THE invitation to Nawaz Sharif and other Saarc leaders from Prime Minister-elect Narendra Modi to attend his inauguration was even more surprising than his landslide electoral victory. To put it mildly, Modi has not always been so engaging.

Modi’s rise has been watched with trepidation by India’s Muslims, the Kashmiris and Pakistan. The Indian Muslims have not forgotten his role in the 2002 Gujrat massacre of Muslims, even if Indian courts failed to indict him of complicity on procedural grounds. The Kashmiris resent his desire to abrogate even the token special status they were accorded under Article 370 of the Indian constitution. Pakistanis recall Modi’s words in 2002: “Hindu militancy will destroy Pakistan”.

In his electoral campaign, Modi projected his economic credentials and moderated the extremist rhetoric — an obvious tactical adjustment to broaden his appeal beyond his core Hindu constituency. It was also dictated by priorities of the Indian tycoons who funded the multimillion-dollar, high-tech electoral campaign that secured Modi’s landslide.

Optimists believe that, having gained an absolute majority in the lower house, and thus not dependent on coalition partners, the Modi government will have room for manoeuvre on both domestic and foreign policy. They see the invitation to the inauguration as a manifestation of this. An unidentified Pakistan Foreign Office official even drew a naive analogy between president Nixon’s opening to China and Modi’s putative normalisation with Pakistan.

In Pakistan, some have found solace in Modi’s emphasis on economics rather than ideology. Since development is also the declared priority of the Sharif government, it is believed that the trade and economic cooperation route to normalisation with India can be accelerated

Modi’s invitation is an astute diplomatic move and a mixed blessing for the Pakistan prime minister. Its rejection could have been construed as an unfriendly gesture and justification for future Indian belligerence. However, its acceptance, despite past and recent insults hurled at Pakistan, could cast this country in the role of an Indian satrap, more so if other South Asian leaders attend. The occasion could be utilised by Modi to set the bilateral and regional agenda. In any case, peace is not about to break out between Pakistan and India.

While Modi and the BJP have made tactical adjustments to their ideology, their Hindu hard line remains clearly visible. BJP’s electoral manifesto repeats known objectives — such as building the Ram temple on the site of the destroyed Babri mosque and abrogating Article 370 of the constitution — and some unknown ones — such as “reviewing and updating” India’s nuclear doctrine.

Some of Modi’s campaign comments about Pakistan were extremely derogatory. The best apology he offered for the Gujarat killings was that he was also saddened when a puppy was run over by a car. The open advice being offered to Modi by several former Indian foreign secretaries and high commissioners to Pakistan is to adopt a tough line and a ‘terrorism- centric’ policy towards Pakistan.

Things could get rough if Modi’s promises of economic revival fizzle out. There’s more than an even chance of this happening.

First, Modi’s vaunted economic achievements in Gujarat are not all they’ve been cut out to be. The rich have thrived, but the poor, especially Gujarat’s Muslims, have been further marginalised. Second, the Gujarat ‘model’ cannot be replicated in many other parts of India. Third, with high budget deficits and inflation, and resistance to cutting subsidies and imposing a general sales tax, Modi’s government may not have the financial capacity to stimulate high growth. Foreign investment may not surge into India for many reasons: global slowdown, endemic corruption and ‘nationalistic’ restrictions, such as on retail business, and requirements for local content and technology transfer.

If Modi’s economic programme falters, BJP is likely to turn to the usual political gimmicks to preserve domestic support, especially from its core Hindu constituency. Its manifesto’s promises on the Ram temple, Kashmir, nuclear doctrine, military build-up, would then become the first priority. Pakistan would be consigned to the familiar role of a whipping boy.

Even if Modi’s economic programme is on track, a Pakistan-India crisis could erupt notwithstanding, for instance, if popular demonstrations in Kashmir were put down brutally, anti-Muslim riots break out, ceasefire violations escalate along the Line of Control or a terrorist incident takes place in India (for which Pakistan would be inevitably blamed). Pakistan must thus hope for the best but prepare for the worst.

At this time, it is in Pakistan’s strategic interest to avoid a confrontation with India so that it can focus on promoting economic development, putting down the TTP and dealing with the transition in Afghanistan.

In New Delhi, Nawaz Sharif will need to ensure India’s respect for Pakistan’s sovereignty and its national interests. Pursuing economic cooperation and trade wherever this is beneficial for Pakistan is a legitimate aim. But this will not in itself assure peace and stability. Kashmir remains a time bomb in Pakistan-India relations and requires an equitable solution. India’s conventional and nuclear build-up, and its Cold Start doctrine of sudden attack against Pakistan, have created a hair-trigger strategic environment and must be addressed in any bilateral dialogue. And Islamabad should have the courage to call for an end to India’s interference in Balochistan and support for the TTP, especially in response to India’s loose talk of Pakistan’s ‘sponsorship’ of terrorism.

While embracing Modi’s engagement, Pakistan must keep up its guard and retain the capacity for credible deterrence against India.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

Published in Dawn, May 25th, 2014