A serious situation developed after the government-PNA (Pakistan National Alliance) meeting on June 9, 1977, as no breakthrough could be achieved. The PNA leaders met in the evening and the subcommittee presented its report. After a discussion covering all aspects sprouting from ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’, it was resolved that while the PNA would not shift from its stance on genuine demands and seeking guarantees, it would continue to find an honourable and amicable solution.

The next round began on June 10, which was also attended by Z.A. Bhutto. The meeting began on an optimistic note but the participants soon found themselves in a very grim situation as Bhutto did not appear to ease his stance on six issues — announcement of the election date, appointment of a neutral election commission, end to the emergency, constitution of a caretaker government and guarantees to avoid a March 7-like situation during the polls. The arguments from both sides were so rigid that at times it appeared that there was no way ahead. Such was the deadlock that at one stage Mufti Mahmood and Prof Ghafoor wanted to stage a walkout, but were stopped to vet the press release. The meeting lasted for a little less than two hours and its results were evident in the press release that comprised only three paragraphs. The talks had again reached a stalemate.

Despite the fact that nobody gave an official statement, the news quickly spread that the talks had reached a deadlock. Besides Pakistanis, the envoys of Muslim countries were more worried as they wanted progress on talks to end the stand-off. The Saudi envoy Riazul Khatib immediately called on the PNA leaders and on the morning of June 12, when the sixth round of talks was to be held, he met Bhutto in a bid to press for an amicable solution.

On the same evening when both teams met, the government negotiators presented a draft of proposals containing 24 points. These proposals countered all points presented by the PNA earlier. However, its main points clearly affirmed that elections to the National Assembly would be held on Oct 7, 1977; though the elections to the provincial assemblies might be held on the same day or within three days. All those detained during protests after Jan 6, 1977 would be released except those involved in criminal cases; a committee would be formed to decide their fate on a case-to-case basis. All affected in the agitation after March 14, 1977 would be compensated. The Defence of Pakistan Rules and the tribunals created therein would come to an end as soon as the accord was signed. The army would stop assisting the civil administration in Balochistan four months after the signing of the accord. The election commission could call the army for assistance during the polls. In a week’s time, the two parties would evolve a code of conduct for holding elections. An implementation council, as also suggested by the PNA, would be formed comprising four members from each side and in case of a dispute, the matter could be referred to the chief justice who would nominate three judges as arbitrators.

During the two-hour session no lengthy discussions were held; only the government’s proposals were read out and both sides said that they wanted a fair solution. However, the PNA reiterated that it should be in accordance with the wishes of the people who had struggled for a just system. The PNA pledged to discuss the proposals and return with some appropriate answers.

June 13 was a crucial day. Apparently the talks had reached a deadlock but both sides still made attempts so as not to be held responsible for the failure. Although the government had proposed that the elections could be held on Oct 7, 1977, it emerged that this was not possible; instead November or December were suggested as more appropriate months. In contrast, the PNA wanted the polls in August. This point could also have been resolved. But the demands of Sherbaz Mazari, Begum Nasim Wali Khan and Asghar Khan were more intriguing; they insisted on the dissolution of the Hyderabad Tribunal where Wali Khan, along with his 54 National Awami Party leaders, was being tried for the so-called London Plan since 1973, and an end to the army presence in Balochistan.

Both demands related to the army which had reportedly told Bhutto not to adhere to the two demands. It is reported that when Bhutto informed the PNA team about the government’s stand on these two demands, Prof Ghafoor appeared dismayed. However, Bhutto expressed a desire to meet Sherbaz Mazari and Nasim Wali separately, perhaps to tell them the truth and explain the severity of the situation, but both refused to meet him for no apparent reason.

Thus the state of deadlock continued.

Next week: Bhutto seeks commanders’ views on handling the situation

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