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A FRIEND said the acronym for the National Action Plan, or NAP, was very apt: those responsible for implementing its non-military aspects seem to be napping.
So while many politicians expressed their anger and concern that the military’s public relations arm, the ISPR, should have publicly rebuked the government for falling asleep at the wheel, they failed to tell us why our rulers have proven so inept. Actually, no surprises there: our politicians and bureaucrats are not famous for decisiveness and rapid action.
But even by their low standards, one would have thought that given the dangers posed by jihadi militancy and mindset, the government would have stumbled into action by now. After years of dithering despite the loss of tens of thousands of lives to terrorism, the PPP government finally passed the National Counter Terrorism Authority Bill in 2013.
Our lack of progress on NAP is distressing.
This legislation envisaged Nacta as the supreme anti-terrorism body that would coordinate with all intelligence agencies and provincial governments. Under the act, Nacta would report directly to the prime minister.
And herein lies the rub: clearly, our powerful interior minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, would not want to be bypassed by a mere bureaucrat or police officer. Nor would he want to share the media limelight and the attention he gets from foreign governments as they discuss terrorism-related issues with Pakistan.
The other problem is the reluctance of intelligence agencies to share information with others. In fact, the world over, spooks guard their sources very jealously, and rivalries are common. Here, with several federal and provincial agencies, coordination was always going to be a difficult task.
As a result of these crosscurrents, the current ‘acting coordinator’ of Nacta, Ihsan Ghani, is clearly out of his league. Only a small proportion of the organisation’s sanctioned posts have been filled, and it has reportedly received a fraction of the budget it asked for. We were recently informed that six years after its inception, it has not even framed its service rules.
Implementation of NAP by the government has been just as fitful and lethargic. For instance, the finances of extremist groups were supposed to have been disrupted, but there is little indication that this has been effectively addressed.
Crucially, the reform and regularisation of our thousands of madressahs has not even begun. Although a few of the more virulent ones have been identified, this is a long way from the root-and-branch review of their curricula, financing and teaching methods that is needed. Apart from addressing security concerns, this long-needed reform would benefit millions of children.
But which politician would want to open this can of worms? The government can’t even put the Lal Masjid cleric Abdul Aziz Ghazi in his place. After the death of security personnel at the fire-fight in the mosque in 2007, it must be galling for many in the army to see Aziz strutting around, hurling threats of leading a movement for the imposition of Sharia law.
NAP also calls for basic reforms in the criminal justice system that is currently too cumbersome to try those accused of terrorism quickly. Many of these are released on bail, or declared not guilty, as witnesses are too scared to testify in the absence of a protection programme. Malik Ishaq, the notorious Lashkar-i-Jhangvi chief, was wanted for several murders, and did a few years in jail before being released on bail. Thankfully, he was taken down in an ‘encounter’ with the police a few months ago. This is just one example out of dozens of the shambolic state of our justice system.
Small wonder, then, that the armed forces are seething over the lack of progress on the various points agreed on when the NAP was hammered out. It took the lives of 132 innocent children at Peshawar’s Army Public School to force our reluctant politicians to forge a consensus over a plan of action.
But while the military’s Zarb-i-Azb has yielded some welcome results in terms of neutering militant groups in the tribal areas, many terrorists are lying low. In Karachi, the Rangers have been successful in neutralising criminal gangs earlier protected by political parties. However, in many cases, their godfathers are either abroad, or living in Karachi, protected by the leverage they have in Islamabad.
So while the army has lost hundreds of soldiers fighting a ruthless foe, our federal and provincial governments are dragging their feet. And while it is probable that the army high command has privately communicated its impatience over the slow, ineffective response from the government, it finally went public over the lack of progress.
Those who argue that the government genuinely lacks the capacity to deliver are wrong: after 30 years in the civil service, I know when it wants to, the bureaucracy can deliver. What is needed is the political will in our leadership, and a bit of backbone. Both are in short supply.
Published in Dawn, November 28th, 2015
