealthy patron that pays for terrorist training and offers rewards to families of suicide bombers.”

On the Palestinian question too, Mr Bush has revealed his real aim. Not long ago, he faulted his predecessor for devoting too much time and presidential prestige to a failed effort to broker Israeli-Palestinian peace. Now he has even offered his “personal commitment” to achieve “a free, democratic, viable and independent Palestine” alongside Israel.

The thinking in Washington appears to be that solving the Arab-Israeli dispute would remove one of the chief grievances that has helped fuel anti-Americanism in the region which in turn has further complicated the fight against terror. But a closer look at the Bush plan will reveal that the keenness to change the regime in Baghdad is also designed to provide long-term security to Israel.

It would knock out the strongest pillar of the “rejectionist front” — Iraq, Iran and Syria — that has consistently opposed peace with Israel. The head of Israel’s army, Lt. Gen Moshe Yaalon has significantly stated recently that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would set off “a regional earthquake” undermining hardline states and “strengthening” pragmatic elements.

Given Washington’s past reluctance to sufficiently pressure Tel Aviv to reach a just settlement with the Palestinians, will Mr Bush be able to fulfil his “personal commitment” after his victory over Mr Hussein? Does the recent statement of hawkish Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that Israel is ready to make “painful concessions” signify that the creation of an independent Palestinian state is now acceptable to him?

Mr Sharon has recently won a hardline mandate from the Israeli voters and leads a coalition government that includes two extreme right-wing religious parties bitterly opposed to the creation of an independent and viable Palestinian state. Unless Mr Bush is prepared for a real arm-twisting of Israel it is doubtful if the overthrow of Mr Hussein will automatically result in the solution of Palestinian-Israeli problem.

Mr Bush has pledged to bring democracy and freedom to Iraq and has further stated that “all the Iraqis must have a voice in the new government”. But how will he reconcile the basic principle of democracy — rule by the majority — with the desire of his close Arab allies who want the present system to continue in Iraq, after the overthrow of Mr Hussein, to ensure that the Sunni minority continues to rule over the country which has 65 per cent of Shiite population?

Of course, the most important part of the Bush plan relates to changing the political landscape of the whole region. He has given a clear warning to autocratic Arab governments that unless they change and bring about democratic reforms they will be swept away. It is widely believed that if the American-led military action against Iraq goes ahead, Saddam Hussein is not the only leader whose regime will topple in the aftermath of war.

It is significant to note that though officially all the Arab states oppose the war against Iraq, their leaders seem to be trapped between the fear of their people and the fear of the United States. Half a dozen of Arab states have offered their territories as launching pads for the coming onslaught.

And even those who have not (such as Egypt) are deemed to be colluding with the Arab-American war camp.

Another strange phenomenon has been the apathy and lack of concern shown by the vast majority of the Arabs to the coming American invasion of Iraq. While massive demonstrations against the Bush plan have taken place across the globe (even in countries closely allied to the United States) nothing of the sort has occurred in the Arab countries. Even mild public protests have been missing.

Is it because of the ruthless repression with which Arab governments counter any serious manifestation of the popular will? Or is it because the disgust with the existing order is so deep and widespread that many Arabs will actually welcome the collapse of the present system?

Or is the outward calm no measure of the pent-up anger that lies beneath the surface which maybe ignited when the first missile falls on Baghdad? Only the coming days will provide an answer to these agonizing questions.

Sri Lanka: hopes and fears

IT was an inspiring sight in the midst of festivities at Colombo a few days ago. All were there — the prime minister, leaders from the opposition parties, academicians, artists and others, resolving how to change the one-year-old ceasefire between the government and the LTTE into a peace settlement. I found the same sentiment all over, with prayers on many lips.

A country, which has been beleaguered by hostilities for more than a decade, has begun to enjoy an atmosphere where people can hear the chiming of bells from the temples and the churches. There has not been a single victim of violence in the last 12 months while the toll had run into thousands earlier. Both the security forces and the militant LTTE have fought for supremacy against each other for years.

Earlier, fear stalked the land. I remember how my car was stopped and searched two years ago at every half a kilometre from the airport to the hotel. This time not even a single soldier was on the road even at midnight. Barricades, iron gates, check posts have all disappeared to the relief of the people.

Yet I have returned with a feeling that all is not well. The future is still uncertain. Peace is not the absence of hostilities alone. It is an environment of trust and faith; it is an understanding that all those engaged in conflict have embarked on the path of conciliation. The Sinhalese, who rule Sri Lanka, feel it is too good to last. They suspect that the LTTE has something up its sleeve, which may not allow the peace process to become a settlement. There is a credibility gap.

