WHILE it was encouraging to see a post by a minister on the importance of local governments, it raised a pertinent question: who really wants LGs? Or perhaps, who doesn’t? The public? Local representatives? Bureaucracy? Politicians? Or the military? The answer lies in identifying who stands to lose from genuine devolution.
Despite lofty rhetoric about grassroots democracy, support for empowered LGs has been largely symbolic. The weak implementation of Article 140A tells the story. Perhaps, Pakistan’s power elite has never quite recovered from the memory of Musharraf’s era, when LGs briefly showed what decentralisation could look like.
The fear is simple: if LGs are empowered, the grip over resources weakens; money and authority would flow downward, making it harder for powerbrokers to manipulate governance. Hence, LGs have been systematically disempowered by the ‘powers that be’ through a mix of de jure and de facto strategies — hardly creative, yet brutally effective.
Chief amongst these tactics are frequent amendments to the LG Act, largely tailored to suit the incumbent government. Arguably, no single law has undergone as many changes, with each revision resulting in the immediate dissolution of existing LG structures. These amendments repeatedly revise mandates, sometimes localising authority, only to later re-provincialise it. In several instances, powers have been shifted from local representatives to bureaucrats, undermining service delivery and eroding local authority.
LGs have been systematically disempowered.
Another common ploy is the establishment of parallel bodies at provincial level that encroach upon the mandate of LGs. Instead of strengthening the capacity of existing local authorities, functions such as sanitation, water supply, urban management, etc, are provincialised (at no less cost), under the pretext of inefficiency. Examples include services managed by the LWMC, SSWMB, WASA, PHA, LDA, KDA, and so on. Such arrangements keep political visibility and control with provincial governments, sidelining local representatives altogether.
Other parallel bodies have also been created at the provincial level that deprive LGs of critical finances such as revenue from cattle markets, parking fees and property-related fees. Agencies like the PRA, SRB, KPRA and BRA have taken over these streams, tightening provincial control over resources. While existing revenues are curtailed, financial dependency is further entrenched through procedural hurdles and the requirement of bureaucratic approvals in the introduction of new revenue streams.
The most ironic is the establishment of LG&CD departments at provincial levels. These departments, contrary to their names, are extensions of provincial government staffed by bureaucrats. Funds directed through these departments must navigate lengthy chains of command, rarely trickling down to local levels. Perhaps the most unimaginative tactic is the deliberate delay in LG elections. Political parties try to postpone elections until they are confident that their preferred candidates have a strong chance of winning, reducing local bodies to mere subservience. Control is further solidified through HR using two key strategies: ensuring all hiring is done at the provincial level and that no hiring is done at the local level. In this way, all important seats are designated to politically well-connected people, preserving the status quo.
By using these tactics, an equilibrium of sorts has been reached — ‘you scratch my back, and I’ll scratch yours’. In the context of LGs, the most significant is the nexus between the deputy commissioner and the MPA: MPAs use de facto powers to secure funds for schemes that are transferred to DCs. DCs get more financial authority, making them powerful in the local context; and MPAs get greater influence on how funds will be spent, allowing them to strengthen their vote bank. The end game is control! Why negotiate with elected mayors when you can command compliance through bureaucratic reshuffles?
But here’s the irony — in this obsession over control, powerholders ignore the one strategy that could actually strengthen their legitimacy: investing in human capital and public service delivery. If service delivery improves, so does goodwill, and if goodwill grows, so does the vote bank. Yet short-term gains trump long-term reform. In this scenario, empowered LGs seem unlikely soon. The entire status quo would have to be dismantled, and many powerholders would have to relinquish control.
Although one idea does come to mind: maybe, the chief secretary — usually more powerful than the chief minister — can simply put stricter enforcement of Article 140A on the assembly’s agenda. As simple as that.
The writer is a senior research associate at SDPI, Islamabad. The views expressed are her own.
X: @AroojWDar
Published in Dawn, November 12th, 2025
