WHY negotiate? This is not a question that a professional politician anywhere in the world, of any hue, will recognise or comprehend. The contents of your politics emerge from interest and ideology, but at least half of your actual work is to negotiate — with your supporters, across interest groups, and of course, with your rivals. Yet this is precisely the question that has exercised so many able minds in Pakistan over the last few months.

Why does the leader of the largest political party of the country negotiate with a military dictator who is manifestly wedded to perpetuating his own power? Many harsh words have been printed, about sullied reputations, sold souls and recovered fortunes.

As the situation moves from negotiation to protest after the declaration of emergency there are some who feel that this is the real thing. They think that now negotiations are buried for good, and any political change will be wrested through confrontation alone. Some go so far as to say that negotiations were a mistake waiting to be corrected.

Negotiators be damned, onward to the barricades. This simplistic disregard for politics serves us badly. It belittles the real achievements of resistance to the Musharraf regime thus far, and trivialises what needs to be done in the future.

The obvious needs stating: in politics negotiation and confrontation are two sides of the same coin. Pick up virtually any political conflict anywhere in the world, and behind a confrontation there is the demand for negotiation. We now know that the British government was negotiating with the IRA even through periods of extreme violence from both sides.

Nelson Mandela was in indirect talks with the apartheid regime for at least ten years before his release from prison. Confrontation is deemed legitimate when you can demonstrate that your opponent has rejected the path of negotiation, or his terms for negotiation are unreasonable.

All the while that she admitted she was negotiating with the Musharraf regime, Benazir Bhutto consistently said that the path of confrontation was always open, and that it ought to be taken at the right moment, when all other options were closed. In his interview from detention in which Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry exhorted the people to come out, he also stated his willingness to negotiate with General Musharraf in order to save the Constitution.

This puts Benazir Bhutto and Iftikhar Chaudhry on the same page of the political science textbook, and many bookshelves away from those who start out by demanding the hangman’s noose for their political opponents.

So, given that confrontation has become inevitable, were the talks a big mistake? Did Benazir Bhutto entertain unrealistic expectations about General Musharraf’s willingness to share power? Or was she so blinded by the lure of office that she got trapped into a position of non-opposition? Most importantly, was the time spent negotiating lost time?

Her opponents find comfort in vilification, and nobody can quite gauge the inner workings of a mind, but a review of the facts is instructive. The most important fact is that powerful foreign governments, notably America and Britain, played a crucial role in encouraging the parleys.

According to published reports that have not been denied, Benazir Bhutto was approached by the British Foreign Office in order to initiate the talks. Given the depth and detail of the involvement of these powers it would be incorrect to call the process a dialogue — rather these were tripartite talks or a trialogue.

The US-British investment in the trialogue appears to have been a marginal effort at the start — a probe into the possibility of obtaining a broader political front in Pakistan in the war against terror.

The dominant view in the US was premised on two absolutes: one, Pakistan, was too dangerous for democracy, and two, General Musharraf heading the military was the most reliable partner who must not fail.

The trialogue process aimed to challenge the first premise while keeping the second one intact. In other words, it had to be demonstrated that free elections will not deliver a fundamentalist government in Pakistan (in contrast with virtually all other Muslim countries where the US has a strategic interest), and that it was possible for mainstream parties to cooperate with General Musharraf in the war against terror.

By engaging — her critics say a bit too earnestly — with this trialogue Benazir Bhutto strengthened the hand of elements within the US establishment who saw democracy in Pakistan as an ally rather than an irritant. The process of engagement inevitably produced its own facts.

Negotiation presumes that parties are not familiar with each other’s real intentions, and good negotiations set up contingencies that force them to reveal their intentions through action. General Musharraf’s frequent statements about his commitment to a transition to democracy could now be tested directly by foreign powers that were party to the trialogue.

General Musharraf proclaimed the emergency and breached his promises to the Pakistani people -- something that he had done many times in the past without inviting opprobrium abroad. This time round, however, he also reneged on his promises to powerful foreign governments that had invested much political capital in the trialogue.

He left them with no option but to judge him as an unreliable partner — a complete U-turn from a situation where he was seen as the only reliable partner in Pakistan. So, a negotiation process that began tentatively with chipping away at one of the two pillars of unconditional US support for General Musharraf, ended up in wobbling both of them.

So, why did she negotiate? For a return to power, to sell her soul, or to recover her fortune… Benazir Bhutto and her party have many admirers as well as detractors who can debate this in their own time. Whatever the intent, the effect was to contribute to a major shift in US and world attitudes towards Pakistani politics, and to make prospects a little brighter for those who believe democracy is necessary and attainable in our country.

I WRITE this column when the proclamation of emergency is less than a week old. Nonetheless, its impact has already been felt by the economy.

