Where the US went wrong

THE Bush foreign policy has provoked intense debate both at home and abroad. Within the US, one is stunned by the inconclusiveness of the debate; it is strained and confused. It is obvious that the fractious debate is reflective of the testing times the country is facing internally and abroad in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world. But scarred by the 9/11 trauma, inspired by a religious outlook and driven by the supreme consciousness of power, the American response tends to simplify or distort emerging challenges.

The fact is that although the United States may have become the sole superpower, globalization and the end of the Cold War have also led to a certain devolution of power, thus raising the status of other powers with competing interests and policies. This makes it difficult for the US to lead, tempting her to dominate and so provoking reaction and resistance. There is a tragic paradox in America’s condition; being the only superpower encourages the temptation to use power yet constrains the prospects of success as never before. American power, therefore, is not absolute. And, on many issues, the United States is walking alone.

It was alright in the days when the US was a dominant power, at least in half of the world. Now it may command the whole world but its power and influence are no longer incontestable. Also, coalitions or partnerships these days are not as rigid as during the Cold War era. They are based on narrow or limited interests, are transient and unstable, and ever more susceptible to the vagaries of public opinion in each country. America has to thus learn to lead not through domination but consensus and compromise. And that is the central dilemma it faces: how to navigate the transition from hegemony to domination and to leadership. Its recourse to unilateralism could well be an escape from this dilemma.

That said there is broad agreement in the United States that terrorism poses a grave threat to national security. In the wake of the 9/11 tragedy, Americans genuinely feel that they are unsafe and vulnerable especially when the threat could conceivably be from weapons of mass destruction. On that there is no difference of opinion in the US, nor is there any dissent regarding the desirability of a demonstrable projection of power in response to 9/11. Any other American leader would have reacted equally strongly. When it comes to the core issue of national security, the rights and wrongs of the response are hard to disentangle.

Where did Bush go wrong? A major part of the problem has been the Iraq war. The Bush administration has been a matrix of multiple political strands — ideologues, evangelists, neo-cons, Cold Warriors, special interests, holdovers from the Reagan and Bush Senior era, with strong and long-standing ties to big business, specially oil, and career lobbyists for Israel. Many of them had been mighty men of power once. They had been waiting to regain ascendancy, and could not resist the opportunity offered by September 11 to overreach themselves.

Their varying agendas merged and found a good focus in a president with a simple world view and a combative and quixotic disposition. Drawing their support from an ideologically committed and politically activist minority in the country they have prospered in America’s fear and pain and have come to dominate the foreign policy discourse, thus hampering the emergence of a policy based on a strategic calculation of America’s broader national interests.

Doctrines such as that of preemptive strikes are basically “political oratory”. America has struck preemptively in the past and will do so in future; so it was not a novel idea after all. It is just that America attacked the wrong country for the wrong reasons and at a wrong time, and badly entangled the war on terrorism with the WMD issue and the so-called democracy initiative.

This created a huge backlash in the Islamic world at an emotionally charged time after 9/11 when both Islam and the West felt they were under siege. It simultaneously unleashed so much anti-American and pro-Islamist feelings that the United States ended up intensifying rather than weakening the radical forces and tilting the balance of power in favour of the Islamists.

Anti-Americanism has complicated not only the war on terrorism but also Bush’s so-called democracy initiative. There is a lot of talk in Washington about freedom and democracy, but the fact is that in large measure it is driven by the need to redefine the Iraq invasion for the sake of history and to sustain domestic consensus for the war effort.

This talk may also be meant to give a moral veneer to the hard-line approach the Bush administration has adopted towards authoritarian regimes that threaten US interests or its friends in the Middle East. Indeed, democracy may be a codeword for a change of regimes perceived as unfriendly. The real test of American commitment to a democratic Middle East will come when the US has to move against undemocratic but friendly regimes.

Even if Iraq does get on the road to democracy its example will not be relevant to other countries. Muslims do not take American intentions to democratize the Middle East seriously, even though the American public, specially the academic community, does. I guess the public has great faith in the American idealism. Muslims, however, feel that the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were not about democracy. They were about removing certain perceived threats to the United States and to global security, and in the process, to set up client states in a region of immense strategic and economic importance to the US.

It is a different matter that the US has ended up with unintended consequences in Iraq and is now making the most of a bad bargain on which it is putting on a brave new face of democracy promotion. Ironically, democracy may now be the only avenue open for the Iraqis to seek an end to the American occupation and for Shia activists to empower themselves, something the Americans may not have bargained for. Whatever the case, democracy in Iraq has a unique context not to be extrapolated to the region. The only relevance that the Iraq example holds is that this may not be the best way to bring democracy to the Islamic world.

In any case, the Islamic world does not need an example to inspire it towards democratic ambitions. These ambitions have been flickering for decades. If anything, the Iraq war and the war on terrorism have come to militate against the advancement of democracy. On the one hand, they have raised the profile of the Islamists, and on the other, strengthened the forces resistant to change since state power is needed to act against extremism and the ruling elites in Muslim countries may have found another rationale to legitimize their power.

