IN my last article, I had critiqued Pakistan’s India policy. Taking our officialdom’s belief that Indian Prime Minister Modi is trying to isolate Pakistan at face value, I explained that his ability to do so derives from (i) his country’s growing power differential vis-à-vis Pakistan; and (ii) the world’s support to Delhi ahead of Islamabad. Given the respective trajectories and international standing of the two sides, the longer Pakistan resists thinking and acting ‘outside the box’, the more India will gain on both counts.

Therefore, I argued, Pakistan must think afresh about avenues it has traditionally considered no-go areas. The obvious one is enhancing economic ties with India. My plea was not to accept the ‘trade and all else will be okay’ line. Mine is a hard-nosed realist contention that argues for creating leverage over India by locking it into an economic relationship. This could come about if Pakistan agrees to act as a transit country for energy infrastructure and India’s extra-regional trade, and thereby force “India to develop stakes in keeping the Pakistani economy integrated and thus, mainstreamed”.

This logic seems to have piqued the interest of some who matter. It remains for me to further this debate relating to three key aspects.

First, doesn’t India have a shared responsibility to make peace in the region?

India-bashing does little more than allow us to divert attention.

Indeed, if I were writing for an Indian audience, I would equally advocate a serious rethink there because India’s ability to play in the big league will continue to be hampered by its troubled ties with Pakistan. I would also point to many troubling aspects of India’s Pakistan policy and its more hawkish approach to Pakistan versus its other neighbours.

One can go on. But India-bashing does little more than allow us to divert attention and absolve ourselves of all failings. This is precisely what Modi would want if his goal is indeed to isolate Pakistan. Smart policy demands the opposite: thinking about what you can do for Pakistan’s sake even if the other side doesn’t uphold its end of the bargain.

Second, if India is trying to isolate Pakistan, and if I argue that acting as a transit country for energy projects and trade would give us leverage over India, why would India agree to engage in such partnership?

For one, because India is committed to energy projects like Tapi and Casa-1000 that connect Central Asia to India via Afghanistan and Pakistan. Multilateral institutions are already pouring in massive sums of money to build related infrastructure. India won’t be able to walk away from them. It has also much to gain from an overland trade route to Afghanistan and beyond. Admittedly, some other avenues previously suggested (like incentivising India-held Kashmir to conduct their global trade through Pakistan to lock it into Pakistan’s economy) will be much harder to achieve.

Interestingly though, Pakistan will gain even if India doesn’t bite. At the very least, you will be able to prove to the world that you have switched paradigms and are willing to invest on the economic front. India’s attitude would now quite obviously be in contradiction to its assertion that it wants to see a stable Pakistan. You would start creating a constituency in the West (and within India) who will feel compelled to question Delhi’s policies in such a situation. Ultimately, you’ll begin to undercut some of Modi’s diplomatic leverage that is a prerequisite for his supposed isolate-Pakistan policy.

Third, if Pakistan’s goal is to put a stop to the fast growing differential vis-à-vis India, why can’t we focus on options not involving Delhi?

Very simply, because numbers don’t add up in Pakistan’s favour in any other way. Consider the costs: you’ll lose significant transit fees; you will lose the smaller South Asian markets; Afghanistan won’t give you access to Central Asia till you allow it overland trade to India; absent the overland route, Gwadar will face intense competition from Iran’s Chahbahar port; India will continue to keep you out of the fastest growing markets, namely Asean and Oceanic Rim countries; and your traditional markets in the West are saturated and have little more to offer.

You are basically left with China — read CPEC. Indeed, this could be a game changer. But even this can’t deliver optimal results to become the great equaliser Pakistanis wish for unless it is integrated into China’s larger One-Road One-Belt initiative. This larger Chinese vision includes India; the Chinese have already been telling us this.

Pakistan must turn its traditional take on economic ties with India on its head, precisely because this is now the only way for it to be able to achieve what it wrongly believes trade will force it to give up: have a chance of getting India to negotiate more even handedly on all outstanding issues.

The writer is a foreign policy expert based in Washington, DC.

Published in Dawn, September 22nd, 2015

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