Turf troubles in Sindh

The Sindh government boasts that it has been more active than the other three provinces in implementing the National Action Plan (NAP) — a contention rooted in the efficiency of its Apex Committee, which has held more meetings than their counterparts in the other provinces. It has also taken the most decisions … only to see very few of them implemented.

Central to the Sindh government’s concerns on poor implementation of decisions is a tug of power between the federal and provincial government. Twice in the recent past, the Sindh government has had to push back Islamabad and the military establishment to keep the paramilitary Rangers to the confines of Karachi division.

Sindh believes that the federal government and its agencies are attempting to encroach upon their turf whereas they need to be empowering them instead.

With much counter-terror business left incomplete, Sindh blames poor implementation of NAP objectives on the federal government

“In Sindh, the Apex Committee has met 16 times in the last 20 months. In the other three provinces, apex committees haven’t held meetings more than five times,” argues a spokesman for the Sindh government. “Have you ever seen anyone from the governments of Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or Balochistan briefing the media about a meeting of their respective apex committee? We have done it each time following a committee meeting.”

And yet, most decisions taken by the Apex Committee have been Karachi-centric.

The remaining 23 districts of Sindh — being the dominant turf of the ruling PPP — have largely been kept shielded from the NAP agenda, as the PPP considers it to be a red herring thrown by the security establishment.

Till now the ruling party has been successful in keeping the paramilitary Rangers from launching a Karachi-like operation in other districts of Sindh. It fears that giving in to pressures from Islamabad and Rawalpindi will translate into the guns being turned on the PPP.

The perception of there being a power joust between the centre and Sindh was further reinforced after the arrests of Dr Asim Hussain, former petroleum minister and a close aide of PPP chief Asif Ali Zardari, and Nisar Morai, who headed the Fishermen Cooperative Society. The duo is in jail facing charges of graft.

“Their arrests by agencies run by the federal government offended the provincial government, which took it as an attack on its turf. At one point, the [continuation of the] provincial government was virtually at stake and was only saved by the soft diplomacy of former chief minister Qaim Ali Shah,” says a senior official privy to the matter.

The outcome of this tiff has had grave implications on meeting the counter-terror objectives detailed in NAP. Sindh faces not just a lack of confidence from the centre but also a shortfall in funds that were pledged by the federal government.

Islamabad had initially pledged Rs14 billion rupees for Sindh’s counter-terror and institutional efforts but it has not provided a single penny yet. The Sindh government has allocated 65 billion rupees for law and order for the current fiscal year. Previously, officials say, the government had spent more than 50 billion rupees on security operations but received no funds from Islamabad.

“Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif agreed to provide five billion rupees to Sindh during his recent meeting with Chief Minister Murad Ali Shah, but we are seeing no signs of any money coming our way,” says an official in the CM House.

Because of a lack of funds, recruitment of 200 special prosecutors has been delayed while just 10 special anti-terrorism courts are functioning, which should have been 26 as per decision of the Apex Committee. Officials claim that the chief minister, exercising his discretionary powers, has ordered the recruitment of 25 special prosecutors, but more special courts will only be set up once funds are made available.

“Because of this shortage of special courts and prosecutors, more than 4,500 cases are currently pending,” explains one provincial government official.

When it comes to surveillance, the federal government has not permitted the Sindh government to have GSM locators, which too was a part of the NAP. Such locators are already being used by Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa authorities. No explanation has been given by the federal government for this restriction.

23 districts of Sindh have largely been kept shielded from the NAP agenda, as the PPP considers it to be a red herring thrown by the security establishment.

Officials say there are just 2,000 surveillance cameras in Karachi, which have a two-megapixel resolution. Not only are these immensely insufficient in number but their resolution quality is also insufficient as it impacts the quality of pictures available to law enforcement. By comparison, London, a smaller city by population, has 60,000 modern cameras for surveillance purposes.

“The federal government’s funds are required for this project as well as for a state-of-the-art forensic lab and explosives analysis lab,” explains another senior official.

Despite this crunch, many government officials and even some high-ranking bureaucrats argue that the provincial law enforcement has been as efficient as was possible given the constraints.

According to Sindh government statistics, a total of 16,654 raids have been conducted in the province since January 2015, which included 3,481 combing and 2,233 search operations. Some 1,198 people have been arrested for violation of loudspeakers; 67 for hate material or speeches; 67 for wall-chalking; and 21 for violating the temporary residents ordinance 2015. Provincial authorities have also arrested 2,366 Afghan nationals for illegally residing in Sindh.

However, despite a lapse of several months, the geo-tagging of madressahs has not yet been completed. Official figures compiled by the Special Branch, Sindh, show they have spotted 10,033 madressahs in the province, of which 1,178 were unregistered or ‘ghost’ seminaries. They claim to have sealed some 2,309 madressahs so far.

Officials in the Sindh government argue that incidents of violence or terrorism in the province outside Karachi have been far and few ever since NAP was introduced. This also corroborates their contention that it is only Karachi that needs NAP to be implemented in letter and spirit.

“We have only witnessed a couple of terror acts in Jacobabad and Shikarpur districts since late 2015. Terror activities by separatist elements are too indistinct to be taken gravely. On the separatists’ front, our police have been working efficiently and have busted many gangs and arrested dozens of separatist activists,” says the government spokesman.

The officer further claims that not a single suicide bomber involved in any attack across the country belonged to Sindh. In comparison, he says, many suicide attackers hailed from the other three provinces. “Despite this, nobody is asking the other three provinces to do their job; all kinds of pressures are exerted on Sindh, which is already doing a good job,” he argues.

But all is not in harmony.

One official of the provincial home department contends that the Rangers have done little to benefit the NAP agenda. It was primarily given the task to take care of those involved in targeted killings, extortion, kidnapping for ransom and terrorism in Karachi.

“But the paramilitary force started an operation against corrupt practices and sources of funding in various cases, which are normally entrusted to the provincial anti-corruption establishment. The situation worsened at that point,” says the official. He calls it a ‘clash of interest’ between the two sides.

“The federal government, beside all this, is also required to consider the re-promulgation of the Protection of Pakistan Act (POPA), which has lapsed now,” contends a security official.

“Everyone is responsible for this unfinished business in Sindh — the provincial government, the agencies working under the interior ministry, and the federal government itself for not owning NAP in letter and spirit.”

The writer is a Dawn staffer

Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, August 28th, 2016