April 28, 2008	Monday	Rabi-us-Sani 21, 1429

With food and power security threatening the social fabric, the new government would do well to have a fresh look at the working and utility of the Indus River System Authority (Irsa) – a body charged with (mis)handling water affairs for the last 15 years.

Unfortunately, Irsa has reduced itself to a debating club, where provincial officials, loyal to their ethnic identities, try to rig the system in their own favour – thus putting pressure on the federation.

The original mandate and character of the body seems to have been lost somewhere in the haze created by the provincial pulls and pushes-- to which the authority has made itself more vulnerable.

The (Irsa) was created in the early 1990s to implement the Water Accord among the provinces. The accord, by its nature, was a development document and included mechanism to share the benefits of that development.

Precisely for this reason, out of 14 clauses of the Accord, 13 deal with development of water resources and only one talks about shortages (water poverty) and their sharing. Interestingly, even the shortages clause (14 to be precise) was inserted in the accord on the insistence of Sindh. It only underscores the development optimism attached to the accord: representatives from the federating units maintained that shortages would be unthinkable if the accord was implemented in letter and spirit.

But, the authority’s failure to keep the developmental part of the accord has been dismal. The Water Accord is now more known for creating discord, rather than being a guiding light for water development path. Neither Sindh nor Punjab is ready to trust either the accord or the authority. Even Balochistan and the NWFP, who do not have to depend on the Irsa for water as their share is ensured in the accord, have seldom defended its role.

The last Rabi season water calculations and distribution problems reflect the twisted working of the body. According to the original calculations, the authority claimed that the country would have three per cent more water than its historic (post-Tarbella Dam) uses. Actually, Pakistan suffered 30 per cent shortage during the season. This kind of gross miscalculation is an unpardonable act. The debate whether it was a case of sheer incompetence or deliberate data rigging can only generate more political pressure on the federation.

Because of the failure of Irsa to act as a federal body, leading from the front, the country has repeatedly tried to find refuge in other committees and commissions to build consensus on water issues. Unfortunately, these committee and commissions also took a cue from this premier body in dealing with the issues and ended up generating further divisions and controversies as the provincial interests clouded professional opinions. The latest being A.N.G. Abbasi — a respected name from Sindh as far as water issues are concerned — Committee. But, the gentleman, in spite of heading an eight-member committee, chose to file his personal views in a separate report, which contradicted collective opinion of his other seven colleagues.

In Sindh, the personal report of Abbasi has become a reference point and Punjab takes the collective view of seven members as a valid way dealing with issues and substantiates its arguments in favour of its claims. But, the controversy refuses to go away.

The failure of the Irsa to act as a federal body is also reflected in politicking around selection of its own member, in addition to four provincial representatives. Since its birth, provinces have been trying to get that one seat in order to increase their numerical strength from one to two members and force decisions of their choice. The authority makes its decisions through participatory management.

The federation has also not helped its cause by granting the fifth seat as a favour to one province or the other instead of selecting a professional to lead the body.

The fifth seat (also known as federal representative) has become source of bringing politics into the working of the Irsa rather than help solidifying its federal character.

Instead of resolving the water issues in federal spirit and defending the Water Accord, which was the rationale of the creation of Irsa, the authority lent itself to open up even those issues that pre-date the accord. This has worsened the situation.

Operations of the two link canals – Chashma-Jehlum (CJ) and Taunsa-Panjnad (TP) – are two prime examples. Both canals were built, and being operated, under the Indus Basin Water Treaty, which came into force in the 1960s. Their operations are a matter of controversy in the Irsa meetings.

The country can hardly afford such luxuries any more because it has to take hard and prompt decisions on two inter-linked issues of water conservation and power generation. The work ethic of such bodies like the Indus River System Authorities should be re-invented to help achieve consensus solution on both issues and no federating unit should feel left out. That would only be possible by bringing in professionals who could develop better working ethics to serve the federation as well as the provincial interests.