ON the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the uprising of 1857 against the British Raj in India, we organised three conferences — in Lahore, Karachi and Gujrat. The idea was to recall and analyse the events of that historic year.

Some friends raised questions about its relevance to the times in which we are living. We realised how people can misunderstand history and take it as an obsolete discipline.

True, all historical events are not relevant to the present. But very often those events which are forgotten surface again in a pattern that sheds light on the happenings of today and inspire us to learn lessons from the past. The commemoration of 1857 not only serves to revive the past and to help us remember the sacrifices of those who fought against foreign rule, it also helps us understand the people’s response to such rule. Thus we can grasp its consequences.

The revolt of 1857 was a widespread popular reaction against British rule and its injustices. But the paradox was that there were also a number of native groups and individuals who supported and collaborated with the British. That raises the question: why did they collaborate with a foreign power against their own people?

There were actually three groups which had supported British rule.

First, there were those who were in the service of the East India Company and, following the tradition of loyalty, defended the Company’s interests.To them the Company Bahadur was personified as their patron whose servants they were and to support it in case of trouble was their moral duty as they had eaten salt with them — (namak halali). Being low-ranking office-holders, they were overawed and impressed by the Company’s organisation and its military power.

Second, there were the princes and feudal lords whose interest it was not to get involved in any conflict which could endanger their own property and privileges. They realised that the rebel forces could not successfully fight against the well-disciplined and well-organised British army. They were not interested in supporting a losing cause and paying heavily in the end. Only those princes and jagirdars sided with the rebels who had already lost their positions as a result of political structural changes.

The third group consisted of those who sincerely believed that British rule would modernise India. To them, foreign intervention offered the only option to pull India out of its backwardness. How far were these expectations proven correct? This is a question that needs to be analysed in order to understand the colonial period. As a matter of fact, British rule in India was beneficial to only those sections of society which were already at a certain level of civilisation and culture. Such was the case with the Brahmins and the Muslim bourgeosie.

The rest of the Indian population was backward, illiterate and extremely poor. The benefit of political reforms and technological advancement did not reach the majority. Here is an example for those who believe that relinquishing our national sovereignty and accepting foreign intervention is the only solution to our problems. The fact, as history tells us, is that nations cannot be reformed by alien and foreign powers. Only their own leaders can change them.

When the rebellion of 1857 was over, the British started to analyse its causes. The revolt had been too unexpected for them and they failed to understand why there was such a strong reaction against their policies. Some British bureaucrats reached the conclusion that the revolt was masterminded by the Muslims and the Hindus were just trapped in it. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, for one, was very much concerned with the hostile attitude of the British towards the Muslims. He had already written The Causes of the Indian Mutiny and Tarikh-Sarkashi-i-Bijnor (The History of the Mutiny of Bijnor). To respond to this allegation and to prove the innocence of the Muslims, he started to write a series of articles known as ‘The Loyal Mohammedans’.

He collected material from those Muslims who had supported the British during the rebellion and had protected their lives and properties, in some cases at the cost of their own lives. In his articles, Sir Syed mentioned the certificates which were given to the loyal servants of the Company by British officers acknowledging their support and loyalty. He also mentioned the awards of the British government to these people in the shape of landed properties and robes of honour in appreciation of their loyalty. He convinced the British that all Muslims were not against their government. On the other hand, they had respect for Christians as ‘people of the Book’ and remained loyal to their cause.

The interpretation of 1857 changed with the emergence of nationalism and the ‘mutiny’ was interpreted as a ‘national war of independence’. The heroes of the British became the villains of the people. However, the families of those ‘loyal Mohammedans’ who were awarded landed properties and cash remained as powerful and influential as before, especially in parts which later became Pakistan. For lack of historical knowledge and perception they are never brought to justice. The result is that there is no anti-colonial approach in our historical narrative. On the contrary, there is great admiration for British rule.

What is the lesson of history? History tells us that imperialism cannot succeed in occupying another country without local collaboration. Today, we are facing the same situation in Iraq and Afghanistan on the one hand and Palestine on the other. We are hearing the same arguments that with the help of foreign powers and intervention, religious extremism and terror will be wiped out. Again, history tells us that it is not correct. We cannot rely on others to fight our wars.

We learn from 1857 that the defeat of a resistance movement is not the end of the struggle, as those involved in it always learn a lot as a result of defeat and correct their approach for the next engagement. The events that followed 1857 were a mix of violence and non-violence. It was not the constitutional approach alone but also resistance which consequently led to our independence.

