ACCORDING to the column, ‘A wrong war’ (Sept 9), thousands of our soldiers were dropped across the ceasefire line in Operation Gibraltar. We then penetrated deep into Indian-occupied Kashmir in Operation Grand Slam. Both operations failed. This went on for months. How could we not expect retaliation from the Indians?

PAF reconnaissance aircraft spotted the heavily armed Indian troops inside Pakistan territory in the early hours of the 6th of Sept. President Ayub Khan was informed at 4 am. When he telephoned Gen. Musa the reply was: “He had heard the news and was awaiting confirmation.” Lahore was open and undefended.

“‘65’ war mistakes” ( Sept 22) says that Gen. Musa got alerted late in the evening on Sept 4 and that too by a broadcast from All India Radio.

Both the versions show our ‘high command’ in poor light.

Who can deny that our brave young army officers and men in the trenches put up an outstanding defence along the BRB canal and sacrificed their lives.

Air Marshal Nur Khan, not consulted before Operation Gibraltar, was now on the forefront. The PAF literally knocked out the Indian air force out of the skies. Many lives were lost.

For the author of ‘65 war mistakes’ to just say that all three assumptions made by the ‘high command’ were incorrect or that the foreign ministry misled them is not enough. Neither is it right to take away the credit from these young officers and men who laid down their lives and give it to the ‘high command’.

That Mian Arshad’s coded warning did not reach Ayub Khan is not a mistake, it’s a conspiracy.

No investigation was ever held. Things were just glossed over. The intrigues of civilian leaders both from East and West Pakistan flourished; the complacency of our ‘high command’ became worse. We lost East Pakistan. The contention that the Indians made blunders and we only made mistakes in 1965, is no consolation.

Capt. S. Afaq Rizvi
Karachi

Published in Dawn, October 4th, 2015

On a mobile phone? Get the Dawn Mobile App: Apple Store | Google Play