NECESSARY as it is for the political government to lead the rehabilitation and resettlement phase in Fata, especially North Waziristan, in the near-total absence of civilian input, the task is falling to the military leadership — with uncertain long-term consequences for the region. The military leadership, as evidenced by the Peshawar corps commander’s relatively candid news conference on Monday, is trying to do its best, and there is certainly a sense of purpose and determination in its actions. Operation Zarb-i-Azb has been a counter-insurgency success, complementary counterterrorism operations in Khyber Pakthunkhwa are ongoing, and the military appears determined to send IDPs back to a life where hardships enforced by war are mitigated a great deal. There is no reason to doubt that, as pledged by the corps commander, if all goes to plan, rehabilitation work in Fata will be completed by 2019 and by 2021 the military will hand over security duties to the FC and local levies. But as Swat, Balochistan and counter-insurgency generally have demonstrated, the best of intentions and the most specific of plans tend to crumble in the face of governance failures and strategic policy errors.

Until the political class begins to take its responsibilities towards Fata seriously, the security establishment will continue to dominate Fata policy. So, perhaps the candidness of the military commanders should turn inwards to examine policy mistakes, old and new, that could derail the military’s plan to normalise Fata. The increasing blame on Afghan safe havens of anti-Pakistan militants mirrors Kabul’s long-standing complaint that were it not for Afghan Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan, Afghanistan would have been stabilised years ago. Surely, while sanctuaries are a problem for both countries, they are not the core of the problem. Next, while border management is a crucial aspect of Pak-Afghan relations, the military-led approach being pursued is not the right solution. Border decisions need to be taken in political capitals because implementing those decisions is not simply about local, border-area military actions. If anything, militarised border management will only lead to existing problems being pushed further underground and new political tensions being layered on top. Finally, Fata communities will not be rebuilt by economic incentives alone — there has to be a sense of local ownership in the rebuilding and revival of post-conflict areas. The military should be seen as protectors of last resort, not all-powerful overlords.

Published in Dawn, June 1st, 2016