In the first working day after the proclamation was issued, the stock market sank, losing its value by nearly 700 points. While institutional buyers stood on the side, ordinary investors, in a state of utter panic, continued to sell into a rapidly declining market.Foreign investors were reported to have also withdrawn some of their investments. Among them were the members of the prosperous Pakistani diaspora who were deeply troubled by the events taking shape in what was once their homeland.

Foreign reaction should have been anticipated. As expected, it took the form of both disappointment at what had happened and the indication that economic steps would be taken to force the Pakistani leader to correct the course on which he had set himself.

Among the measures being taken are those that will have an almost immediate impact as well as those that will have lasting consequences. Some governments, in particular those in Europe, are threatening to stop budgetary support to the government while keeping in place the programmes and projects that are aimed at helping the poor.

The Dutch were the first to suspend aid operations in Pakistan. Other European countries may also follow. Pressures are building up in Washington and London to force the administrations in those capitals to adopt some punitive measures.

What is perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the situation is to increase what in the jargon of finance is termed the ‘Pakistan country risk’. This was already high but had declined in recent months as investor confidence in Pakistan improved and the investment community was prepared to come to the country in search of attractive opportunities. The country risk rating increased sharply after the proclamation of emergency. One important credit rating agency has already significantly reduced its rating of investments in Pakistan.

Perhaps the most important contribution the Musharraf administration made to the management of the economy was to place the private sector in the role of the leader. The government began to reduce its role as the direct manager of the economy by encouraging private entrepreneurs. But the governments can only encourage private entrepreneurship, they can not force it. The best way of doing that is to create what economists call an ‘enabling environment’.

This has many aspects. The most important of these is to demonstrate to the investors that the rules of the game will not be changed and the environment in which the investors are operating will not be administered shocks. General Musharraf has often likened investors to nervous birds who only come to the ground once they are assured that it is safe for them to land. However, once they have come, a simple clap of the hands will produce noise sharp enough to scare them away. The emergency proclamation was such a clap of the hands.

What is also extraordinary is that the government that had used its management of the economy as a claim to political legitimacy should have taken the step that is likely to cost the economy incalculable damage. The extent of the harm done is hard to estimate. Even if steps are taken to set the country back on track, I think what has already happened will lower the rate of growth in GDP in 2007-08 by at least one to two percentage points.

The emergency proclamation has at least two economic attributes. Both of them are negative. Each gives a signal that will highly damage perceptions of the state of the economy. First, it recognises, albeit implicitly, that a weak executive created a vacuum of power and authority that was occupied by two better organised forces. They are the judiciary backed by a strong constituency of lawyers and the religious extremists. Both brought into the space the executive should have occupied, their own sense of what was wrong and what was right.

The judiciary used its suo motu powers, given to it by the constitution, to venture into the areas that are normally the preserve of the executive. The extremists attempted to impose their own laws, drawn from their reading of the Holy Scriptures. In other words, the proclamation recognises that the system over which the current regime has presided suffers from a number of severe institutional shortcomings. This is quite an indictment of its own performance.

Second, in recognising that such a redistribution of power had indeed occurred, the chief of the army staff, decided to adopt a number of draconian measures. He maintained in the emergency proclamation that a state of emergency was needed to restore balance between different parts of the government. The method for accomplishing this pushed him way beyond what the constitution permitted. Institutions of the government were to be rebuilt by the use of ad hoc instruments rather than by the use of another set of institutions.

I use the term ‘institution’ in a broad sense. It means not only organisations but also laws and rules. Well developed economic, political and social systems have built-in mechanisms to correct errant behavior. These take the form of rules and laws. In the situation faced by the executive in Pakistan, recourse to what was perceived as encroachment of its space by the judiciary was available in the constitution.

Under the constitution, the National Assembly could have used its law and rule making powers to define the roles of the two other branches of government – the executive and the judiciary. Through the acts of parliament the assembly could have drawn the boundary around the jurisdiction of the judiciary. Instead, the army chose to use the proclamation of emergency in order to regain the space the executive had lost to the judiciary.

Would the chosen path take the country to where it wishes to go? Economists have begun to provide some clear answers to questions such as this. They believe that economic progress can not be made unless the economy rests on firm institutional foundations. If these foundations are shaken, the economic structure erected on top of them becomes weak and wobbly. If the jolt is too severe, it may altogether collapse. In other words, the opposite of the intended consequences would be achieved.

The problem that has been created needs to be resolved. It is unfortunate that Pakistan is back on the path it has traversed so often before. Institutional progress occurs only where the systems in place are allowed to evolve to deal with difficult situations as they develop. The tendency in Pakistan has been to shut down the entire system and begin all over again. This only retards progress by creating uncertainty.

