SEVENTY-EIGHT years of statehood and the prospect of regional peace in the subcontinent remains as distant as ever. After a brief passage of possibility in the early 2000s, diplomatic polarisation and state and non-state conflict has returned as the norm. Recent social and political transformations in both India and Pakistan are cause for further divergence between state officials and between common citizens.

In India, the rise and entrenchment of aggressive right-wing nationalism has had several stark consequences for the region. Its ‘self-assured’ turn in foreign policy and posturing as a civilisational power has reduced the space for any concessions on cross-border issues. This posturing remains mostly for the domestic electorate. But by linking the idea of national success to displays of hard power — surgical strikes, cross-border interventions, supporting non-state actors — the space for critical viewpoints on foreign policy issues is closed down further.

Of greater concern is the widespread societal acceptance this particular brand of politics now receives in the country. The BJP’s success is based on selling the idea of economic growth (even in its skewed, top-biased nature) combined with cultural purification. The latter involves portraying Indian Muslims, first, as cultural deviants left by an external, invading force and, secondly, as betrayers due to their association with the creation of Pakistan.

This formula of otherisation may eventually reach its limits, but it has proven to be fairly successful in helping BJP and other Sangh affiliates retain their popularity in north India. There are few political campaigns where Pakistan is not mentioned in some explicit or implicit manner, often to distract from development-related inadequacies.

Adventurism that puts the lives of people living along the borders at nuclear-tinged risk is still a distinct possibility.

One outcome of this regressive politics for the region is that Pakistan appears as the external projection of domestic problems associated with Muslims. In the right-wing imagination, the country’s very existence is a persisting reminder of their professed ‘dual traumas’ — that of Mughal rule, and of Partition that violated (imaginary) territorial unity. In this light, the BJP has gone all in on commemorating Aug 14 as ‘Partition Massacres Day’, using the tragic events of seven decades ago not to build compassion or empathy, but as political currency in the present.

What makes the situation more unfortunate is that large swathes of India’s media ecosystem, including entities that nominally position themselves as liberals, continue to toe the state’s line on foreign policy issues. Amplification of jingoistic discourse, even by nominally independent observers, further cultivates an environment in which polarisation becomes the norm. With social media blockades shutting off people-to-people digital contact (in-person contact was done away with years ago), any societal push for normalisation of ties seems entirely implausible.

Driven by different circumstances, the situation in Pakistan is non-conducive to regional normalisation in its own way. The domestic situation remains highly stifled, with the establishment’s rule prevailing and the space for popular politics increasingly non-existent. Given the hierarchy of decision-making currently in play, security and foreign policy are shaped by concerns of military strategy, rather than any other motivation.

The situation is further compounded by Pakistan’s internal security troubles — both in the northwest and in Balochistan. The portrayal of both issues as primarily problems of Indian external interference, rather than being domestically driven, narrows the space for thinking through alternative solutions. In the process, it shuts off the possibility of diplomatic engagement that doesn’t involve the notion of terrorism and militancy.

The recent conflict in May has not helped on this front either. A regime struggling for legitimacy due to its ongoing battle with the PTI was given a renewed lease in the face of India’s hostile aggression. The strong military response, and its associated geopolitical dividends currently being reaped by the Pakistani state, provided validation of the hawkish military view on India. Such validation means there is little reason to consider alternatives. Instead, this brief period of public appeal is a way to shore up more power and further drive home the prevailing way of approaching the region.

On the societal front, Pakistan fares somewhat better than India. Given the demographics, there is no active demonisation of any domestic group via its association with India, other than politicians slinging mud on each other. People here are generally curious about the other country, and cultural consumption of movies, TV and music remains fairly robust. People-to-people contact in Punjab, via religious tourism, remains an important source of quelling polarisation on this side. On that front, Pakistani authorities deserve credit for not sacrificing this type of contact at the altar of state-level politics.

But all that amounts to naught in the present. The rise of right-wing forces in India has pulled the rug from under the feet of the pro-regional peace segment in Pakistan. The latter remained critical of their own state for its military pursuits, while advocating for greater normalisation and acceptance of a shared cultural heritage. Instead, now, the blanket refusal to engage from the other side, and the increasing volume of dehumanising discourse about Pakistan and its citizens in the online realm, make advocating for any form of peace and integration far more difficult.

For the foreseeable future, it appears that the militarised logic of security will dictate relations between the two countries. Adventurism that puts the lives of people living along the borders at nuclear-tinged risk is still a distinct possibility, and polarisation between societies — a mass of 1.5 billion people — will remain the norm.

But it is precisely amid such bleak prospects that one must remain wedded to an ideal higher than perpetual war. Both countries and their people are here to stay. Peace may not seem likely any time soon, but it is certainly more preferable as a way of existence than one of complete and utter insecurity.

The writer teaches sociology at Lums.

X: @umairjav

Published in Dawn, August 18th, 2025