The Ranail Wickremesinghe government, however, dismisses such fears. As chief peace negotiator and minister G L Pieris, says: “It takes time for a militancy organization to change itself into a political party. This should be viewed as a process. Nowhere in the world has this been smooth.”

The government believes that the LTTE is tired and wants peace for economic development, as it cannot sustain war. But this can be interpreted differently: it has accepted a ceasefire to use the respite to consolidate itself. The earlier ceasefires seem to confirm this. At a meeting at Oslo, the LTTE spokesman said that they would accept a status within Sri Lanka. But there is nothing on the ground to suggest that the process is moving even by inches. True, it takes time to create an administrative structure that will give confidence to the LTTE to swap its dream of Eelam, a sovereign state, for an autonomous status within Sri Lanka. But even a preliminary discussion on a federal concept has not yet begun, leave alone disarmament of the LTTE.

Peiris concedes that some movement towards demilitarization will indicate the progress towards a settlement. He is conscious of the fact that the Sinhalese are getting restive. What worries him and his government is the attitude of President Chandrika Kumaratunga and her Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP).

She says she is all for a peace process. But she is waiting for any wrong move to pounce upon the prime minister and his United National Party that won the elections on the peace plank. None has yet spelt out the federal structure, neither the LTTE nor the government. But Peiris believes that the model will have to take into account “the cultures and traditions of the country.”

What concrete shape it will take is difficult to say. I think that the very acceptance by the Sinhalese of the federal model is a long step forward. A few years ago they were so hostile to the federal system that they saw in it the seeds of their country’s disintegration. The LTTE has done very little to allay the fears of the Sinhalese. It could have made some gesture. An opportunity arose in Jaffna where the government had rebuilt the library building it had destroyed in the early eighties. Colombo could not open the library even though Jaffna is under its control.

The LTTE came in the way, probably to underline its supremacy in the north. Even the unanimous resignation by the local municipal council in protest has made no difference to the LTTE. The LTTE has not stopped the recruitment of children to its military wing, though human rights organizations and some western newspapers have bemoaned it. The brainwashing of the youth by the LTTE and the extortion of money from the Tamils in the north have continued even after the ceasefire.

Still Colombo has not allowed the LTTE to occupy more land. The government guards the sea and the beach at the Trincomale port. The LTTE controls the forests skirting its territory. It tried to occupy part of the beach but the Sinhalese army thwarted the LTTE’s advance.

Following the same principle, Colombo has intercepted a ship carrying illicit arms to the LTTE territory. The plus point in this is that unlike in the past, the LTTE has made no fuss and accepted what the Sinhalese army is doing to enforce the ceasefire. The LTTE territory is still beyond the control of Colombo. But the government is in no hurry. According to Peiris, matters like division of power, of the police, alienation of state land and distribution of foreign aid “need a lot of deliberation.”

The government’s strategy is to help the LTTE economically. Its territory, by all accounts, is poorer than the areas in eastern UP and interior Orissa and Bihar. Colombo believes that if people in the LTTE territory begin to improve their living conditions during the ceasefire, they will not allow the return of violence to disturb the rhythm of their life. Colombo expects New Delhi to join the efforts to improve the conditions of Tamils in the LTTE territory.

The Sinhalese government is said to have requested India to attend the meeting of donors at Tokyo later this month. Japan, to New Delhi’s dislike, has agreed to give most of the aid. New Delhi’s annoyance with the LTTE is not only over its plan to amass arms but also over the venom which its papers pour against India. The LTTE abuses New Delhi but not the Tamils. It has a soft spot for former chief minister Karunanidhi whom it wants to play the role of a peacemaker. But he washed his hand of the matter when the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi.

Still the role of India is important, not because of the LTTE but because of Sri Lanka, a key neighbour. Peiris says: “We understand New Delhi’s compulsions after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination but we want it to play its role.” New Delhi says that it is in touch with Norway which is brokering peace. Its non-participation is understandable because it burnt its fingers when it sent its forces to help the Sri Lankan government some 15 years ago to oust the LTTE.

Whatever New Delhi’s justification to stay distant, it is of no relevance to the situation prevailing in Sri Lanka. Already an international forum, including the US, has come into being. It is meeting regularly. Both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE participate in it. In fact, the LTTE, to which New Delhi objects, has already earned legitimacy. India has given Norway the green light to go ahead. But now when the process is on, it is not politics to stay away.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.