THE Pakistan-US partnership is a truly complex one. The more you parse, the murkier the picture gets. With one exception: the constant tendency of both sides to continue talking past each other. It is remarkable how two countries that have worked together so intimately at multiple levels can be so incapable of (or unwilling to) interpreting each other’s signals accurately.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s recent visit to Washington provides a perfect example of how this plays out in reality. I intentionally didn’t write on this topic before the premier’s trip. In retrospect, I should have — if only to highlight how obvious it was to a neutral observer that things would come to a head unless both sides recognised that they were misperceiving each other’s asks, and therefore expecting the impossible.

Till early summer, preparatory conversations seemed to be going according to plan. Pakistan and the US were finally converging on Afghanistan; there was light at the end of the tunnel on the nuclear issue; the US had urged the Modi government to continue dialogue with Pakistan; etc.

It started to unravel thereafter. Both sides felt the other promised certain deliverables but then surreptitiously changed goal posts and backed out.

Pakistan and the US need to continue talking.

Take the discussions on the nuclear deal for example. The US wanted Pakistan to agree to curbs on its nuclear arsenal in return for a conversation about a Nuclear Suppliers’ Group waiver. Pakistan wanted the announcement of a waiver within a set time frame in return for a conversation about the size of its programme, but with no intent to limit it any time soon. Not for a second did either side believe they were signaling the flexibility the other was perceiving. Yet, somehow, both genuinely felt that they were making progress.

The mismatch of expectations was even starker on Afghanistan. Since late-2014, Pakistan had worked to get the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table. Pakistani officials would tell you that this was Kabul and Washington’s key demand. In Washington, policymakers disagreed, arguing the ISI was still backing the Haqqanis and that they had communicated that Pakistan needed to stop the Taliban and Haqqani network from contributing to violence in Afghanistan. Yet, both sides pretended they were working off the same script.

Some argue that these misperceptions allowed for uncharacteristically candid conversations in Washington during the prime minister’s visit. Perhaps. But this means nothing if the two sides will continue failing to absorb each other’s intended messages. The concern applies to each key security issue discussed.

First, Kashmir’s specific mention in the Obama-Sharif joint statement surprised many. The Pakistani side saw it as a success. But I cringe when I see pundits spinning it as a vindication of Pakistan’s position. To avoid another heartbreak, Pakistan must be clear: the US wants India and Pakistan to continue talking and it will push Delhi to that extent. But there isn’t a single notable voice in Washington that supports a US role in Kashmir, or believes that anything but the status quo can be the solution. This isn’t about to change.

On Afghanistan, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made a rather candid statement during his speech at the US Institute of Peace, his last stop in Washington. He categorically ruled out a military solution and argued that Pakistan “cannot bring them [the Taliban] to the table and kill them at the same time”. Decode it keeping in mind that the statement was made in front of a Washington policy audience a day after the official joint statement had rehearsed the US demand that Pakistan force a stop to Taliban and Haqqani activities, and you should be able to grasp the real message: Pakistan will bring these groups to the table but it shall not go after them militarily, period. Judging by the post-visit statements from Washington however, there seems to be a keenness to hold Pakistan to the formulation in the joint statement. Even more worrying is the continued hope that Pakistan will deliver on this count.

Finally, the nuclear discussions were a flop. Both sides are peeved and may feel that putting this conversation in cold storage for now is the best option. Not so. Because the status quo doesn’t help anyone in this case. Instead, they need to continue talking but candidly lay out their red lines even if this will only confirm the major disconnect in their positions. They will at least know what they have to work with.

Pakistani and American interests in South Asia suffer from fundamental divergences — since 9/11. However, the two sides have skirted this reality by kicking the can down the road. This tendency is to blame for their mistrust and communication gap. A better option would be to have honest conversations on the divergences so that they can discover just how much sincere cooperation is possible on each of the key issues.

The writer is a foreign policy expert based in Washington, DC.

Published in Dawn, November 3rd, 2015

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