PAKISTAN reportedly floated a $1.2 billion plan for a deep-sea port at Pasni to export critical minerals from Balochistan. Though unconfirmed, the idea appears to have been discussed with US firms, including Missouri-based US Strategic Metals, which recently signed an MoU with the FWO on mineral refining and exports. With the government courting the Trump administration via “strategic resource diplomacy,” some official interest is plausible. But the proposal demands rigorous scrutiny.
The commercial case for another deep-sea port in Balochistan is, at best, tenuous. While both Pasni and Gwadar possess the natural depth required for large cargo vessels, this natural advantage is offset by their peripheral location, weak hinterland connectivity, and negligible commercial traffic. These constraints make them less competitive than the ports of Karachi, Port Qasim, and Iran’s Bandar Abbas.
Gwadar offers a cautionary tale. Despite two decades of infrastructural investments and plans, it remains largely idle. Pakistani importers prefer Karachi and Port Qasim, even at the cost of higher demurrage charges and longer clearance times. While proponents can argue for the potential of Pasni (and Gwadar) to function as exit points for mineral exports and as entrepôts for trans-shipment trade, even this narrower role faces technical and political obstacles.
The first is the absence of reliable connectivity between the mineral-rich Chagai region and the Makran coast. At present, road transport between Chagai and Gwadar can take up to 15 hours, traversing routes that are neither designed nor maintained for heavy cargo traffic. This is why Chinese companies operating in Saindak currently rely on Karachi port rather than Gwadar. The only serious option to make either port commercially viable for bulk mineral exports is a new rail corridor linking Nokundi to Gwadar or Pasni, but this is a highly expensive proposition. Pakistan has made repeated efforts to convince Barrick Gold to finance the proposed railway infrastructure, but the company has shown little enthusiasm so far. Even if American firms were inclined to invest in such a railway, on the assumption of long-term mineral revenues, this would only solve the technical problem of poor connectivity. The security and political challenges are far more intractable.
The reported Pasni port proposal echoes a familiar pattern.
Balochistan is currently experiencing the longest wave of insurgency in its history. Grievances over the extraction of natural resources without local benefit or meaningful local participation remain a central driver of this conflict. These resentments have been exacerbated by the incumbent provincial government’s recent Minerals Act, widely viewed locally as a rollback of the hard-won gains of provincial autonomy. Launching another mega-extraction project in this context, without prior political reconciliation, is likely to deepen rather than resolve the ongoing conflict.
The experience of CPEC illustrates this. CPEC was rolled out amidst an active insurgency without prior peacebuilding initiatives. Islamabad’s militarised approach, marked by increased checkpoints and movement restrictions, undermined local livelihoods and, in the eyes of the common Baloch, delegitimised the project. The Chinese, initially indifferent to local political grievances, soon found themselves facing repeated insurgent attacks and a deteriorating security environment. Any American-led initiative that ignores these lessons risks repeating the same cycle, triggering militarisation and insurgent violence rather than sustainable development.
Beyond domestic politics, a US-backed Pasni port would reverberate across the region. Chinese and Iranian actors are unlikely to view the project with equanimity. For Beijing, a parallel American-led mineral export corridor a short distance away will be perceived as strategic encroachment. Given Pakistan’s increasing financial and security dependence on China, there are clear limits to how far Islamabad can pursue ‘balancing’ between great China and the US without provoking geopolitical friction.
In short, the Pasni port proposal represents a familiar pattern: courting foreign investors while ignoring local grievances and the underlying political economy of conflict and exclusionthat has historically defined state-society relations in Balochistan.
Without transparency and meaningful local participation and ownership, such projects will remain both commercially fragile and politically explosive. Before courting another foreign power to build ports and railways, Islamabad must rethink its centralised, militarised, and extractive approachto development in Balochistan.
The writer is a public policy and development specialist from Balochistan.
Published in Dawn, November 10th, 2025
