THE GPEI Polio Eradication Strategy aims to eradicate type 1 wild poliovirus by 2027 and the more prevalent type 2 by 2029. The war on terrorism has turned a public health matter into a governance issue. Despite better planning and coordination, security threats to police and vaccinators in KP and Balochistan compound the challenge.

Vaccine misconceptions are exploited by militants and community elders in militancy-hit area, who often obstruct polio teams from giving oral drops to children in door-to-door campaigns. Instances where community and religious leaders as well as other stakeholders oppose such drives are termed ‘refusals’. Despite political backing and administrative ownership, there’s weak community support for polio eradication in militancy-hit areas. Both health workers and police are targets. Disrupted drives leave children vulnerable to the potentially crippling disease.

Pakistan joined the Global Polio Eradication Initiative in 1994. When five female polio vaccinators were killed in Karachi in 2012, an already overburdened police began escorting polio workers in 2013, adding a new function to a long list of non-policing duties. Relying solely on security may not resolve the issue; more effective communication and community support, including the clergy’s, are needed.

Disrupted drives compound the challenge.

Vaccination drives require planning and extensive security coverage based on threat levels and other factors. Other districts often provide more manpower for security coverage but this borrowed manpower may not be familiar with local security and geographic conditions. Campaigns can continue for three days to a week, with 40,000 to 50,000 personnel deployed in places like KP. To plug manpower shortages, districts rely on police training schools. This not only affects training but also exposes recruits to threats and disrupts routine policing. Deploying non-local personnel without proper briefing or effective supervision creates operational gaps. Militants easily locate and target polio teams who move in small groups in densely populated areas. Polio drives increase police vulnerability. Attackers usually appear on bikes and target teams in slums, the outskirts and the former tribal areas. While rare, they may use IEDs against teams and police during transportation.

KP is the worst-affected area during drives, followed by Karachi and Balochistan. KP saw 139 attacks on polio teams in 2012-2026, resulting in the death of 54 policemen and 15 polio workers, who were protecting children’s health despite facing threats. This shows Pakistan’s commitment to defeating polio. With 18 police deaths in KP, 2024 was the worst year for officers providing security to vaccinators. In Sindh, 10 incidents were recorded in 2012-2016; nine policemen were killed. A suicide blast in Quetta killed 12 policemen deputed for vaccinators’ security in 2016. Attacks on polio teams and police in KP occurred mostly in the south and the newly merged districts. Since 2022, of 79 attacks, 23 occurred in former Fata and 48 in south KP. More innovative coverage rather than a purely security-focused approach is needed.

With eradication a high-profile global goal, terrorists target polio and security teams for maximum media attention to harm the country’s image and police morale, and trigger reluctance in health workers. Targeted killing is one of the easiest acts of terrorism; its prevalence is reported in slums and rural areas where militants exploit security gaps.

Supported by the anti-polio vaccine lobby, misinformation is spread that the West wants to render Muslims infertile. The influx of Afghan refugees, porous borders and religious edicts misinterpreted by some clerics have impacted eradication efforts. Low conviction rates embolden militants, who often are unidentified as they are masked and use unregistered motorbikes. Thus, investigations and prosecutions lack clear direction and incidents aren’t resolved. Better investigation standards, modern technology and public support are needed.

For better campaign effectiveness, commuters in transit must be covered through polio desks at borders, toll plazas and bus stands. To discourage refusals and enhan­­ce vaccination coverage in affected areas, financial incentives can be offered to enc­o­­urage parents to get their children vaccinated. Besides enhanced community eng­a­gement and more innovative security steps, improved coverage must be linked to school admissions, registering children with Nadra, obtaining CNICs, passports, domiciles and driving licences, opening bank accounts, and seeking BISP benefits. While processing these documents, the production of authentic polio vaccination certificates, duly verified by the centralised data bank, must be made mandatory.

The writer is a security analyst and author of Pakistan: In Between Extremism and Peace.

X: @alibabakhel

Published in Dawn, June 30th, 2026