SITUATIONER: What we (don’t) know about proposed changes to Article 243
• Rationale offered by security circles outlines changing requirements as nature of conflict evolves
• Observers see possibility of upgrading office of Chairman Joint Chiefs to enhance synergy between various military branches
• Legal experts split over whether statutory ‘rationalisation’ even requires changes to Constitution
THE debate over possible changes to Article 243 of the Constitution – as part of the planned 27th Amendment proposing major restructuring of financial, administrative and judicial systems – has once again drawn attention to the complex history of the provision, and how both political dispensations and dictatorships have used it to tilt the civil-military balance.
A closer look at the evolution of this provision shows that almost every amendment has mirrored the prevailing power struggle between elected governments and the military establishment, and the tug-of-war between them over control of top appointments in the armed forces, including the army chief.
Article 243 governs the relationship between the prime minister (as head of the federal government) and the president (as the head of state) in relation to the control and command of the armed forces.
While the federal government has the power to command the military, the “supreme command” of the armed forces vests in the president, a phrase inserted by Gen Ziaul Haq through the Revival of the Constitution Order (RCO) of 1985, ahead of the party-less elections that year.
Changes by successive regimes
A lawyer explained that this was the first major change to the article. Zia later went further, empowering himself through the 8th Amendment to appoint the service chiefs and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee “at his discretion”, sidelining the prime minister altogether.
These changes reflected a military ruler’s desire to concentrate authority over the armed forces in the presidency he occupied at that moment. In effect, the then-army chief arrogated the powers to appoint not only other service chiefs and chairman joint staff committee but also his successor.
This structure largely survived subsequent constitutional overhauls. Even the 18th Amendment, which aimed to restore the parliamentary character of the 1973 Constitution, did not remove the reference to the president as “supreme commander”.
Under the original arrangement, the president’s role was limited to formal functions such as raising and maintaining the armed forces and granting commissions, while appointments were made on the prime minister’s advice in accordance with Article 48.
Civilian leaders later tried to restore the earlier balance. In 1997, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif used the 13th Amendment to remove the phrase “in his discretion”, reinstating the prime minister’s authority over top military appointments.
But the change proved short-lived. Gen Pervez Musharraf’s 17th Amendment restored presidential dominance by replacing it with “in consultation with the prime minister” — effectively reducing the premier to a consultee whose advice the president was not bound to follow. By then, the general had already shifted to the presidency.
The pendulum swung back once again with the 18th Amendment, which repealed Musharraf’s changes and made these appointments explicitly subject to the prime minister’s advice, reaffirming civilian supremacy.
Each of these adjustments to Article 243 was more than a legal modification; these were a reflection of the shifting balance of power between elected governments and the military leaderships.
That said, constitutional experts across the board believe that the proposed changes to Article 243 — though still undisclosed — may run deeper than ever before and could prove far more consequential for the country’s power structure than any of the previous ones.
Yet, no one really has a clue as to what exactly is being proposed or why. The scope of the amendment remains unclear.
That uncertainty, however, has not stopped social media users from speculating wildly, each according to their political leanings. Even members of the government appear to be in the dark. A state minister was recently seen struggling to respond when asked about the matter during a television current affairs programme.
Role of the chief
The renewed discussion around Article 243 may be linked to the increase in the army chief’s tenure to five years, extendable for another five, through the controversial 26th Amendment. However, this change created fresh confusion.
The present army chief – who was recently elevated as field marshal, a ceremonial title not provided for in Article 243 – was appointed under the earlier law providing a three-year term extendable for the same period.
Legal experts now hold two conflicting views: one side argues that since the law has been amended, the term automatically stands extended to five years, while the other contends that because the appointment was made under the previous rules, a fresh notification would be required to extend it under the new provisions.
Some lawyers believe the proposed constitutional amendment could be aimed at removing this uncertainty and ensuring clarity regarding the current army chief’s term.
Others see it as a broader move to institutionalise the existing civil-military balance (or imbalance) by giving constitutional cover to certain powers or offices.
Still more speculate that it might be about creating a new position on the pattern of some other countries, where the Chief of Defence Staff is the permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and is responsible for ensuring ‘joint-ness’ and synergy between the army, navy, and air force.
Such a position can be created by law without altering the Constitution, one lawyer pointed out. “If a new position is being considered here, its role must first be defined. The posts of the service chiefs are statutory, not constitutional.”
Whatever the motive, the history of Article 243 shows that even small textual changes carry deep implications. Each amendment has marked a moment when the delicate balance between civilian and military authority shifted one way or the other. If fresh changes are indeed being contemplated, they will likely have a similar effect, shaping not only the legal framework of command but also the broader political dynamics that have long defined Pakistan’s civil-military relationship.