US foreign policy has traditionally rested on two planks: a measure of idealism wrapped in soaring rhetoric and a missionary sense of exceptionalism, and cold-blooded power politics. The US always claimed to have primarily acted in the name of principles and values but often the facts have spoken against this stance. Yet America was either given the benefit of the doubt or there were overriding factors to put up with its dominant behaviour as it maintained some semblance of balance of power and international order and stability, and played an admirable role in the two World Wars. There has also been at times a humanitarian complement to the pursuit of its geopolitical interests.

But the world has changed. As America chooses to affirm some treaties and UN resolutions and reject others, attacks some countries but tolerates others, enforces non-proliferation in some places and not in others, kills innocent citizens in Afghanistan and Iraq and treats prisoners inhumanely, the legitimacy and morality of its conduct is coming under serious challenges. This fuels anti-Americanism particularly in developing countries many of which do not feel as critically dependent on the US as before and have alternative choices of allies among other big powers.

Their populations are becoming assertive and are expressing their resistance to their pro-West elite and their pseudo liberalism, which has made little material difference to their lives, through nationalism and anti-Americanism. The Islamic world is doing so in the idiom of religion and Latin America through its flirtation with the Left.

Nonetheless not everything in the US foreign policy is exceptionable. Relations with China, Russia, Japan and India are anchored in good strategic calculations. The fundamentals of its alliance with Europe remain viable and enduring — it is not the alliance but the concept of American leadership which is in trouble. Yet the US anticipates growing difference of approach if not interests with the increasingly assertive “Old Europe” in the future as it grows out of a relationship of dependency on the US. That is why America is trying to strengthen its ties with the New Europe which will remain dependent on it. The same concept of dependency is being tried with India in assisting it to achieve its big power ambitions especially where China’s strategic shadow looms large. Pakistan will remain important for some time, but for different reasons.

Do we see hints of “imperialism” in the US foreign policy today? No, America has not embarked on an imperialist venture in this day and age. Yet America commands an immense array of diplomatic, economic and political assets and its power will continue to play a decisive role in international affairs, but for its own good and that of the world America will have to learn to use its power differently.

The current policy is not sustainable. Major domestic crises seem to be gestating at home — deficit, social security, health care, energy, political corruption, the state of education, jobs, outsourcing and other challenges of globalization. There is no lasting place for an expansive foreign policy in future national priorities. Indeed, the next election may change more than a president.

Perhaps the Iraq experience is the best thing that has happened to America. A success there would have set America on an even more dangerous course.

The writer is a former ambassador

A king-size problem in Nepal

I WISH I could make out our policy on neighbours. At best, it is a reaction to what they do or do not do. We should cultivate them. But there is nothing called generosity when it comes to dealing with them. Whether it is Islamabad or Dhaka, New Delhi is against showing any gesture.

It waits for the problem to solve itself like the dust which eventually settles down. Even when we should take a stand, we prefer to keep quiet. The argument which I have heard from the topmost government quarters is that India does not want to get involved in the affairs of its neighbours. This is what we tell Colombo which needs our assistance to check the LTTE’s terrorism.

But where we have exposed ourselves the most is in Nepal. It is the worst case of our prevarication. Do we want the king or not? We cannot make up our mind. We want monarchy but no kingship. It is only playing with words. What it means is that we would like the king to be a constitutional head like our president. Thank God, our constitution does not provide for president’s rule at the centre. Jawaharlal Nehru once explained that he did not want a dictator in India. Therefore, the writ of our presidents — we had a couple of ambitious ones — does not run beyond the precincts of Rashtrapati Bhavan.

In Nepal, the king has himself become the constitution. We are unhappy because he does not listen to us. Some of our best supporters in that country — for example, the opposition leader and former prime minister, G.P. Koirala — have been restricted to their home. Our request to the king to take popular leaders into confidence has not been heeded. Yes, we have our ambassador in Kathmandu, always going back and forth for consultations with New Delhi. But he must be exasperated, helpless and even embarrassed because he has made no progress with the king. We want the ambassador to ride two boats at the same time: put pressure on the king to restore democracy and convince the opposition that India will eventually get them back their popular rule.

However, the opposition has very little confidence in us. Even this was lessened when we gave military aid to King Gyanendra after he grabbed power one year ago in the name of improving security. Our explanation is that the military aid was very little and we stopped it when the king did not pay any heed to our plea to move towards democracy. Still, we have never faced him with the untraced murders at the palace.

The fact is that we resumed the supply of weapons on his promise to restore democracy “before long.” The king duped us because there is nothing to suggest that he wants to dismount the tiger he has chosen to ride. Why does a powerful country like India not do something? This is the question that the Nepalese ask. One of the reasons hawked about is that if we were to jettison the king, he would go to Pakistan to get arms. I wish he would do that. Let us see what happens when the two authoritarian powers meet.

