TALKS with the TTP continue to keep Pakistani pundits preoccupied. Even as the government is taking talks forward, the national debate continues to centre on whether there should be a military operation.

Normatively speaking, I am agnostic when it comes to the operation. Neither do I find myself agreeing with the liberal left who want the government to go for the kill irrespective of the fallout, nor with the part of the right who sympathise with the Taliban.

That said, we are out of options here. And the longer an operation is delayed, the tougher it will become for the state.

Why do I say this? First, talks won’t deliver any permanent gains. There’s no common ground on the key contentions of both sides. You can get to ceasefires, prisoner exchanges, strategic pauses, and buy-out deals but the TTP has an ideological bend that cannot accept the modern constitutional remit.

Moreover, the TTP feels it has held off the state successfully and is not about to buckle. It has tasted power in Fata and won’t be willing to give it up so easily. Also, the leadership knows they can find sanctuary across the Durand Line; usually, when insurgent leaderships are likely to survive, the chances of a major compromise on their part are even lower. Bottom line: both sides will use the talks as a strategic pause but both already know that at the end of the day, they will have to go after each other.

Why an operation sooner rather than later? Because all variables in play suggest that the longer you delay this, the tougher it will become.

What are the prominent arguments in favour of a delay? First, that even if talks won’t work, they’ll allow the government to gain the high moral ground. Delusionary. We have a discredited state up against a TTP that has succeeded in conflating its agenda with anti-Americanism, poor governance of the state and a narrative of political Islam that may not find sympathy but is also seldom rejected outright by conservative segments. There is confusion within the polity; more is being sown by countless, ill-informed debates on the media.

The natural outcome will be a split view as it is now. On the other hand, if consensus is so important, it can be created instrumentally. All the state needs to do is to consciously put the TTP’s dark side out in the open. Remember the flogging video during Swat? Bring out those flogging videos, those showing brutal killings of Pakistani personnel at the hands of the TTP, and the like. See how the nation galvanises.

Second, some argue that there is need for political consensus for an operation. Presumably, the prime minister would like to get the PTI (and less importantly, the religious parties) to accept that the TTP was given a fair chance through talks.

Sharif must ask himself: why would they want to grant him this victory? They’d much rather keep opposing the operation; backing the army when the operation begins, branding themselves as true patriots, and then bashing the government when the militant backlash begins and it is clear that the operation has not resolved Pakistan’s terrorism problems.

Third, they say the state needs time to prepare. For what? The military is as ready as it will be. As for the civilian apparatus needed to protect the cities, what you haven’t been able to do in years, you can’t now. Efforts to enhance counterterrorism capacity involving police, civilian intelligence, etc. go on constantly and there is little you can do except step up surveillance in times like these. Ask the police — they’ll confirm this.

Fourth, some argue against an operation saying that the element of surprise is gone. True. But waiting isn’t going to bring it back either.

Finally, some believe that the TTP’s potency will diminish automatically once the US leaves. More likely: Afghan Taliban declare victory as soon as the US leaves; the TTP piggybacks on this to raise its own morale; if more trouble spills over from Afghanistan, the TTP will find more space to operate; and with Isaf forces gone, the TTP will also enjoy a much freer existence in Afghanistan as and when needed.

To be sure, the military operation will neither finish off the TTP as we know it, nor will it be the military’s last counterinsurgency operation. It will only manage to disrupt the TTP’s operational capacity temporarily. But the alternative seems to be an increasingly emboldened TTP (and company) penetrating Pakistan in a manner that may soon make the trend irreversible. So the operation is not a great option but the alternatives seem even worse. No point in procrastinating.

The writer is a foreign policy expert based in Washington D.C.