THE government lacks self-definition and will not gain public confidence until it makes clear two fundamentals: General Musharraf’s standing as a president vis-à-vis the new executive and legislature; and the precise content of the new executive and legislature’s implementation of the mandate for the restoration of the deposed judiciary.

The hurdles have not been crossed. Instead ‘constitutional packages’ and sundry modalities are discussed.

After transparent delaying tactics, the official emphasis is on the urgency of keeping the coalition intact while not upsetting a delicate balance with western allies who find Musharraf comfortable. One deprecates the kind of confrontationism that could derail the democratic process. But if prime objectives and principles are foregone isn’t the train left on track devoid of the goods?

Looked at this way, there seems much wisdom to the principle of an electoral boycott that made elections contingent upon the renunciation of the lately-retired-COAS president and his regime’s election commission. Elections such as the boycott league were holding out for would have left the decks cleared for tackling explicit problems and responsibilities.

Yet, even in hindsight, given the rapprochement between Benazir Bhutto and General Musharraf and in the post-assassination context, the PML-N is not to be faulted either tactically or in principle for not having stayed with the boycott. But the same may not be said for staying with the ruling coalition regardless of choosing the role of loyal parliamentary opposition.

Ms Bhutto held the democratic oppositional initiative in exile. Much of the PML-N had been absorbed into the PML-Q but Musharraf was not able to bring enough PPP (Parliamentarians) into his approved brand of PPP (Patriots). Makhdoom Amin Fahim’s fidelity was exemplary. Eventually, Benazir Bhutto herself chose to come to terms with Musharraf in ‘transitional’ politics. A boycotting Nawaz Sharif would have left the PML-N facing a long spell outside parliamentary parameters, contending with an electorally revitalised military establishment and its new parliamentary crutch.

That is why Ms Bhutto in the context of deal politics appeared more a compromised heroine than a compromising one. For the deal was brokered among General Musharraf, Benazir Bhutto and the US. Like the general, Ms Bhutto too had a personal stake in how the judiciary ruled on cases; yet the treatment meted out to Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry had brought people on to the streets and she expertly rode the crest of that wave. She was uniquely positioned to hunt with the hounds and run with the hare. Nobody in the PPP today has the standing to attempt the same feat; and probably she would not have intended to pull it off too long.

The grassroots democratic inclinations would have been too strong. Whatever else they may or may not bring about, the elections have demonstrated General Musharraf’s lack of popular standing. Whether the new government has the perspicacity or the will to honour its mandate we do not know.

It is hard to put a kind interpretation on the government’s dilly-dallying. Were Gen Musharraf to dissolve this parliament, validly ensuing elections would simply serve him a stronger rejection certificate. As far as continuity and compatibility with US policies go, that country’s loquacious officials have already nodded graciously at the new COAS, the prime minister and the powers behind him.

There should be no hurdles there, unless the gracious inclination includes something undisclosed to the public. And if that understanding is reached in the supreme national interest why not let the nation share it? An independent judiciary strengthens democratic institutions and perhaps the US prefers a less vibrant democracy in frontline states.

However, a vibrant democracy itself, the US cannot but be deeply embarrassed by the flak that comes with not explicitly rejecting the kind of blatant misdemeanours General Musharraf displayed in his dealings with the judiciary. If this elected government collapses any makeshift junta would simply exacerbate the problems that compelled General Musharraf and his avid underwriters into seeking a B team. Western allies need to access Pakistani sentiment, not just its would-be handlers.

As undoubted coalition leader, the PPP can easily play games with various political elements and rework the coalition and stay in the saddle. But how wise is that course? Precedents show that breakaway factions from the PPP never prospered the way that breakaway parties from the Muslim League did. But it could be fallacious to apply this logic to the PPP as it stands today. PPP breakaways did not prosper because in doing so they were settling for less than the common people’s commitment to the democratic egalitarian principles that are the animating principles of that party.

Benazir Bhutto’s heirs are differently placed to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s heirs. His wife, Begum Nusrat Bhutto, battled with a dictator while he was under trial. She nursed the party under threat and through adversity, giving its devotees a rallying point and keeping the core intact for their daughter. Begum Bhutto’s strong political past underwrote an untried Benazir’s personal commencement in office. Bhutto himself dominated the political scene when apprenticing Benazir.

Benazir tutored Bilawal while herself at a remove from the issues besetting Pakistan. No one thought she was ready to manage things after a short trip to Simla with Daddy even though she watched the making of the Simla agreement. The PPP cadres today may have a share of impassioned hooligans as all our political parties do alas; but it also has party men and workers who do not see the party vehicle as a means to mere self-advancement. A PPP breakaway if the new heirs mishandle the heritage could simply be leaving the flamboyant shell behind and taking the hard core along.

