In the name of national interest
By Mubarak Ali
During a recent TV discussion a leading Pakistani historian remarked that the army action in former East Pakistan was in the national interest. According to her it was meant to deter the separatist movement and to preserve the unity of the country.
This is a very dangerous argument in favour of the ruling classes and justifies all actions of the State in the name of national interest to kill, massacre, torture, and imprison all those who are against the misuse of political power and privileges.
If this principle is accepted then in the sixty years of Pakistan none of the brutalities against the people can be challenged or condemned, be they against the people of East Bengal, Balochistan, Sindh, or the NWFP.
In other words the nation itself is denied the right to protest against injustices ‘in its own intetrest’. One might as well ask what this concept of national interest is and whence comes the moral authority to crush, subdue and punish people without any qualms of conscience?
The emergence of the concept of a nation-state in Europe and later in the Asian and African countries after the end of colonialism offered an opportunity to the ruling classes to monopolise the state and its institutions for the promotion of their own interests and to enhance their privileges.
Once the state’s institutions are appropriated the ruling classes acquire an authority to use them in their favour and not in the interest of the people. This national interest is not only valid within the state where their power operates constitutionally or in violation of all legal norms but also outside the boundaries where it is used to expand their power, resources, and influence.
The conflicting national interests in Europe in the 20th century led the European nations into the First World War as every nation-state of Europe had wanted to possess more colonies and more natural resources. These states were also driven by their race for an empire. Every European nation-state wanted to have more colonies than its rivals. The clash of national interests later on entangled European powers and the US in the Second World War. Humanity was sacrificed at the alter of national interests.
In recent history the US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan is explained away as being in the national interest of America as both the invaded countries were perceived as a threat to the American security. Propaganda in the name of national interest thus led to the destruction of the two countries and their people.
Former colonial powers had followed a similar policy claiming that it was in the national interest of countries in their posession. During the British rule in India it was in the British national interest to crush every rebellion and resistance. It was the imperial and British interest to put down the revolt of 1857 by hanging, shooting dead and blowing up by cannons not only rebels but also innocent civilians. The massacre of Jallianwala Bagh was also justified by the colonial government in the name of maintenance of British control that was declared to be in the interest of the Indians. General Dyer who was responsible for the massacre was proclaimed to be the saviour of imperial rule and was welcomed in Britain as a national hero.
After independence the ruling classes of Pakistan continued the policy of national interest by using state institutions to further their power and authority. Anyone who resisted the policies of the government and launched protest campaigns was dubbed a rabble-rouser, miscreant, trouble-maker and an agent of a foreign country working against the national interest in order to harm and damage the existence of the state.
Such persons therefore had to be punished, imprisoned and tortured as enemies of the state. It was considered to be legal and constitutional.
Slogans which are raised to promote and popularise national interest are based on the perceived needs to maintainn law and order, safeguard security, and preserve peace.
Law enforcement agencies justify their action on this basis. If people demonstrate for their basic rights, against prices-hikes, or corruption of state institutions, these demands and demonstrations are condemned as being against the national interest. National interest thus is regarded to be above human and fundamental rights and secret agencies are required to tape telephone conversations, censor the post and watch over movements of suspected persons.
What happened in former East Pakistan was not in the national interest but in the interest of the ruling classes and some politicians who were not in favour of sharing power with the legitimately elected leaders of East Pakistan.The ruling class preferred military action and the killing of tens of thousands of people who were, at that time, all Pakistanis.
It is about time to correct our vision of history!
Both under the democratic governments as well as under dictatorships powerful ruling classes accomplish their political agenda in the name of national interest. This whole concept of national interest needs to be overhauled, but that would be possible only when we set up grassroots democratic structures and create political consciousness among the people to understand the real meaning of the expression national interest!


President’s powers
By Bilal Hasan Minto
THE Constitution of Pakistan does not recognise the army chief as having any role in the country’s governance. An ‘emergency’ under the Constitution may be imposed by the president, and by no one else, in the event of a war or when internal disturbance in a province is beyond the control of the provincial government.
When a constitutional emergency is declared, only such articles of the Constitution are permitted to be temporarily suspended as are strictly necessary, in order to deal with the menace at hand.
This is not what happened on Nov 3. Whatever good name they might like to give it, a ‘martial law’ was imposed on that date with the specific aim of getting rid of some judges and an independent media.
It was a measure that put the entire Constitution in abeyance and it was taken by the army chief and not by the president. The president, who is himself a creature of the Constitution, cannot put the Constitution in abeyance.
The source of power from which the Nov 3 actions emanated was the office of the army chief alone, the split personality harbouring the two offices together at that point in time, notwithstanding.
The Provisional Constitution Order No: 1 of 2007 (PCO) was issued, again by the army chief of course, on Nov 3 to tell us how the country would be governed while the martial law continued. In the PCO, the army chief stated that for day to day governance the structure of the Constitution had been adopted by him but that the president could, whenever he liked, change that structure as he pleased and that the president could also amend the PCO and the Constitution as he wished.
Subsequently, an amendment was made in the PCO by the army chief, which also gave the President the power to lift the martial law. This — giving of these powers to President Musharraf by Army Chief Musharraf — was done to enable the former to retain them even after his uniform was off. As a result of this we now have a civilian President Musharraf who has the power to lift martial law when he deems fit and also to do whatever else he likes in the meantime.
But the civilian President Musharraf enjoys these powers presently only because they were delegated to him by the army chief. The office of the army chief remains the actual, original and primary source from which the martial law and these powers emanated and that office, which no longer vests in Musharraf, can take them away from him at any time. This is not just hair splitting.
