IT is about time the United States clearly defined its interests in Afghanistan, the objectives it aims to accomplish and stated candidly and publicly the policy it proposes to pursue.

The situation today is radically different from what it was on 9/11. Even then, as a book published a few days ago reveals, deliberations within the US administration “reflected an inchoate approach that would undermine the coming intervention in Afghanistan”. Afghanistan How the West lost its way

Tim Bird and Alex Marshall's book bears an apt sub-title . In a crucial meeting at Camp David, on Sept 15, “only Al Qaeda and Iraq, not the Taliban, were deemed to be 'strategic threats' to the US”. On Oct 7, air operations were begun as a prelude to combat on the ground. The Taliban regime was swept aside. On May 2, the Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden was killed.

What, precisely, then are America's aims in Afghanistan in mid-2011? One would think no more than the establishment of peace and a stable government based on a consensus; domestic and external. It would seem, however, that it has far wider aims in mind. It seeks to extract from Afghanistan, in its hour of need, a 'Permanent Bases Agreement'. The New York Times

In a speech to the Asia Society on Feb 18, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke of “a long-term framework for our bilateral cooperation”. The details were reported from Kabul by correspondent Rod Nordland on April 20. Apparently, formal talks on a long-term agreement began in March under Marc Grossman who succeeded Richard Holbrooke, as President Barack Obama's special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The name of the game is a 'Strategic Partnership Declaration'. A State Department delegation visited Kabul to fill in the details.

News leaked out. Iran's interior minister rushed to Kabul followed by the national security advisers of Russia and India. A political adviser at the Russian embassy in Kabul Stefen Anikeen, pointedly asked: “How is transition possible with these bases? A 10- or 20-year agreement can be prolonged at any time. And we have no guarantee they're not permanent.” As the French shrewdly say, nothing lasts longer than the temporary.

Far sharper was the criticism made by Ataullah Ludin, deputy chairman of the High Peace Council which President Hamid Karzai set up to promote talks with the Taliban. He said: “The Americans have not been honest about this, even among themselves. One says we are not building bases; another says we are building them.” The denials are deceptive. More recently, Zalmay Khalilzad, former US ambassador to Afghanistan, urged what he called a minimum, permanent 'military presence' in the country.

Nato's heads of state decided last November in Lisbon that foreign forces would withdraw by the end of 2014 and security duties would be transferred to the Afghan National Army. An orderly withdrawal depends on two factors — Pakistan's assistance and an accord with the Taliban who insist on the withdrawal of foreign forces.

The US attempts will only muddy the waters and make a settlement almost impossible. Who will suffer the most? Pakistan, of course, Michael Krepon, co-founder of the prestigious Stimson Centre in Washington D.C. warned the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on May 5, “We might also reconsider our present course. In my view, our Afghan policies hurt, rather than help Pakistan to find its balance.” With stark realism Krepon proceeded to add, “If authorities in Afghanistan are unable to safeguard our military's hard-won gains, we are obliged to ask how much more blood and treasure ought to be devoted to this cause. I acknowledge that there are risks in accelerating reductions in the US level of effort in Afghanistan. In my view, greater risks and costs are incurred by remaining on our current glide path.” The New York Times

Krepon's plea for accelerating efforts “to secure a political settlement”, alongside steeper reductions in the troop levels, would have won Richard Holbrooke's full support. His widow, Kati Marton, shared with Nicholas D. Kristof of some of his “scattered reflections” now in her hands. “He thought that this could become Obama's Vietnam. Some of the conversations in the Situation Room reminded him of conversations in the Johnson White House. When he raised that Obama did not want to hear it. …Richard never thought that this war could be won on the battlefield”. He sought a “viable lasting solution”. The only way out of the mess was “a peace deal with the Taliban”. Le Nouvel Observateur

There is a certain irony in the Vietnam analogy. True, the Soviet Union bears a heavy responsibility for its invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. But what went unnoticed is that months earlier president Jimmy Carter had accepted the proposal of his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, to deliberately provoke a Soviet invasion intended to create Moscow's “own Vietnam”. Brzezinski spilled the beans in an interview to of Paris (Jan 15, 1998). Carter signed the fateful directive on July 3, 1979 for secret aid to the Mujahideen. “I wrote a note to the president … this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention … We didn't push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly created the probability that they would.” Later, the US brought in some 20,000 Arabs, including Bin Laden, to fight the Soviet troops. It is now faced with another Vietnam of its own making.

In consequence the entire region has suffered grievously. Holbrooke made a sage remark. Pakistan “was centre stage; Afghanistan was a sideshow”. It is all to the good that on April 16, a delegation led by Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani visited Kabul. He was accompanied by army chief Gen Kayani, DG ISI Lt-Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha, and the ministers for defence and the interior. By all accounts they agreed on the framework of a strategy for peace. These efforts will be wrecked by America's lust for bases and the region will be destabilised for a long time to come.

The writer is an author and a lawyer.