Search for legitimacy

THE present political crisis has been discussed to death in the press, and before it was curbed, in the electronic media. However, its governance related repercussions still need to be analysed. The process of trying to legitimise ‘constitutional deviation’ is more destructive of the institutions of governance that affect the lives of common citizens, than ‘constitutional deviation’ itself.

This is because the only tools available for legitimising the usurpation of power are lies, deceit, and coercion, buying and selling of loyalties and the support of turncoats, opportunists and sycophants, in short all those who have no interest in the well-being of society. So how can anything vaguely ethical or beneficial for society emerge from or survive such an onslaught?

The search for legitimacy also leads to manipulating existing governance institutions, ostensibly for getting rid of corruption. However, the real reason is to curtail their autonomy and make them subservient to the illegitimate power structure. As a result, they become ineffective. For the same reasons new governance systems are created which have nothing to do with the real needs of society or with existing social and political relationships. These institutions are not created through a normal process of rules and regulations and so their only loyalty is to those who have usurped power. As such, these institutions do not take root, their continuity is always questioned, and by their very nurture, seeped in their origins, they promote corruption and nepotism. This has been the story of Ayub’s basic democracy, Zia’s Majlis-i-Shoora and education and legal ‘reforms’, and more recently of Musharraf’s devolution plan.

The search for legitimacy is also sought through the development of high profile projects unrelated to the needs of the people and to building grand monuments that serve no purpose. All the previous generals who have usurped power have indulged in promoting grandeur as an alternative to genuine progress. False propaganda, which even becomes farcical at times, is promoted and if one reads between the lines, it is not even believed by the sycophants to those in power.

The present ruling elite’s thesis that Pakistan is rich and prosperous because of the number of cars and mobile phones that have been purchased, is a case in point. That education and health systems have collapsed and people have no access to housing does not seem to matter. This tendency to fabricate increases as the failure to legitimise usurpation increases with time, and ultimately it is only the ruler and his court who believe in it. The ineffectiveness and corruption of the institutions of governance on the one hand and the disbelief of people in what the state says on the other, promotes opportunism, cynicism and/or alienation at all levels in society.

The greatest damage of ‘constitutional deviation’ however, is that it suspends all consensus making mechanisms and reduces all political activity to a one-point agenda for the restoration of democracy in which there is no place for discussion on development and progress. This has a fourfold effect.

One, it fragments society to the extent that centrifugal forces set in and keep increasing in geometric progression with the passage of time; two, that by suspending the political process, a new political leadership does not emerge and people have to turn to their clan, tribal or ethnic organisations for support to the extent of solving their personal and property disputes and intervening in their dealings with state organisations; three, in the absence of a dialogue between different points of view inappropriate and often disastrous policy decisions are taken; and four, since maintaining power through illegitimate means becomes a priority, a ruthless game of divide and rule takes precedence over all other things. We have seen all this happen in our last eight year period of ‘deviation’.

In the case of Pakistan, the propaganda justifying ‘constitutional deviation’ has in the last sixty years, constantly used the excuse of ‘Pakistan is in danger’. There is no other country in the world, except Israel, where this excuse is offered for unconstitutional, immoral or unethical policies and laws. The major repercussion of this process is the disconnect between the rulers and the ruled and the depoliticisation of the elite, who for their own vested interests see no option but to side with the rulers. It also leads in our case to a questioning, often irrationally, of the viability of our state and its origins, especially by the better educated of our younger generation.

Given the serious repercussions of ‘constitutional deviation’ on the institutions of governance, among other issues, it is necessary that it should never happen again. The proposed elections in the present circumstances in Pakistan are in themselves a constitutional deviation. As many commentators have said, they will not solve Pakistan’s constitutional crisis and will not bring about stability, legitimacy or reform. They will only make the crisis fester longer and lead subsequently to further fragmentation of society. The main victims of this will be the people of Pakistan who will increasingly have to seek illegal means or the support of self-servicing patronage to solve their problems and the problems of the settlements in which they live. Therefore, it is in the larger interests of the political parties, to not only boycott these elections but to come together to promote and struggle for a future election process that guarantees a proper election and hence a future legitimate set-up. The million dollar question is why are they not doing this? Perhaps in the answer to this question lies the real political crisis in Pakistan.

