IN the Senate opposition’s rejection of a government-sponsored ordinance amending the NAB law, a host of issues appear to have become entangled. First, in disapproving of the hastily promulgated presidential ordinance merging the rules governing voluntary returns and plea bargains — and in doing so, making court permission mandatory before either option can be authorised by NAB — the opposition has sent yet another signal against the misuse of presidential ordinances. Presidential ordinances are a constitutional legislative mechanism designed to be used in exceptional circumstances when the normal, parliamentary legislative is not available. But as an opposition senator pointed out on Wednesday, the ordinance amending NAB was promulgated after the Senate session had already been convened. In essence, like all governments before it, the PML-N has found it legislatively convenient to rely on ordinances and only later turn to parliament to force through the existing law. The practice undermines parliament’s relevance, and surely prevents the strengthening of the democratic process and institutions. It should cease.

Second, the government’s approach to the issue of accountability. In the face of court pressure and public outrage, the government acted quickly to try and defuse some of the justified anger at the woeful state of accountability. But the government’s response also betrayed a willingness to only do the bare minimum. It is also reasonable to question if the Panama Papers hearings in the Supreme Court played a role: was the government only acting quickly on the NAB front because doing nothing on accountability would be politically damaging? In truth, it does not appear that the government takes the issue of accountability seriously at all. Had the government been serious, a review of the accountability laws would have been conducted expeditiously and parliament would have been tasked to overhaul the system. But three and a half years into the government’s term, an ad hoc approach still reigns.

Third, what should be the principles underpinning a new accountability regime? The voluntary settlement and plea bargaining system put an emphasis on recovery of ill-gotten wealth and assets — but they achieve little in terms of deterrence. Surely, if a senior public servant faces no mandatory minimum jail sentence, the temptation to indulge in corruption will remain high. After all, the end of employment with the state and returning only the assets the state is able to trace would be a reasonable risk for many to take. An effective accountability regime would emphasise both recovery and deterrence, and the latter is difficult to achieve without mandatory minimum sentences. A graduated approach could be put in place whereby petty corruption is treated differently to institutional corruption by the accountability system. Creating an effective and just accountability system is politically difficult and institutionally disruptive, but it is necessary if Pakistan is to become a modern, law-based state.

Published in Dawn, January 20th, 2017