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August 20, 2008
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Wednesday
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Sha’aban 17, 1429
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Georgia on their mind
By Mahir Ali
FORTY years ago tomorrow, Soviet tanks rumbled into Czechoslovakia to bury an experiment in socialist democracy that had become known as the Prague Spring: a broadly popular effort by elements within the Czechoslovak ruling party to shake up the postwar political model imposed throughout much of Eastern Europe.
It was by no means obvious where the reforms would lead, but the combination of political and cultural freedoms with a socialist economy could potentially have evolved into a model that would have appealed to progressive-minded citizens in Western bourgeois-democracies. The party bosses in Moscow did their capitalist sparring partners a huge favour by decreeing that Czechoslovakia’s course must be reversed by force. Of course, that wasn’t their main purpose: they were driven largely by the fear that the Prague infection might cross borders within the communist bloc.
This was, mind you, the Brezhnev era, characterised by a lack of imagination at the helm, which fed into a determination to maintain the status quo. The epic bloodthirstiness of the Stalin years was a thing of the past, but the spirit of Uncle Joe had not been effectively exorcised (notwithstanding the Khrushchev interregnum), and deviations from the mundane uniformity decreed by the Kremlin were frowned upon. Sadly but inevitably, the Prague Spring was perceived as a challenge to Moscow’s authority.
Had Czechoslovakia’s path not been blocked in 1968, it is at least conceivable that Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union itself would have evolved along different lines, and the upheavals and sharp transitions of two decades later could somehow have been avoided.
Be that as it may, in recent weeks Russian tanks have again been on the move in a foreign land for the first time since Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan 20 years ago. Not surprisingly, the Georgian incursion has elicited semi-spurious comparisons with that earlier invasion. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, for instance, has been quoted as saying: “This is not 1968 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, where Russia can threaten a neighbour, occupy a capital, overthrow a government and get away with it. Things have changed.”
Her boss has made similar noises, albeit without putting himself through the ordeal of trying to pronounce “Czechoslovakia”. The general thrust of American comments can be summed up by Republican presidential candidate John McCain’s pronouncement: “In the 21st century, nations don’t invade other nations.”
For a man who not only fervently supports the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan but has indicated that he is keen to extend a similar privilege to Iran, this is hypocrisy of breathtaking proportions. To point this out is not to imply that the Russian military action against a tiny neighbour was justified. But it does have a context, which has been all but ignored by American officials, politicians and much of the media, partly because the alternative entails acknowledging wrongdoing, or at least brash stupidity, on the part of Mikheil Saakashvili, the young New York lawyer who became president of Georgia four years ago.
His elevation to that post was considered a triumph for US foreign policy, given that he worships the Bush administration, is extremely keen to join Nato, and has contributed more troops to the Iraqi misadventure than any country other than the US and Britain. Nearly half those troops were airlifted back to Georgia with American assistance after the fighting began. Georgia’s modest army has been equipped and trained by the US and Israel, and about 130 American military advisers are based in the country.
It is extremely unlikely that they were unaware of Saakashvili’s intentions or of the likely Russian response. There is thus far no evidence that the Americans encouraged the Georgian provocation — and no explanation for why they didn’t prevent it.
South Ossetia and Abkhazia have long been anomalies in the geopolitical sense, as they were incorporated somewhat arbitrarily into Georgia, despite the absence of strong cultural or ethnic affinities. This did not matter all that much while the Soviet Union was intact, but when Georgia became independent in 1991, the two territories sought to break away. Georgia wasn’t willing to let go, and violence followed. Ultimately, both achieved a degree of autonomy, with Russian assistance. Saakashvili, basing his appeal on a nationalist platform, sought to change this.
His success in recovering two other zones with separatist tendencies may have blinded him to the likely consequences of toying with Russian sensibilities in South Ossetia. He clearly harboured illusions about Georgia’s invulnerability on the basis of his status as one of Uncle Sam’s favourite nephews. The US would have been reluctant at the best of times to directly take on Russia over such a matter, but even the dumbest administration wouldn’t seriously weigh the possibility when it is so obviously otherwise engaged, with its military capacity stretched to the limit.
When a planeload or so of American humanitarian aid headed for Georgia, the nephew had the audacity to announce that US forces would be taking over control of his country’s ports and airports. The uncle’s representatives hastily responded with a string of denials, even as Rice headed towards the war zone — quite possibly relieved to be dealing with a crisis that fell within her area of academic expertise, unlike the blasted Middle East.
However, the secretary of state’s presence in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, had little immediate effect on the Russian show of force. An early ceasefire agreement mediated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy on behalf of the European Union apparently had little effect, as Russian troops overran the town of Gori (which happens to be Josef Stalin’s birthplace), encountering little resistance.
At the beginning of this week, a pullout from Georgia proper was supposedly underway, Moscow having made its point. Long-term occupation was never a prospect, but the future of South Ossetia (and Abkhazia) is no longer in Saakashvili’s hands. In fact, once the upsurge in nationalist feeling wears off, his political future could be in doubt, given the astounding lack of nous that went into staging an unnecessary provocation.
In the years since the Soviet Union imploded, the US has established military bases across a majority of former Soviet republics. Others have been incorporated into Nato, despite promises to the contrary.
Russia has now given notice that it is no longer willing to lie back and accept this encirclement.
It is perfectly reasonable to entertain qualms about a resurgent Russia’s intentions under Vladimir Putin and his handpicked clone, Dmitry Medvedev. However, unlike the Soviet conquest of Czechoslovakia 40 years ago, its resolve to challenge American hegemony in the 21st century may actually pay dividends in the medium term.
The writer is a journalist based in Sydney.
mahir.worldview@gmail.com


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