Consider, for example, a situation in which for some reason (a personal reason let us say—since one does not wish Ziaul Haq’s fate on anyone) Musharraf were unable to continue as president after taking oath, and the chairman Senate or Chief Justice had to be sworn in as president.
It would be entirely possible, if not absolutely certain, that the army chief would quickly act to amend the PCO and take back these delegated powers from such a president and exercise them himself.
So the power to lift martial law, make laws and amend the Constitution is enjoyed by Musharraf at the pleasure of the present army chief, that is, General Ashfaque Pervez Kayani. He can take them away when he wants, lift martial law when he wants and restore the judiciary and the media to their Nov 2 status if he wants.
Whether any circumstances are likely to arise in which General Kayani may decide to take any or all of these steps is another matter. Humble civilian subjects are not privy to the goings on in those high corridors of power and may only guess and pray. From President Musharraf’s ongoing headmaster like tone, the guess for now is that at least he is quite confident that this will not happen.
As for prayer — to each his own.


Understanding the changes
By Shahid Javed Burki
AS suggested by me earlier, we should look at the discipline of economics to seek an explanation for what politically ails Pakistan these days. Economics provides us with the analytical tools to understand what has persuaded so many people to offer opposition to the very regime whose policies helped to increase their number and their economic power.
The regime, not inclined to do deep analysis of economic issues, is itself not fully aware of the economic and social changes its policies have brought. If it had that comprehension, it would not have acted the way it did.
It is also partly economics that helps us to understand why the Pakistani street — which in the past was quick to come to life —has remained so quiet this time around. It has not gotten involved in the agitation against the government that currently wields power in Islamabad. The current movement is led by a few social groups that had not come to the street before. Their number is not large and they are not supported by the masses.
If these findings are correct, we should then ask the following questions: Is there enough comprehension among leadership groups about the changes that have recently occurred in the economy to bring comfort to a highly agitated population? If the leadership groups were to develop a better understanding of the current situation, how should they act to gain the support of the people?
The answers to these questions don’t provide much comfort. The leadership groups currently active in the political field seem to be unaware of what has happened to the economy in the early 2000s and how its structure has changed over time. They don’t seem to understand as to which social groups have benefited from the rapid growth of recent years and which have suffered from the policies pursued by the regime. They have not attempted to analyse the composition of the groups that are resentful for having been sidelined by the changes that have taken place and what kind of aspirations these people have as they look to the evolving political system for help.
A great deal has happened to the economy since Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif left the country and went into exile. The way they have acted since their return suggests that they have not made a serious effort to understand the political significance of the transformation of the economy while they were absent from the country.
The economy has not doubled in size since 1999 as is often claimed by the government but it has expanded significantly. Eight years later, it is almost 50 per cent larger. This means an average rate of growth of 5.8 per cent a year and an increase of 3.7 per cent in income per head of the population. But the poor were not helped as much as should have been the case had the economic managers used a different growth strategy.
Growth came from the country’s largest and most populous province (Punjab), from the two largest cities (Karachi and Lahore) and from the capital city of Islamabad. The sectors that led the growth were construction (in large houses, office buildings and shopping plazas), telecommunications and commercial banking.
Foreign capital flows — mostly from the Arab world and also from China — have played important roles in the development of these sectors.
It is extraordinary that the government approached economic growth by essentially ignoring the two sectors in which the country has considerable potential. Attention to these sectors could have helped deliver benefits to the poorer segments of the population and more backward parts of the country. The government neglected the sector of agriculture, in particular the part of the sector involved in producing high value added crops and products.
And, it gave little attention to the development of small scale enterprises, in particular those involved in agricultural processing, manufacture of consumer electronics, and the production of parts and components for large industries.
As already indicated, the pattern of growth that did take place did very little for the poor and the lower middle classes. It did not help the more backward parts of the country. There was a lively debate in the country as to the impact of growth in the last eight years on poverty and income distribution.
The government maintained that the impact was very positive; that the incidence of poverty declined by 10 percentage points, from 34 per cent of the population to 24 per cent; that regions other than Punjab also benefited.
It also suggested — but did not provide precise numbers to back up that assertion — that income distribution improved. A number of economists outside the government have contested these claims, creating in many minds some serious issues regarding government’s credibility on economic matters.
Given these developments in the shape of the economy, why didn’t the classes that were essentially bypassed raise their voice? This is for two reasons: expectations about positive change in the future and the absence of alternatives on the basis of which the poor could be politically mobilised. I dealt with the second reason in the article last week, suggesting that the people were not exceptionally energised by the return of the leaders they had already tried. Today I will say a few words about the expectations on the part of the professional classes that the changes introduced by the regime would bring benefits for them.
The growth of the economy, in particular the concentration of this growth in the large cities, had begun to create opportunities for the middle classes — or at least there was some hope that positive change was just round the corner.
Lawyers were hopeful that the legal system would develop to create opportunities for them to ply their trade profitably and honourably. The Supreme Court seemed determined to assert its independent role in the judicial system and thus aid the development of the legal structure.
Journalists were enthusiastic about the transformation of the print and electronic media. Employment in these activities had become economically rewarding. Educationists were equally enthusiastic about the attention the state was giving to the sector of education, in particular to higher education. The private sector was getting actively involved in the development of education.
Given these expectations, it is extraordinary that the government, by proclaiming emergency on Nov 3, hit at the groups who were hoping to greatly benefit from the regime’s policies. It hurt the very people who could have helped the regime to expand its political base.
This approach could have been adopted only if Islamabad did not understand what its own policies had done to people’s expectations. The regime has paid a heavy price for not trying to understand what the economy needed and what its own performance had done (both positively and negatively) to the citizenry. Unfortunately for the country the leadership groups that are now in the political contest don’t seem to have done their homework either.

