HAT started as a case of an unknown citizen of Christian faith, Aasia Bibi, has now gone far beyond the prospects of her fate. What scenario awaits her future and whether she will get any further recourse to law in order to clear her name is quite uncertain. In the meantime, blasphemy is no longer the issue as nobody with sane mind would commit the sin of insulting the Messenger of God.

The problem is the abuse of the law. Statistics do not lie; both Muslim and non-Muslim citizens are exposed to its abuses. There are two aspects of this problem: first, accusation made in the name of blasphemy to score personal or private grievances can be straightened out in due course through procedures in the criminal code; second is more intractable as indicated by the fact that quite often a person accused of blasphemy is murdered in the broad daylight and the killer is acclaimed as a hero. Salman Taseer is only the latest notable example in this regard. Many other known and unknown persons have suffered this fate.

It is the second problem, therefore, that has brought notoriety to Pakistan, and rightfully so, from the international community. In its recently organised rallies, Tehrik-i-Namoos-i-Risalat (TNR) has conveniently ignored it. The position advocated by Minister of Law and Justice Mr Babar Awan, seems to be no different. A copy of his unsigned memorandum to the prime minister, published in a local newspaper, advises him against amending blasphemy law. Usual arguments are offered in support of the position, emphasising theory but ignoring practical deviations: that the constitution guarantees legitimate interests of minorities, that legal remedies are available to protect rights of the people, and that propaganda against Pakistan fails to recognise that safeguards are embodied and entrenched in judicial system of the country.

The memorandum also points out that in having blasphemy law in its statutes is not exceptional for Pakistan. He cites a long list of other countries in support of his contention. But he weakens his argument by mixing both developed and developing (especially Muslim) countries in this regard.

In Canada, for example, it is doubtful that a case of blasphemy would hold in a court of law in light of its very comprehensive charter of rights and freedoms. The memorandum therefore compounds the challenge facing the PPP-led coalition government which has assumed a defensive position, with prime minister in his mea culpa extending his assurances that the government had no plans to change or amend the blasphemy law.

The amendment to the law proposed by Sherry Rehman, for example, has been withdrawn at the insistence of the party. A duly submitted proposal for consideration of the parliament, however, would call for application of proper process which oddly has been ignored in the above memorandum. If it had been determined not to proceed with it, then appropriate democratic rules should have been followed and let it expire when the house was prorogued. A better, and a more honourable, course of action would have been to establish a joint committee of the legislature to examine the issue and deal with it in accordance with its recommendations.

When Mr Shahbaz Bhatti was appointed as minister of minorities, there was hope that he would search for a solution to the problem faced by the minorities. But he himself became victim, however, of the smear campaign which is the haul mark of many religious leaders. He was accused of committing blasphemy by Ahmed Mian Hammadi, a Muslim cleric when he rose to the defence of the two Christian brothers who were murdered in July 2010 for `committing` blasphemy. This was a clear call for the government to review the situation and appoint a committee consisting of qualified scholars to examine the situation. Nothing was done. It is especially sad because a higher proportion of Christians has been the victim of blasphemy law, over 50 per cent, in the context of the fact that they belong to a minority constituting only 3 per cent of the population.

Returning to the murder of Salman Taseer in broad daylight by his own bodyguard, as referred to above, there obviously seems to be more than meets the eye, especially in terms of reaction of the Zardari government. It is reasonable to assume that President Zardari was aware of the planned visit of Taseer to meet Aasia Bibi in the jail and to assure her that justice would be done in her case. It can be argued that the call for pardon was premature. He should have taken steps to make sure that the law would be allowed to take its course. Now, as far as President Zardari is concerned, Taseer event is a closed chapter. He has said nothing, not even a word about the manner the Governor of Punjab was murdered. Such is the pull of expediency in the official circles about the grave matters facing the nation.

The roots of the problem run deep. It started with pampering of religious lobby by the politicians. The Objectives Resolution is an early example of this policy. Still, the 1956 constitution managed to provide for a balanced membership of institutions such as Council of Islamic Ideology both from moderate experts and the religious groups. This was unacceptable to the latter and they got their wishes fulfilled during Z.A. Bhutto regime, with further extension of their monopoly under military rule of General Ziaul Haq.

The legacy left for Muslims by the Messenger of God is the two pillars of the Quran and Sunna. It is this legacy which was the source of interpretations done by early theologians, through ijtehad. The literature is rich and diverse, as all points of view were equitably considered. Thus Sharia was born. Later, the four well-known imams in the Sunni tradition and the imams in the Shia tradition developed their schools of thought, respectively. Within each of the two main branches of Islam, the diversity of views was accepted and respected.

The credentials of the theologians were determined by long periods of training as disciples and by their scholarly publications. It was this rich evolutionary legacy that received a blow from several sources including al-Ashari and Ghazali who claimed that doors to ijtehad were closed and Sharia was frozen in time.

In this framework Islam in Indian subcontinent kept its own dynamics. Political and intellectual alignments of the main Sunni Islamic groups were clustered around five distinct religious movements: the Darul Uloom in Deoband (to reform and purify the old order), the Faranghi Mahal and Nadvatul Ulama in Lucknow (to promote something of a new order), and the Barelvis (tradionalist belief and social accommodation). With Partition the situation changed. Now there are no academies or seminaries equivalent to those in India. The dominant points of view are nevertheless represented by those Ulema who claim to be Hanbali-Wahabi-Deobandi or Barelvi.

Barelivis are structured under various organisations and many charity and terrorist organisations claim Deobandi affiliation. There are many notable examples of sectarian violence indicating disputes between Barelvis and Deobandis. Also, the Barelvis have taken a clear position against the Taliban movement, in line with their opposition to Puritanism.

Do Barelvis represent tolerant Islam as generally claimed by many commentators? A clear answer to this question is not possible. They follow a variation of Hanafi jurisprudence and do not believe in ijtehad. Many scholarly publications have underlined what may be regarded as the core value of their faith: the Holy Prophet with extraordinary attributes such as quality of noor (light); hazir (ominipresent); and ilm-e-ghaib (knowledge of the unseen). Barelvis express these beliefs through celebration of Milad-un-Nabi, among other practices including asking the ‘awliya’ to intercede to God on behalf of the living. These values distinguish them from other Sunnis many of whom regard them as pure ‘shirk’ or ‘bidat’.

The focus of the Tehrik-e-Namoos-Risalat should be examained in light of this reality. Once the TNM gathered momentum, however, the Ulema from other sectarian groups could have stayed away from it only at their own peril.

Blasphemy is not mentioned in the Quran and Sunna is a well known fact. Several Muslim countries have provided for a variety of punishments to those charged with this crime but are open to abuse. In Pakistan, however, death penalty is awarded as the only punishment, as determined by the Federal Shariat Court, on the basis of a code whose language is open to interpretation and is also very much open to abuse.

The writer is a retired professor. izzud-din.pal@videotron.ca