The hitherto inglorious PML-N is also at a critically determinant stage. It has a chance to outgrow its original military-establishment affiliations and live down its use of provincial clout and its leadership’s obsession with un-curtailed power. It has to handle both the advantages and disadvantages of its leaders’ un-anglicised cast intelligently.

Undeniably, the Sharif brothers appear more media savvy as well as suitably chastened. But their party has no record of parliamentary opposition except as aides to the perennial forces for the status quo. Personalities like Javed Hashmi are giving it a new tone, but the Sharif family has to show how it adjusts to party men with dimension and substance.

Although we bemoan Pakistan’s faltering over 60 years, the undaunted quest betokens determination as well as resilience. It is not that easy to set aside principle in the guise of pragmatic politics. Pakistanis will always watch the direction pragmatism takes: there is every reason to hope the just cause will not be abandoned. This time it would also be bad politics. Sometimes it actually pays to be honest.

NOW it is clear that Saddam Hussein had no WMDs, that Al Qaeda has become stronger in Iraq, and that liberal democracy has failed to spread through the Middle East, one fallback justification for the Iraq invasion remains: it overthrew a murderous, fascist dictator.

Even if it went catastrophically wrong, runs the argument, the invasion had a good, liberal, humanitarian cause embedded in it. In that sense, as Tony Blair often suggested, it was like the second world war. Much of what the allies did between 1939 and 1945 – the blitz on German towns and cities, the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki – may have been morally questionable, but the ultimate war aim of overthrowing fascist regimes was irreproachable.

But was the second world war quite what we think it was? I have just read Human Smoke, by the American author Nicholson Baker. It has caused controversy in the US, and will probably be the most hotly debated book of the year when it reaches Britain next month.

Baker’s account, however, reminds us that the war was not fought for humanitarian or democratic ends. Britain fought Germany for the same reason it had always fought wars in Europe: to maintain the balance of power and prevent a single state dominating the continent. America fought Japan to stop the growth of a powerful rival in the Pacific.

The book ends on December 31 1941. At that moment, he says, “most of the people who died in the second world war were still alive”. The idea that wars can be “helpful” is a relatively new conceit. The second world war started when Britain went to “Poland’s aid”.

As AJP Taylor pointed out in The Origins of the Second World War: “In 1938, Czechoslovakia was betrayed. In 1939, Poland was saved. Less than one hundred thousand Czechs died during the war. Six and a half million Poles were killed. Which was better – to be a betrayed Czech or a saved Pole?”

We have given the second world war such a retrospective glow that many now believe that it was fought because Hitler was beastly to the Jews. Yet at the time, almost nobody talked about the Jews. Hitler’s intention to murder every Jew in occupied Europe was well corroborated by December 1942. In that month Rabbi Stephen Wise, head of the American Jewish Congress, presented President Roosevelt with a 20-page dossier called Blueprint for Extermination. The House of Commons stood for a minute’s silence after it heard of this “bestial policy”. Yet nobody in authority gave more than a few minutes’ thought to how Jews could be saved.

Would the Holocaust have happened if there had been no war or if the western democracies had acted against Nazi Germany earlier? We can never know – though it is likely that, if Britain had made peace in 1940 after the fall of France, the Jews would have been sent to Madagascar. What is certain is that the war prevented any concerted attempt at rescue.

Once Britain was at war with Germany, it existed on a similar moral plane. Baker records how the British, not the Germans, started the night bombing of civilian populations, and how Churchill wouldn’t allow food relief to occupied Europe.

Romanticising the second world war has led us into foreign policy traps ever since. We look for new crusades against new Hitlers and new Mussolinis. We yearn to cheer our young men into “good wars”, to fight once more against the simple badness of fascism. Tony Blair thought he could detect a national interest in fighting Saddam because he was so anxious to emulate Churchill and defeat “evil”. Hitler was monstrous and wicked; but we fought him, not for that reason, but because he was trying to make his country a rival great power, using force where necessary.

Other leaders, including British and American, have pursued similar foreign policies. As Taylor observed, there was nothing especially wrong with Hitler on the international stage except that he was a German. Equally, there was nothing wrong with Saddam except that he was an Iraqi. The difference between him in 2003 and Hitler in 1939 was that the latter posed a genuine threat and there was no need to quote liberal or humanitarian justifications.

— The Guardian, London

The writer is a former editor of New Statesman.