IRAN’S revolution seems deferred — for now. But, as the poet said, the centre cannot hold. It is thus time to ask what the possible collapse of the regime there would mean for Pakistan. Developments in Iran have always had domestic ripple effects. The countries’ trajectories have been entwined since Iran became the first country to recognise Pakistan in 1947. The neighbours have over the decades banded together — for example, during the 1965 and 1971 wars — but also squabbled, as seen in the recent tit-for-tat targeting of armed groups in 2024.

Any change in Iran’s ruling dispensation would affect Pakistan. This may not be an immediate prospect given the shocking violence meted out against protesters in recent days, reportedly leaving thousands dead. Writing in Time magazine, Narges Bajoghli points out that at this moment, the ingredients for another Iranian revolution do not quite add up.

In 1979, the Iranian people, the clergy, and the ‘bazaar’, united, with the support of several key military factions. That unity is elusive right now: there are reported tensions among the clerical authorities, the merchant class is now integrated with and dependent on the regime; and the security forces are still willing to open fire on the people.

But this will not be the case indefinitely. The warning signs are there: Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is 86 and has no clear successor; the regime’s credibility with the Iranian people is heavily eroded as apparent in successive uprisings; the government has few tools with which to alleviate the economic crisis in the country, and its regional influence is severely diminished following the rout of allied groups in recent times.

Pakistan will be affected by any change in Iran’s ruling set-up.

In this scenario, Pakistan’s short-term concerns would be linked to the security situation in Balochistan, as political instability across the border would create more space for Baloch separatist and jihadi groups to operate, leading to a wider uptick in terrorism. Pakistan would also fret over the $2 billion-plus in jeopardised bilateral trade, not including the informal trade in fuel and electricity, which drives economic activity in our southern and western provinces.

But in the longer term, Pakistan would have to pull off a geopolitical juggling act, starting with managing ties with the US. Recent events have made clear that Washington will punish (through sanctions or tariffs) those who support the Iranian regime much further, and will vocally back opposition to the regime, despite the fact that such support would position the opposition as a stooge of Western imperialism, and US and Israeli interests in particular. Islamabad would find itself needing to balance support for America’s desired outcomes in Iran with its links to pro-Tehran elements, as well as managing domestic sentiment against Western interventionism.

Any celebration of the regime’s downfall by official elements in Pakistan or even perceived support for American puppeteering, would risk fuelling sectarian tensions within Pakistan and across the region. This became apparent during the Iran-Israel war last year, when some pro-Iran Shia leaders warned of repercussions if the regime were forcibly displaced.

Both these concerns — resentment against Western meddling and pro-Iran Shia mobilisation — would be particularly acute in the event that an opposition fronted by former Iranian crown prince Reza Pahlavi succeeds the regime. This is because Pahlavi is widely perceived as US-backed and Israel linked. For Pakistan, Pahlavi carries the additional challenge of being pro-India — he has called for improved Tehran-Delhi ties, and is a proponent of more In­­dian investment in Iran. It is not inconceivable that he would look the other way while India stokes Baloch separatism via Si-stan-Baluchestan. Constructive eng­agement with him may have to be­­come a priority for Islamabad.

The other key challenge for Pakistan would manifest in its relations with Gulf countries and Turkiye as they respond to the exit of the regime. A regional tussle over political influence within Iran and Iranian offshore wealth, as well as a race to fill the regional power vacuum left behind by the regime would be likely.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Oman and Turkiye would all join the fray, potentially at loggerheads. Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, which would vie for political dominance in Syria, Iraq and Kurdish regions, are likely beneficiaries, which given their alliances with Pakistan would be a net positive. But intra-Gulf power games within Iran would leave Islamabad in an awkward position. For good or bad, this is not a new conundrum for Islamabad in the context of its relations with Tehran. Let’s hope the foreign policymakers are heeding the signs, and preparing for the imminent balancing act.

The writer is a political and integrity risk analyst.

X: @humayusuf

Published in Dawn, January 19th, 2026