Reinstatement of the deposed judges
By Anwar Syed
MR Aitzaz Ahsan said recently that if the deposed judges were not reinstated by the end of January the lawyers would once again launch an agitation. The judges were dismissed under the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO) issued on Nov 3. Gen Musharraf later made it a part of the Constitution and all measures taken under its authority got protection.
Some observers suggest that with the restoration of the Constitution, the PCO and the resulting measures, including the dismissal of judges, stand repudiated and annulled. Mr Aitzaz Ahsan thinks that since the proclamation of emergency and the PCO were promulgated by the army chief, the new chief (rather than the president) can and should revoke them. The reasoning in support of these views has not been spelled out.
In still another interpretation, which I share, the next parliament will have to pass a constitutional amendment, repealing the one that had added the PCO to the Constitution, and only then can the deposed judges be reinstated.
This amendment will require a two-thirds majority in both houses of parliament to pass. We don’t know if such a majority will materialise. The PML-N wants to get the judges reinstated. It may not win even as many as 50 seats in the next assembly. The Jamaat-i-Islami and Tehrik-i-Insaf are of the same mind but, having boycotted the election, will have no presence in parliament. The JUI-F may be persuaded to support the needed amendment. The same might be the case with the ANP and some of the minor parties in Balochistan. As things stand now, the PML-Q, PML-F and possibly the MQM will oppose the amendment in question.
Benazir Bhutto adopted the paradox that while she was all for the judiciary’s independence, she was not concerned with the government’s treatment of individual judges.
Independence of the judiciary as an institution could conceivably be taken away by passing a law that allowed the executive to veto judicial decisions. This recourse is not open to polities that claim to uphold judicial independence. Another way is to make it known that the executive can and will penalise ‘uncooperative’ judges.
In Pakistan this has been done by manipulating their retirement, promotions and placement. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Gen Ziaul Haq sponsored constitutional amendments to change the retirement age of judges to retain one of them beyond his prescribed retirement or to get rid of another sooner than his due retirement date. Uncooperative judges can be transferred from one high court to another or to the Federal Shariat Court (where there is little work to do). The judiciary as a whole is intimidated and compromised when judges unwilling to do the executive’s bidding are chastised. Ms Bhutto’s indifference to the future of deposed judges may have gratified Mr Musharraf but it was untenable.
If the post-election arrangements of governance bring Musharraf’s present supremacy to an end, the PPP may change its stance and there may then be a chance that the amendment under reference will pass. But it may not even come to a vote if the party retains its original position.
Let us now try to figure out what kind of a president Mr Musharraf is going to be. In a recent article in this newspaper (Dec 21), Kuldip Nayar said that elections in Pakistan did not make sense because Musharraf would continue to be as powerful a president as he is now. Many Pakistani observers hold the same view. They believe he is invested with an enormous amount of authority and power. When pressed, they will refer to Article 58-2(b) and to his role as chairman of the National Security Council as the sources of his power. In my reckoning this interpretation is not valid.
It is true that he ran the government as a one-man show, as his personal fiefdom, even after the elections of October 2002 had brought forth a new National Assembly, a prime minister and his cabinet. It should be understood that he exercised the powers he did not because they belonged to him under the law but because he had usurped them, and those whom he robbed of their rightful authority did not have the will or the political capacity to rebuff him and put him in his place. He got away with this lawlessness because he was the army chief at the same time that he was president.
That is no longer the case. Having resigned his post in the army, he does not control its manpower and, more importantly, its intelligence agencies that have been making life miserable for those who would not do his will. The next prime minister will not be his creature. He will have his own support base, and he should be able to limit the president to the role the Constitution allows him.
That role is fairly limited and inconsequential. He can require reconsideration by the cabinet of a decision that the prime minister has made, but he must go along with the decision resulting from such reconsideration. He can appoint the chief election commissioner and chairman of the Federal Public Service Commission in his discretion. He is to make all other appointments (provincial governors, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, chiefs of the army, navy and the air force) after consultation with the prime minister. He appoints the Chief Justice of Pakistan, presumably after consulting the prime minister, and judges of the Supreme Court and the high courts after consulting the chief justice and others named in the Constitution. The advice of the chief justice is virtually binding on him.
Contrary to the widespread but mistaken belief, the National Security Council, being merely an advisory body with no executive authority whatever, cannot confer upon either the president or the military commanders a directing role in governance. Note also that the majority of its members consists of politicians (prime minister, leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, four provincial chief ministers), and not officers.
Article 58-2(b) of the Constitution does indeed authorise the president to dismiss the National Assembly (and with it the prime minister and his cabinet), but he may take this action only if there is reason to conclude that the government of the federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. The president will most likely fail to establish to the satisfaction of discerning and reasonable men that such a situation (and the ‘necessity’ to meet it) had in fact arisen. In that event the courts may well find his act to have been unwarranted and annul it. This is what the Supreme Court did when President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the assembly in 1993. If the court regains its ‘independence’, it will probably do the same thing the next time the president dismisses the assembly. It may be safe to say that in the years to come a president will not be able to exercise his authority under Article 58-2(b) arbitrarily.
The writer, professor emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, is currently a visiting professor at the Lahore School of Economics.
anwars@lahoreschool.edu.pk