The anatomy of protest

THE space, participation, intensity and content of the resistance campaign against emergency-cum-martial law imposed by General Pervez Musharraf on Nov 3 have prompted serious questions about the scope and pattern of the popular uprising for political and civil rights in Pakistan.

A cursory look at the character of the resistance campaign would indicate that the scope and outreach of assertive dissent has remained exclusive to professional interest groups, a section of urban socialites, rights activists, students and a negligible minority of political workers.

The detained lawyers and judges were found asking reporters and their colleagues with some curiosity why the common people had not moved spontaneously against the repressive regime? Why was the public at large not participating in the protests?

Let us recollect how the current campaign originated. The initial protests came in the wake of the infamous presidential reference against the Chief Justice (CJ) of Pakistan in March. This was articulated and resisted as a despotic move by a military ruler. The case was argued in the courts as well as in the streets by the lawyers and their bar associations. These associations became the hotspots of resistance; and the lawyers, later joined by the intelligentsia and social and political activists, remained in the vanguard of the movement against the presidential reference.

After a euphoric and hectic struggle of 134 days the CJ was restored by the 13-member bench of the superior court. The short term objectives of the lawyers’ movement were achieved but the protesting community intended to extend the ‘life span’ of the movement by purging the superior court of the lingering ghost of the ‘doctrine of necessity’ – which has ruthlessly ruled the judicial imagination of Pakistan for sixty years.

It has to be recalled that the judiciary in Pakistan has been a structural legacy of the British legal rationality which introduced a new culture of litigation later used as a sophisticated instrument of control, subjugation and victimisation by the influential and affluent. This judicial system is flawed with procedural complications that deny rather than facilitate people’s access to justice. At the same time, the judiciary is and has been a major stakeholder in power. It was erected — or rather thrust upon this region — over the debris of local justice systems; it is difficult not to perceive in it the signs of a deep cultural alienation.

Lawyers are inseparable constituents of this whole edifice of this corporatised justice system. They have direct professional and institutional stakes in the (mal)functioning of this system. Hence they make a powerful and privileged group of the intelligentsia, exposed to the logic and ill-logic of a power dictated by a colonial codification of the law.

However, the lawyers’ movement starting from March 2007 was predominantly a reactive movement for the consolidation, autonomy and assertiveness of their institution. The core emphasis of the movement’s demand was on the institutional autonomy of the judiciary as a critical estate of governance. The structural foundations of the judiciary were rarely analysed and articulated. How judicial administration, as an extension of colonial and post-colonial rule, is situated in the experiential memory of the masses was not sufficiently taken into account.

The expectation of mass support for the movement of judicial autonomy remained high on the wish list of protesting groups. It failed to widen its struggle to include broader questions of governance and the everyday concerns of society. It revolved around constitutional abstractions such as ‘rule of law’ and ‘supremacy of the judiciary’.

Therefore the judiciary, once again, within a very short span of time began treading the same path even under the restored CJ. It is interesting to note that in the case of General Musharraf vs. CJ, the court’s verdict secured a brother judge. Yet another petition, that one concerning the eligibility of a serving general contesting the presidential election, was turned down on the basis of ‘maintainability’.

A reborn and reinvigorated judiciary overturned the popular demand for the clear-cut separation of political institutions — this time, the military and the executive — on so-called technical grounds. Lawyers had to resume the struggle at the point where they had left it. The military regime retaliated against this by its darkest move on Nov 3, when the emergency-cum-martial law was imposed targeting the judiciary and the media. The dissenting judges were detained and protesting lawyers were beaten and an elaborate strategy was chalked out to silence public critique. Lawyers, judges and the media called for the masses’ support to resist the military moves but failed to mobilise the people.