Whatever General Pervez Musharraf’s government may have said in the past Islamabad cannot be so inept that it would give arms to Nepal. Even if Pakistan wants to embarrass India, it can ill afford to take on the people with yet another unpopular step. Islamabad has also to ensure who is overlooking its shoulders. The ubiquitous Americans are always there to keep Islamabad in line. They have already said from the pulpit, the White House, that they do not approve the king for “harassing peaceful democratic forces.” How can the Musharraf government do the opposite?

Even China will think twice before displeasing India when the two are already joining hands in South Asia for peace and development. All these years, Beijing has kept away from Kathmandu knowing well that New Delhi is over-sensitive to foreign interference in Nepal’s affairs. After all, India accepted the suzerainty of China over Tibet in no time.

The problem is with New Delhi. It does not want to displease the king on the one hand and does not like his methods of dealing with political parties on the other. India would wish to devise a formula which could please the king and the opposition at the same time. In fact, it has been vainly trying for that.

Initially, New Delhi was not unhappy over the king’s takeover because it saw in it a strong action against the Maoists who had links with the Naxalites in India. Washington was in tandem with New Delhi’s approach.

The assumption was that the king would come around soon. But it has been a futile exercise. In fact, the king has consolidated himself. Only a few days ago, he arrested hundreds of political leaders and civil liberty activists to prevent a protest rally. In a clash with the public, the Nepalese Army killed some 21 people. Because of strong indignation abroad, the king released some known political prisoners. But the curfew in Kathmandu continues and so does the suppression of the press and dissenters.

Once again Indian news channels have been stopped, along with cables. People feel increasingly insecure and abandoned. They are not to blame because they have looked towards New Delhi in the past and they still do. It is India which has been keeping its eyes shut to the developments.

The Nepalese generally do not like the Maoists who have introduced violence to their peaceful life. True, the Maoists are today on the side of the opposition but their methodology is considered undemocratic and their ways authoritarian. Not long ago, a UN report described how the Maoists’ armed conflict turned from bad to worse from 1996 — the year they launched their armed rebellion.

People are disappointed with the king because he has suppressed their democratic functioning. But they are not pleased with the Maoists either. They want a bit of both — the king providing an overall umbrella and the Maoists bringing in egalitarianism in the caste-ridden society.

True, New Delhi cannot march its forces into Nepal. But it can at least criticize the king’s rule and give some public evidence of support to the democratic forces. The king should get the message that India would prefer a republic to a monarchy if he does not restore democracy. I think he has already forfeited the right to rule. If he were to realize that New Delhi could go to the extent of putting its weight behind the demand for his deposition, he might mend his ways.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

A rush on lobbying reform

AS US Congress hurtles toward enacting new rules on lobbying and lobbyists, two contradictory risks should be kept in mind. One is that lawmakers won’t do enough to rein in the excesses of the current system. The other is that, in their zeal to outbid each other, they will go too far.

Strange as it may sound — and looking at the competing plans unveiled last week by the two parties — it may be that both will happen. The former danger — not doing enough — is by far the bigger one. Many of those in the vanguard of the push to adopt lobbying restrictions weren’t exactly champing at the bit even a month ago.

So it may not be too cynical to suspect that they would be as happy now with the appearance of lobbying reform as with the reality. One example: The newly energized reformers seem much more eager to eliminate lobbyist-paid lunches than to eliminate their ability to use corporate aircraft at bargain-basement rates. And it’s notable that few of the proposals floating around have much to say about effective enforcement of whatever new rules are adopted.

The lesson of previous reforms is that tightening up in one area while leaving others unaddressed can simply shift abuses elsewhere. Is it really more corrupting for a lobbyist to buy a lawmaker dinner (a practice that would be barred under some of the leading proposals) than to hand him a campaign check over dinner paid for by the lawmaker’s campaign committee (a practice that would remain untouched)?

More fundamentally, if lobbyists wield undue influence, much of the fault lies with other aspects of the system. The relentless hustling for campaign cash, and the role of lobbyists in collecting and delivering those checks, isn’t so much a function of lobbyists and lawmakers behaving badly as of a campaign finance regime that puts both sides in this unseemly position.

Absent an overhaul of that system, lobbyists should be required to disclose not just their own contributions but also the checks they have harvested from others — the real measure of their influence. And lawmakers ought to disclose the dates, venues and attendees at their fundraisers. If dozens of lobbyists ante up to spend the weekend with a key lawmaker, that ought to be made public.

A disturbing practice in which lobbyists play a facilitating role is the placing of special-interest earmarks in spending bills. Many lobbyists have sent their kids to college and beyond on the strength of their ability to get these earmarks inserted without debate or timely disclosure. But this misuse of public money, which ought to be dealt with, can’t be remedied by lawmakers deciding to regulate lobbyists: They need to restrain themselves, which may turn out to be much less pleasant.

—The Washington Post