General Ziaul Haq was generally aware of what the world thought of him. From time to time, he would be warned by his advisors that his refusal to allow even the illusion of an elected government would leave Pakistan isolated in the comity of nations and that the economy would suffer in that case. By early 1980, the General began thinking of ways of redressing the situation — some 20 months after breaking his pledge of holding elections within 90 days.
In February 1980, a martial law administrators’ meeting was convened, where participants pressed the General to install a political government that was headed by a politician, preferably from Sindh. Gen Zia did not overrule the suggestion, perhaps to show that the army was not against the people of Sindh.
The names of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and Illahi Bakhsh Soomro were discussed as potential candidates to lead the political government.
Jatoi’s name had been circulating ever since the coup. In fact, Jatoi had always been on the winners’ side. He had been visiting the Election Cell after the fall of the democratic government. He had been speaking in ambiguous terms to tell the army leadership that he could bring some like-minded persons from his party and form a government.
As the process of Islamisation takes root, JI begins providing legitimacy to Gen Zia’s government
Through a friendly channel, Jatoi was asked to meet Gen Zia. The meeting subsequently took place at the Army House. Gen Zia was assisted by Gen Khalid Mahmud Arif, Gen Faiz Ali Chishti and Gen S.M. Abbasi, the then governor of Sindh.
Gen Zia spoke in coded terms, asking Jatoi that if he were to accept an important responsibility in governance, how would he fulfil it? Jatoi knew what the General meant, but during the conversation he replied that he might not be of much help if he joined the government alone. Jatoi argued that he would need to form a group of like-minded people from his party and others to run political affairs.
The General reluctantly agreed to the proposal, but at the same time, said that “a mutually acceptable group of persons with good reputations could administer the country till the lifting of martial law.” Jatoi wanted to take Begum Nusrat Bhutto into confidence but Gen Zia did not express any opinion on that. Then Jatoi asked if he could discuss the matter with Ghulam Mustafa Khar. The General immediately replied, “I would not like Mr Khar to be associated.”
The meeting ended on a positive note, as Jatoi said that since he had planned to perform Umra he would like to meet the general after returning from Saudi Arabia. Gen Arif, in his book, Working with Zia, mentions a follow-up meeting, which was held with him to discuss the minute dynamics and details of this partnership.
After performing Umra, Jatoi went to Dubai instead of returning to Pakistan. In Dubai, he met with Ghulam Mustafa Khar, who had come all the way from London for this meeting.
The General now focused his attention towards Islamisation, which included introducing various criminal laws which would purportedly conform to Shariah law, as well as instituting a Majlis-i-Shoora in place of an elected parliament.
Gen Zia found out about this rendezvous well before Jatoi returned from Dubai. After reaching Islamabad, Jatoi tried to meet Gen Zia, but was snubbed. The General did not want to meet him anymore, as according to Gen Arif, Gen Zia felt betrayed.
After this botched attempt at finding a civilian partner, Gen Zia stopped making such efforts ... at least for some time.
On April 12, 1980, Benazir Bhutto and Begum Nusrat Bhutto were released. They had been jailed for the last six months. Both women immediately began meeting with party workers, even though under the Martial Law Order of Oct 16, 1979, political activities had been banned. Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) too had been holding meetings at city centres, but soon, Jamaat got a free hand as the Islamisation process of Gen Zia was in line with their aims.
On May 27, Gen Zia promulgated an ordinance by which the powers of superior courts to review the decisions of military courts and other acts of martial law authorities were withdrawn. This caused much commotion in the legal community but since there was press censorship, the protests could not be aired.
Meanwhile, the General now focused his attention towards Islamisation, which included introducing various criminal laws which would purportedly conform to Shariah law, as well as instituting a Majlis-i-Shoora in place of an elected parliament.
Since instituting the shoora system needed time, Gen Zia began introducing various amendments in criminal laws to make them compatible with Islamic tenets. Since he had met Maulana Maudoodi and gained his support for the process, the JI soon became natural partners with the General.
When civilians were eventually brought into the federal government, the JI bagged some important portfolios such as the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. This support gave the party a strong foundation, enabling it to provide legitimacy to the General’s orders such as Zakat deduction at source or the establishment of the Federal Shariat Court.
In practice, the Islamisation process created a wedge between various Muslim sects, besides bringing changes to legal practice. Some of these orders were only undone years after Gen Zia passed away.
Published in Dawn, Sunday Magazine, April 26th, 2015
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