Why did the people not rise? Western sociologists tracing the phenomenon of social movements in industrialised and urbanised Europe, point out that the qualities that determine the ability of a society to respond to a challenge are the people’s collective and innovative behaviour, capacity to accept extra-institutionality, their networking character and multicentredness, the shifting and fluid boundaries of the movement’s membership, and the willingness of members to disrupt order a little or a lot.

The situation at home however suggests that the social impulse of protest is dialectically influenced and informed by the structural and cultural variables of resistance. A cursory look at the history of social movements in Pakistan indicates five major variables which have proved to be rallying points for popular and sustained mobilisation. These include (a) faith-based belongingness, (b) nationalistic/ethnic bonds, (c) competing claim on resources (d) tribal revenge and (e) individual charisma.

Against this backdrop, it is perhaps difficult to assume that social movements inspired by the Eurocentric models of civil rights and institutional reforms, not considering the existing structural rigidities of a society, would become a central point of popular protest. That might be the reason that the ongoing movement against the regime’s high-handedness is largely viewed as an elites’ and intelligentsia’s movement, with little active support from other, powerless and disenfranchised, sections of society.

Some analysts believe that activism and the politics of protest in our times have become highly monetised and this was reflected in the ongoing protest campaign also. It is difficult for a person who is burdened with the responsibility of earning a livelihood for his/her household to dismiss the risks and repercussions of participating in a protest. Time for such resource-poor hordes of people has become money.

It is not merely the issue of awareness and conscience as believed by many which is the major barrier to their joining the ongoing protests. There is more to it. The direct bearing between the issue in question and the economic pulls and pressures cannot be underestimated while expecting a substantial turn-out on the roads for defiance.

Therefore, the spontaneous social movements in Pakistan could become instrumental in bringing about a definitive social change if the base of their participation is broadened by going beyond the sectoral and institutional approach, and linking them with the class ‘apartheid’ embedded in the power structure of society.

People are reeling under the rocks of hierarchical oligarchies. Thus they wonder how an ‘autonomous’ judiciary would, without questioning the ongoing day-to-day repression they suffer, a repression rooted in the very fibre of society, address their aspirations. People could make these protests popular if they know the deliverables. Therefore, social movements need to link their ongoing struggle with these fundamental questions to achieve success.

The writer is an Islamabad-based development journalist studying the political economy of technology and development in Pakistan.

Kashmir since the peace process

FOR long I had dreamt of visiting the Kashmir valley. Given the visa restrictions for Pakistanis, this remained a distant dream until recently when, a few weeks ago I was finally issued a visa and found myself in the beautiful valley, often described as paradise on earth.

One could not help but note the calm on the surface that belies simmering troubles. The autumn sun shone through the red and gold of chinar leaves, which was a sight to behold indeed. However, its serene beauty aside, Srinagar’s traffic remains as chaotic as that of Lahore or Karachi.

Today a small middle class has also emerged and people are able to move freely without any fear of being gunned down. Everyone seemed to agree that this has become possible because of the ‘composite’ peace process for which the South Asians owe a lot to President Musharraf.

Since the thaw in India-Pakistan relations set in, tourists have started coming into the valley and this year a few thousand Europeans also visited Kashmir, apart from the Indian visitors who found the place safe enough for a holiday.

The Kashmiris also expressed much joy about the fact that for the first time, travel has opened up between the two parts of the state. But this is not entirely smooth. Almost all travellers complain about the difficulties and delays in getting travel papers in order. That, however, does not deter people from flocking to the permit office.

During the insurgency, the valley’s economy was completely destroyed but appears to be on the mend now. India has poured a lot of fund into the state treasury in the last sixty years but most of it went to waste. It was either swallowed up by government functionaries or was used to sustain a large military presence in Kashmir to support unpopular governments in Srinagar. Education facilities have improved but this has also brought with it unemployment in the educated classes.

For a tourist, Srinagar is an embodiment of tranquil beauty. The clear waters of the chashmas (springs) are not just soothing to the eye but replete with mineral contents and do wonders for digestion. There is much food for the soul as well — the old Sufi madressah built by Dara Shikoh, sprawling lush gardens and the famous Dal Lake. But one has to brace oneself for disappointments too.

