Elections and the US
By Tariq Fatemi
PAKISTAN has just been through elections likely to result in the restoration of democracy to the country. The US elections, though still eight months away, will hopefully also usher in a major transformation, repudiating the administration’s failed policies that include an alarming penchant for going against all that is good and great about the US.
With the two countries linked inextricably by their cooperation in the war against terror, it is no surprise that while we follow closely emerging trends in the US, there too Pakistan has continued to occupy centre stage in the foreign policy debates among presidential candidates.
With many Americans acknowledging that the administration committed serious errors in its war on terror, the elections are likely to be most contentious. Moreover, with none of the candidates an incumbent, there is neither a presumed successor nor an assured front runner. In fact, all candidates have expressed reservations about Bush’s policies, though none has been as sharply critical as the unorthodox Senator Barack Obama.
He created quite a stir last August when he indicated that the US should be willing to strike Al Qaeda targets inside Pakistan, without the consent of its government, if the US “has actionable intelligence about high-value terrorist targets and President Musharraf won’t act, we will”. The remark was seized upon by the administration as evidence of Obama’s lack of understanding of foreign policy issues, though it was no different from its own policy.
Obama later clarified that he had “never called for the invasion of Pakistan” and that US troops would enter Pakistan only if there were “actionable intelligence reports” and only if “the Pakistani government was unable or unwilling” to go after the terrorists.
Obama also came in for criticism from his rival, Senator Hillary Clinton, who pointed out that though she “had long advocated a much tougher approach to Musharraf and to Pakistan”, she did not consider Obama’s position as wise. She revisited the issue recently, when she promised to end the Bush administration’s “one-dimensional” policy because it focuses on Musharraf and ignores the people.
Characterising the Pakistan-Afghanistan border as “one of the most dangerous regions of the world and one of the most strategically important to the US”, Clinton pledged to increase non-military assistance to Pakistan, especially as “recent elections are a key step towards the return of democracy to Pakistan”. Senator McCain, the Republican Party candidate, is however closely toeing the official line, aware that he has to carry the conservatives who are suspicious of his liberal stance on domestic issues.
Incidentally, after his recent visit to Pakistan, Senator Joseph Biden, who heads the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, proposed tripling US economic assistance as “a democracy dividend” and to emphasise education and economic development as keys to stabilising society and weaning away of tribal and rural support from extremists.
Of course, US interest and involvement in Pakistan remains intense as evidenced by the many important visitors descending down on us, a worrying but understandable development given our critical role in the furtherance of US strategic objectives in the region. Over the past seven years, our relations with the US have acquired an unprecedented scale, but this cooperation has never been debated in parliament nor the political leadership taken into confidence. The result has been a serious disconnect between the military leadership and the people who have developed serious misgivings about its long-term implications, convinced that the war on terror is simply not their war and is being fought to promote US interests.
The election results, coming in the wake of year-long turmoil, have renewed the faith of Pakistanis in themselves. But they appear to have disappointed Washington and led to fears that the emerging democratic dispensation may not be as amenable to its bidding as the current regime. This is inevitable as the overwhelming majority has come to view Pakistan’s close embrace of Washington as having caused the country great grief even if it has brought it substantial sums of money, much of which has however gone into non-productive ventures. The major political parties too are distancing themselves from this ‘alliance’, not only because they have their reservations about it but because they wish to be in tune with popular sentiment.
Though there is now some recognition of the shifting realities in Pakistan, the Bush administration remains much too deeply attached to the person of Musharraf rather than the people of Pakistan. This has been deeply disappointing to those who expected the US to play a helpful role in furthering the democratic process. Meanwhile, other ‘revelations’ in the US media are even more worrying. These include reports that we have been pushed into accepting US military personnel to train us in counter-insurgency, even though we have one of the world’s biggest and finest armed forces.
Similarly, reports to the effect that the CIA is spreading its presence in the country, while the US is engaged in constructing airstrips in the Northern Areas, are developments that cannot but cause us and our neighbours’ great concern. But the icing on the cake was the weekend report that the US had presented us a laundry list of demands that envisage the most remarkable concessions for its military and intelligence personnel.
Diplomatic observers are intrigued by its timing. Either the Bush administration has failed to appreciate that the centre of gravity is shifting, slowly but inexorably, away from Army House to parliament, or it believes that the Musharraf regime has been so discredited that it can obtain concessions now that would not otherwise be available to it later. Or is it the awareness that with a democratic government coming to power, the entire gamut of the Pakistan-US relationship will be re-examined, first of all to obtain the confidence of the elected representatives and only thereafter to build a domestic consensus for it, which is essential if we are to be effective partners in the war on terror.
For the past couple of years, I have advocated that the ‘terms of engagement’ with the US need to be renegotiated. The carte blanche provided by an authoritarian regime can no longer be sustained. Happily there is growing awareness of this in the US as well. Recently, Bob Hathaway of the Wilson Centre called upon Washington to base its partnership with Pakistan on “a compact with the people, rather than on any one individual”.
American foreign policy guru Henry Kissinger, too, warned this week that any US attempt to manipulate the political process in Pakistan could backfire. He also advised Washington to concede that internal developments in Pakistan are now “essentially out of the control of American decision-makers”. Earlier, Secretary Rice had affirmed that the US needs “to move from a Musharraf policy to a Pakistan policy”.
It is time to act on the wisdom contained in this approach. The US needs to immediately withdraw its patronage of an authoritarian ruler and signal its confidence in and unstinted support and assistance to the democratic dispensation. That is the only way the US can restore its credibility in this country and earn its ungrudging support in the war on terror.