There is no doubt that the proclamation of the state of emergency has already done some serious damage to the economy. What is now required are the adoption of corrective measures that will restore some confidence in the country and its economy.

WE have had five martial laws and thirty two years under emergency in our sixty years of history. This must be some kind of a world record. But have these aggressive measures had any effect on the state of governance in the country? If martial law and emergencies were such efficient measures, the number of times we have resorted to these measures, we should have been a first world country by now.

Since 1947, martial laws have been imposed and constitutions held in abeyance at regular intervals of eight to eleven years, except an aberration in the form of eleven years between 1988 and 1999 without a military ruler at the helm. This is perhaps because we had the likes of General Aslam Beg, General Kakar, General Asif Nawaz and General Karamat, who resisted the temptation to intervene.

It is difficult to conceive that there was a system during this period, where the martial law imposing potential of the general was seen as a negative characteristic, while deciding to give him the command. One can assume that the only reason we did not have martial law for eleven years was because of a stroke of good luck or perhaps these generals could not build enough justification or support to take over.The 1958 martial law was avowedly to shut up the bickering politicians of the time and develop a neat and clean set-up. Since martial laws traditionally give an impetus to big business, which improve the government and the economic statistics (without improving commensurately the lives of the common man), the complacency it generates leads one to ignore matters of details. That is why no attempt was made under Ayub Khan to give the Bengalis a sense of belonging.

The 1969 martial law was to put the messy protesters against Ayub Khan in their place and subsequently to ‘sort out’ the Bengalis, which led to the dismemberment of the country.

The 1999 martial law was to put a pompous politician in his place as he had the temerity to think that he could make a habit of firing army chiefs.

The 2007 martial law (emergency plus according to some government minister) was to demolish a judiciary, which for the first time in the history of the country had the cheek to attempt to defy the executive.

This is an entirely new phenomenon where the public having developed apathy for the politician, who for most part was seen to be in cahoots with the powers that be, have found some one to follow and respect in the form of the judiciary.

When the episode started on Mar 9, there was only one hero created by the government action in the form of the Chief Justice. Now the government has managed to create seven heroes in Islamabad and about fifty all over the country in the judges, who refused to take oath or were not invited under the PCO.

While the ‘emergency plus’ sought to use the normal standard operating procedures of cleansing the judiciary through a PCO, this time around things seem different, because since Mar 9 the public has been seeing a ball by ball match between the judiciary and the executive. And as is human nature, the people are siding with the underdog. That is why the one single demand of all, who genuinely oppose the government, seems to be to reverse the dismissal of sixty or so judges.

Looking around our region to see the contrast, there is the example of Sri Lanka where because democracy of some sorts is being practiced, the serious and prolonged civil war being fought with such ferocity has still not dismembered that country. In Nepal, the public has emasculated an age old monarchy through street power, through a democratic movement to oppose the monarchy’s inappropriate policies and behaviour. Then there is the example of India, where a working democracy is taking the country from strength to strength, despite its multifaceted and chronic problems. Bangladesh is, however, a case similar to Pakistan, where the military keeps resurfacing. Perhaps there is something unique in the Muslim genes, when it comes to democratic behaviour.

Why should one have an issue with governance through martial law? After all someone has to manage the country, and especially a country where the majority of the voters are illiterate and do not know what is good for them when they vote. The problem is that past track records of government by edicts, rather than by law, indicate that it achieves temporary results and in the process, it brushes issues requiring long and consistent efforts to solve, under the carpet. It is like taking an aspirin or a steroid to cure a cancer.

Normally one has seen that the American assessment of foreign countries is superficial and simplistic such as their attempt to publicly forge a moderate coalition for Pakistan. However, a comment from Joe Biden, a presidential candidate and chairman of US Senate’s foreign relations committee, reported recently in the press, appears very perceptive and on the dot. According to the report, he said, “Pakistan has a strong democratic tradition and a large moderate majority. But this moderate majority must have a voice in the system and an outlet with election. If not, moderates may find that they have no choice but to make common cause with extremists just as the Shah’s opponents did in Iran three decades ago.”

This is what a lot of people have been saying in Pakistan also. If there is continuous resentment against the government and there is a sense of deprivation amongst the moderates, which by all accounts are in a vast majority, this majority may start siding with the Islamic extremist (or not resist them) out of spite against an unpopular government elected in a managed way. One should wish never to see the day where a suicide attack against the government undertaken by the extremist is applauded by the moderates.

There is only one answer, keeping all options in view, and that is an early election which is fair and free and where all parties are allowed to contest under an election commission and a judiciary which they trust. Any other option will only take up precious time of the country and put us further behind in the quest to adopt a civilised form of government.

The writer is former interior secretary. tasneem.noorani@tnassociates.net