On April 2, 2015, the US, the UK, Russia, France, China and Germany (P5+1) reached a framework agreement with Iran to limit its nuclear capabilities. Officials agreed on the parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and envisage a final agreement within the month of June. This deal would grant Iran relief from sanctions in exchange for curbing its nuclear programme.

The Iran-Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline has been on the back burner as a result of US sanctions against Iran. Even though Pakistan has maintained that the pipeline is not explicitly prohibited by sanctions, the US has felt otherwise. The project, formalised under the Gas Purchase Agreement of 2009, laid out plans for a natural-gas pipeline running between Iran and Pakistan.

Read: Obama agrees to give Congress a say in N-deal with Iran

This agreement was entered into before the UN imposed sanctions on Iran under UNSC Resolution 1929, as well as before the US aggressively began sanctioning entities that traded or invested in petroleum derivatives with Iran. Since the Gas Purchase Agreement was signed prior to these sanctions, Pakistan was caught in between two conflicting interests: that of financial gain and a solution to Pakistan’s dire energy needs, and better relations with Iran versus that of our alliance with and financial assistance from the US.

The current framework agreement between Iran and the P5+1 would suspend US and EU sanctions, provided that Iran complies with the agreed upon terms to limit its nuclear programme. This includes allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect nuclear facilities and halting enrichment of uranium at select facilities. Although Iran is fighting for the immediate removal of all sanctions, the US has maintained that sanctions will be removed in phases.

Domestic US politics can derail progress with Tehran.

However, these agreements have recently been endangered by domestic politics within the US. The United States Congress has pushed back against the White House’s involvement in a deal with Iran. The US has historically imposed sanctions against Iran in two ways: via the legislature (Congress) or via executive orders passed by the president.

The Iran Sanctions Act 1996, the Com­prehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act 2010 and the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 2012 were all enacted by Congress and impose sanctions on entities investing in the exploration and trade of petroleum resources (including transport by pipeline), export of petroleum products to Iran and the development of petroleum products in Iran, respectively.

After members of Congress expressed concern over the president’s decision to enter in such negotiations without meaningful input from Congress, a compromise was reached to allow Congress the power to approve the JCPOA agreement. Unless the Senate approves the final agreement, the president will not be allowed to lift congressionally enacted sanctions. President Obama will, however, be able to lift sanctions that were imposed by executive orders.

However, local policies like the Senate bill will not have any bearing on the nature of the JCPOA. International treaties come into force in two ways: those that become binding upon signature by the executive versus those that require ratification through parliamentary approval via implementing legislation. The negotiating parties have not explicitly stated whether this treaty will need to be ratified or not. Iran, however, has indicated that they will not negotiate with the legislature of the US, rather, only with the immediate parties present. Therefore, the JCPOA appears to be a treaty that would not require ratification. This assessment is supported by the fact that Senate Bill 615 has mentioned that the JCPOA does not require a vote by Congress in order to commence.

This leaves the US in a precarious position. If Congress rejects the JCPOA agreement after it is reached in June, then America may be forced into non-compliance with the agreement and international law, because local law does not provide a defence to disregarding international commitments.

The US and Saudi Arabia have been pushing Pakistan to focus on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline project. However, the TAPI pipeline would make Pakistan entirely reliant on the stability of Afghanistan’s pipeline in order to transport gas from the Caspian Sea.

Conversely, the IP gas pipeline will directly transport natural gas from Iran to Pakistan without an intermediary. Pakistan stands to benefit from the IP pipeline in more ways than just importing gas — this pipeline could pave the way for importing electricity from Iran, as well as better diplomatic relations between the two.

The removal of sanctions against Iran could hold enormous implications for Pakistan. Talks have reportedly already begun between Iran and Pakistan about beginning construction of the pipeline immediately after sanctions are lifted. This is mutually heartening news for an energy-deprived Pakistan and an economically strapped Iran.

Sikander Shah is the former legal advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Hafsa Ahmad is a political science and economic researcher.

Published in Dawn, April 21st, 2015

On a mobile phone? Get the Dawn Mobile App: Apple Store | Google Play