MORE than 10 members of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) faction led by Hakeemullah Mehsud have reportedly been killed in Karachi since August.

According to news reports, these deaths are the result of clashes with the TTP faction loyal to Waliur Rehman, the TTP commander who was killed by a drone strike earlier this year.

This infighting is sparked by tussles over extortion funds collected by the various TTP factions operational in the city. It is the latest sign not only of how well entrenched the TTP are in Karachi (as in other cities), but also that they’re here to stay.

Given the atrocities the TTP regularly commits, it is not surprising that the organised criminal dimension of its operations is often overlooked. But this dimension is significant. TTP militants have long flocked to Karachi to regroup, shop, smuggle weapons, seek medical treatment, and even work seasonal jobs.

A few years ago, the group reportedly began fundraising in the city through high-stakes kidnappings for ransom and bank robberies. Now, it is a major criminal contender in the city, controlling numerous neighbourhoods and running brutal extortion rackets, announcing its demands to businessmen through two bullets wrapped in a piece of paper.

Which begs the question, how will the TTP’s forays into organised crime feature in the proposed peace talks with the government? Talk of talks has until now focused on issues of the Sharia and sovereignty — that is, the TTP’s demands that Pakistan abandon its Constitution and democratic system in favour of rule by Sharia law, and that the government put an end to US drone strikes in Fata.

If recent history is anything to go by, peace talks, if they do take place, are likely to result in a deal whereby the TTP agrees to stop targeting state security forces in exchange for the cessation of military operations (and perhaps drone strikes) in areas where it dominates. There has been no mention of the TTP halting its criminal activities in Karachi or other cities, either as a condition or concession.

This is ill-considered. As the government seeks to engage the TTP, it cannot separate the group’s jihadi and criminal activities. To begin with, recognising that the TTP has taken the shape of a mafia in Pakistan’s urban centres could help clarify thinking around the proposed talks. Would the state negotiate with criminal elements? Would the population be as supportive of government overtures to criminals as it has been of rabid ideologues?

By only engaging the TTP’s demands regarding drone strikes and Sharia law, the government risks sanctioning the group’s criminal activities. This would be a very dangerous precedent since — make no mistake — the TTP in the shape of a criminal syndicate is here to stay in our cities.

In Karachi, TTP factions hailing from South Waziristan, Swat and Mohmand are said to have systematically taken control of certain areas by killing ANP leaders and anti-Taliban elders, and then collecting a ‘terror tax’ — protection money in their parlance — from the traumatised residents who remain. Such an entrenched and lucrative presence will not be easily surrendered.

Moreover, in the (unlikely) event that the TTP does scale down terror activities such as suicide bombings and ambushes against security personnel, its leadership will probably focus on consolidating urban criminality. This means a lose-lose scenario for Pakistan: increased criminality in our rapidly growing and increasingly fragile cities will lead to localised strife (such as the turf wars that plague Karachi), economic paralysis, the further collapse of law enforcement agencies, and, ultimately, the weakening of the state through criminal rather than militant means.

And let us not be naive: what will the TTP do with funds generated from growing criminal activities in increasingly affluent cities (if not continue with its campaign against the Pakistani state)? The group has already made its ambitions of waging global jihad clear.

If the TTP’s criminal activities are allowed to flourish, we can expect to see more attempts such as the attempted bombing of New York’s Times Square. The consequences for Pakistan of a successful international terrorist attack are terrible to contemplate.

For the reasons outlined above, it is time our government and media addressed the TTP’s criminal deeds alongside its acts of terrorism. The absence of this discussion shows how the TTP has managed to shape the narrative around its growing criminality to its advantage, as it has on other matters.

The group continues to deny that it is extorting funds or robbing banks, saying these activities are carried out by others in the name of the Taliban in order to defame the group. Too many Pakistanis have believed the group when it has denied responsibility for brutal attacks (including, the bombing at All Saints Church in Peshawar), so their gullibility on the TTP’s criminal acts is to be expected.

There is, of course, one other way in which the TTP’s criminal activities could feature in proposed talks. Until now, the group has not made any demands the government can easily fulfil. By some perverse calculation, the group may ask that the state turn a blind eye to its criminality in exchange for the cessation of terrorist attacks. In the short term, this may seem like a good bargain. But in the long term, it would be tantamount to surrender. As weak and befuddled as our government is, it must not ignore the criminal element of the overall threat posed by the TTP.

The writer is a freelance journalist.

huma.yusuf@gmail.com