Changing nature of conflict
Even the ‘rationale’, offered by military sources for the upcoming changes in this article, offers little in the way of concrete information; it simply stresses that the nature of warfare has changed significantly in recent years.
Conflicts are no longer limited to the traditional battlefield or restricted military spheres, it argues, while maintaining that the emerging security environment is characterised by hybrid, cyber, informational, and space-based threats.
These changes necessitate a reconsideration of the existing defence structure, according to security officials, without specifying the proposed changes.
The ‘impugned’ article is also only discussed once, in terms of the structure of the armed forces; military sources argue that this was formulated according to the requirements of a different era. The framework was primarily designed in the context of conventional warfare and separate service boundaries, but the the demands of modern warfare require far greater integration and synergy.
Joint planning, inter-service cooperation, and strategic alignment at the central level have now become indispensable, they argue, adding that a lack of such synergy affects the effectiveness of collective defence capabilities and the speed of response.
Therefore, in their view, a balanced institutional review is necessary to align the armed forces with current threats.
Security circles believe that the review is a refinement of the effective implementation of constitutional command and control. The objective, in their view, should be to adapt institutional structures to modern, multi-dimensional warfare realities. It is through this evolutionary process that Pakistan can make its defence posture effective, unified, and reliable.
More questions than answers
If anything, the statement raises more questions than it answers. Is a constitutional amendment to Article 243 really required for this purpose? Or could such structural reforms, if genuinely aimed at integration, be achieved through ordinary legislation or internal reorganisation of the armed forces?
Prominent lawyer Sameer Khosa argues that, from the rationale offered by security sources, it seems a joint head of services is in the offing – a Chief of Defence Staff-type position. “But it’s a very vague statement [of purpose], which does not shed light at all on what kind of amendment is required in Article 243 for this purpose.”
He is of the view that the changes in the control and command structure don’t require an amendment to Article 243 per se, which primarily concerns the federal government’s control over the armed forces and the appointment of the heads of the army, navy, air force and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee.
“Operational matters and the organisation of the services are governed by the Army Act and the Army Rules. So, unless an amendment touches on the appointment of these four service chiefs, Article 243 need not be changed. For operational or organisational issues, the article doesn’t need to be amended.”
Many agree with him. Even if the armed forces want to create a structure in line with that seen in other countries, i.e. headed by a single officer, it doesn’t require a constitutional amendment, explained another lawyer.
“You can change the structure of the armed forces through ordinary legislation. If a new position is being created, its role must first be defined. The posts of the service chiefs are statutory, not constitutional. You can establish such a position through law and then, if necessary, insert a provision in the Constitution specifying that the appointment, like the rest of the top appointments, will be made by the president on the advice of the prime minister.”
Amendment ‘isn’t the only way’
Waqqas Mir, an advocate of the Supreme Court, doesn’t see the rationale offered by security sources as a helpful basis for anyone to gauge the scope of potential amendments to Article 243.
“[However], if the aim is to set in place a legal foundation for impactful strategic and structural changes, then a constitutional amendment is the best way to go about it. Statutory rules can be easily undone so they don’t provide as solid a foundation as an amendment to the Constitution.”
He thinks that Article 243’s diktat that command and control of the armed forces lies with the federal government, and that the president is the supreme commander of our armed forces, is not something that is likely to see any formal change.
Yet, he feels that “it is possible that the advice of certain high ranking military officials could be given a role in certain strategic matters; but it would be surprising if an amendment addresses such micro level matters.”
Some think that the change in Article 243 could essentially be an attempt to entrench the existing civil-military balance, or imbalance, so that the current status quo is preserved.
Mr Khosa thinks this could be the case. “For that reason, it appears unlikely that either of the coalition parties — the PML-N or the PPP — will oppose this amendment, as doing so could risk destabilising the government as the coalition depends on the establishment’s support to stay in power.”
Mr Mir, however, differs slightly. “I trust the PPP will thoroughly debate the proposal and its micro elements. The party that impressively piloted the 18th amendment will have to make some important calls on changes to the federal governing bargain while preserving the provincial autonomy it has always admirably pushed for.”
“Many of us have lived in Pakistan long enough to realize that the Constitution does not always reflect our lived reality as a polity. Similarly, the Constitution is a political document dependent on how various actors shaping the civil-military relations interact. The nuance or complexity of this is at times far more complex than the text of the Constitution,” Mr Mir argues.
“Far beyond the 27th amendment, the important question is this: how do we want power to be distributed between and exercised by the highest offices in the country? That’s a much longer conversation than one amendment,” Mr Mir concluded.
Published in Dawn, November 6th, 2025
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