15
SECTION 4 of the National Action Plan (NAP) pledges a resolve to activate and strengthen the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (Nacta). By appointing an in-service, full-time law-enforcement expert as head of Nacta, the federal government has taken a step toward fulfilling this requirement.
In Pakistan, internal security is the shared domain of 33 provincial and federal organisations. The total strength of these agencies exceeds 600,000; however, in the fight against terrorism the absence of a coordination apparatus has been particularly felt.
In antiterrorism (AT) and counterterrorism (CT) initiatives, coordination is of vital importance. In Pakistan, AT and CT are both civil and military mandates. Also, in our context, CT and AT lie in both the federal and provincial spheres. Therefore, without effective coordination every unit would be exhausting energies in isolation. But a proactive Nacta can prove to be an effective coordination mechanism for the CT effort.
AT and CT both require legal instruments, an institutional edifice, operational and intelligence analyses wings, and institutionalised coordination apparatus. But during the last decade, instead of a synchronised endeavour, we have opted for piecemeal efforts.
We need to differentiate between assessment and speculation.
One of the stated functions of Nacta is to collect data, information and intelligence, and evaluate, disseminate and coordinate with stakeholders. Threat assessment is a second important function. But in the absence of researchers, experts of intelligence and law enforcement, it is not possible to make correct assessments. We need to differentiate between assessment and speculation.
Among Nacta’s important tasks is the effective monitoring and implementation of NAP and improvement of coordination among 33 departments. To liaise with international organisations, review existing CT laws and suggest amendments to the government are among the authority’s other tasks.
In Pakistan, we are very enthusiastic about legislation but there is hardly any effort to assess the efficacy and implementation of the laws. It is high time Nacta assessed the implementation of anti-terrorism legislation and examined the hurdles in its implementation. Nacta should also assess the efficacy of newly created CT departments by the provinces and determine why the conviction rate in terrorism cases is so dismal. Building the capacity of investigators and prosecutors in terrorism cases should be another top priority. For this purpose, Nacta should seek input from anti-terrorism court judges and devise practical steps to improve the conviction rate.
Ideally, in the preliminary phase Nacta should opt for need assessment. Presently, 12 positions in grade 20 and 21 are vacant; the new chief thus needs to make hectic efforts for team-building and talent-hunting. Administrative, financial and professional autonomy will earn dividends for the authority.
For deliberations pertaining to mandate and functions, the Nacta Act 2013 empowers the authority to appoint experts from both government and non-government organisations.
Another important issue is that academic institutions and the functional arms of the government work in isolation. Ideals conceived on university campuses are shelved in the libraries. There are no linkages between academia and the criminal justice system. Our policies are primarily reactive, formulated without much input from academia.
To encourage research and development regarding counter-extremism and CT efforts, Section 14 of the Nacta Act provides inspiration for the ‘Nacta fund’. Since the law has entrusted Nacta to spend grants received from international bodies and the federal government, it is imperative the incumbent administration make efforts not only to raise funds but also immediately initiate arrangements with national and international academic and research institutes to undertake the mapping of extremism- and terrorism-infested areas and work out a preventive plan.
The government should also go the extra mile and take political ownership of Nacta so the nascent body does not become a victim of vested interests. The interior minister has stated that within a few months Nacta will be a fully operational component of the CT apparatus. The government has already allocated additional funds and entitlement of risk allowance for Nacta employees. A major portion of the additional amount will be spent on the establishment of a joint intelligence department.
Monitoring and implementation of NAP’s 20 points is a gigantic task that cannot be performed with a presence only in Islamabad; Nacta should also have a presence in the provincial capitals or establish monitoring and coordination units within the provincial home departments.
To assess the flaws in our post-9/11 CT and AT strategies, Nacta — on the pattern of Sri Lanka — may suggest to the government to appoint a ‘lessons learnt and reconciliation commission’.
Unless Nacta is made a going concern, revamped as per the aforementioned suggestions, it will not be a viable player in the fight against terrorism.
The writer is a police officer.
Published in Dawn, September 22nd, 2015
On a mobile phone? Get the Dawn Mobile App: Apple Store | Google Play