A visit to the lake is not as spiritually energising as it used to be as its banks and the famous houseboats present a grimy and shabby picture. I was told that international aid had been extended for its cleaning but it was not put to good use.

The fifteenth century Jama Masjid is controlled by the family of Mir Waiz Umar Farooq who has a major influence on the population of old Srinagar. However, the shrine of Hazrat Bal is in Farooq Abdullah’s control. Many years ago, reports about the disappearance of the Holy Prophet’s hair from the shrine caused much agitation and succeeded in destabilising the Kashmir government. Things returned to normal once the sacred relic was mysteriously restored.

Interestingly, a casual discussion with the locals, be it a driver or a waiter in a restaurant, makes two points more than clear. There are two elements that are unacceptable to the peace-loving people of the valley: the Indian army and the mujahideen.

After discussions with leaders such as Mufti Sayeed and Mir Waiz, I came to the conclusion that there are no two opinions among the people about the army being sent back to the barracks. And the problem is further aggravated when reports about the high handedness of security agencies appear in the media. During my stay I came across the report of the brutal murder of a teacher who was escorting two women, one of whom had allegedly attracted the fancy of a jawan (soldier). Such incidents only reinforce anti-army sentiments in the valley.

Politics centres round the three provinces, the valley, Jammu and Ladakh. The valley has the largest population and its single largest party is Farooq Abdullah’s National Conference which also has a sizable presence in the State Assembly. It has been a staunch advocate of state autonomy and is firmly committed to ties with New Delhi.

The Congress Party, never a major force, is in power largely because of its power sharing arrangement with Mufti Sayeed’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Congress nominee Ghulam Nabi Azad is currently serving as the chief minister for the remaining three years of the legislature’s term.

The Muslims of the valley are not too happy with the idea of the chief minister of the state being from Jammu. Azad has been away from Kashmir for the last thirty years, spending his political life in Delhi and Mumbai. Although the Congress has a cadre of dedicated workers in the valley, there is little evidence of their becoming a force in the future elections.

Elections are the event to watch out for. An old friend M.L. Kotru, the fomer editor of Statesman and a Kashmiri Pandit from Srinagar says that all the posturing done by the mainstream parties now is directly related to the prospect of an earlier poll which may become necessary if the PDP decides to leave the governing coalition.

But given the never say die spirit of the political class, the battle for votes has truly begun. There is also the prospect of some of the Hurriyet parties, directly or indirectly, joining the poll fray. Both Gilani and Mir Waiz have political influence in Srinagar.

It is also expected that Pakistan would encourage the pro-Pakistani elements to participate in the elections which may be fairer this time. Militancy from across the line of control has stopped but homegrown militants occasionally register their presence.

Democracy departs

VLADIMIR Putin implored Russians to vote for the party whose list he heads in Sunday’s parliamentary election. But if voters fail to heed the message on posters the size of apartment blocks, proclaiming that “Putin’s Victory is Russia’s Victory”, the Kremlin’s nervous apparatchiks are preparing to employ “administrative means” to win. Russia’s fifth parliamentary election since the collapse of communism could be its most falsified yet.

Thousands of local officials have to report for work on their day off to inflate the pro-Putin vote. Both opposition and independent sources say that local governors have been given quotas of votes that have to be cast for United Russia, Mr Putin’s party. Public-sector workers, including doctors, teachers and university deans, have been told to vote for the party or face the sack and loss of bonuses. Tutors have told their students to photograph their ballot paper alongside their passport in the voting booth with their mobile phones. If they refuse they may not make the grade in their examinations.

The president has a problem. He wants to remain the “national leader”, but the constitution, which he has repeatedly vowed to observe, says that he can not serve a third consecutive term as president.

None of the alternatives are good ones. If he appoints a placeman as his successor and continues in power as prime minister or chairman of the national security council, he is taking a risk: his appointee could swiftly become his own man. —The Guardian