Tackling the militants

IN another bizarre episode in South Waziristan, militants on Friday seized over 150 army and security personnel in what can best be described as mysterious circumstances. The latest seizure comes on the heels of the release secured just two days before by a tribal peace committee of 19 security officials and personnel held by militants. Conflicting reports continue to emerge from the Inter-Services Public Relations department and the dodgy spokesmen for the militants. The exact number of those being held hostage remains unclear: the ISPR reluctantly acknowledges over a hundred personnel while the militants claim that number to be in the vicinity of 200. Surprisingly, this time around, the emboldened militants have given the gory details of their ambush of the military convoy. The seized security personnel, including a colonel and a number of other officers who were reportedly heavily armed, were “stopped, disarmed, and made to surrender” before no more than 20 local Taliban. Their communication equipment and the vehicles carrying them were also seized. Then, dividing them into small groups, the militants took them away to different locations where they are being kept in “prison”. If true, nothing could be more chilling. That the tribal areas are so totally out of the government’s control defies all imagination.

What is happening now is that another jirga, comprising a local senator, the area’s political administrator and other government officials, has been sent to negotiate the release of the hostages. The militants have accused the security forces of not abiding by the undisclosed terms of the agreement that both parties had signed back in February 2005. The Americans and the Afghans, who have obvious stakes in what happens along the porous Durand Line, have long warned Islamabad of the failure of such agreements signed and understandings reached with the local militants accused of backing the resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan. Time has come when the government must reconsider such deceptive safety accords which have failed to secure even its own security personnel.

Tribesmen hostile to the objectives of the US-led ‘war on terror’, in which Pakistan is a key participant, have long defied the writ of law along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. In North and South Waziristan militants have been on the warpath against the country’s own security forces which, among other things, also defend local tribes against a possible foreign assault from neighbouring Afghanistan. The strategy of persuasion, wisely applied by the government so far, seems to have run its course. The political administrators of the tribal areas, who were earlier bypassed by the military commanders signing agreements with the errant tribesmen, must be given a more active role in any ongoing dialogue with the militants. The Durand Line cannot be left undefended or made over to the local Taliban by withdrawing the troops from there, as the militants demand. The region must not be allowed to become a free-for-all zone. Those refusing to fall in line must be confronted, with force if necessary. Pakistan’s internal and external security depends on the firmness required of the government to tackle this seething issue along the western border.

An independent NCSW

HOW effective has the National Commission on the Status of Women been? Set up in 2000 as an autonomous body to review discriminatory laws and make suggestions for equalising socio-economic opportunities, its recommendations to repeal the Hudood Ordinances, for instance, were never given the due attention they deserved. Instead, a watered-down version of the women’s bill was passed last year. Is it then the fault of the commission that it has not taken up as many discriminatory laws as it could have? The government is signatory to many international laws that require it to end gender discrimination and move towards empowering women but it has failed to honour commitments like CEDAW. That the NCSW was without a chairperson for over eight months two years ago is a good indicator of the government’s low commitment to women’s issues. It is particularly disappointing, given the increased representation of women legislators in the assemblies from whom it was hoped one would see a momentum on women’s issues. Meanwhile the commission has — and had — in its ranks some courageous and outspoken people who have aired their views, without fear of reprisal; but beyond making recommendations, they can do nothing. This explains the growing demand for the commission to be made independent so that it can take up issues, without interference or pressure from government quarters, and then work towards providing solutions to those problems. This demand was made on Friday in Karachi at a meeting organised by the Aurat Foundation.

It makes sense to have an autonomous body, along the lines of the one in India which is now so powerful that it can call on any government official when it is addressing a petition. The Indian model may be a good place to start, particularly in understanding its working, sources of funding and so forth. The government also stands to benefit from having an independent body which will be committed to ensuring that no discriminatory laws are enacted. Such watchdog committees are needed in the country. An independent commission will still have to work with the government in redressing many of the issues that require a change in the laws — be it the citizenship act or the law of evidence. The commission can also be a powerful lobbying force that parliamentarians can turn to when drumming up support for a repeal of laws.

Rabies: a matter of concern

THE problem with chalking out a clear-cut strategy for curbing the seemingly rising number of dog-bite and rabies cases in the country is that hardly any proper study has been carried out for the compilation of statistics on a serious medical concern. Figures for the number of rabies deaths are old, dating to several years ago, and it is difficult to ascertain the dog population in the country or to give accurate data on vaccine demand — and supply — at various medical outlets. Without detailed information of this sort, any plan to administer vaccines to dog-bite victims, or indeed, to reduce the population of stray dogs, will be haphazard and will not achieve the desired results. The government’s inaction on collecting such vital information shows how little it cares for rabies victims, many of them children, who, in the absence of timely medical intervention, die writhing in agony. What also points to governmental callousness in this regard is the continuation of the controversial Semple vaccine which was replaced by the more effective and safer WHO-recommended cell culture vaccine in developed countries many years ago. Its prohibitive cost should not be an excuse to short-change rabies patients in their treatment, and efforts must be made to make these readily available in adequate supplies and at affordable rates.

There is also the question of tackling the root of the problem: the presence of large packs of stray dogs. Campaigns by local administrations to eliminate stray dogs, among them the diseased ones, have not reduced their numbers. In this regard, there is much to be said for the infinitely more humane strategy of animal birth control that has seen success in several countries where stray dogs are caught and neutered. Here too there are several problems one of which is the inadequate numbers of vets to do the job. But this is a hurdle that the authorities must overcome, if they want to reduce the number of rabies cases.

America’s Pakistan dilemma

MOST Americans are beginning to focus on their forthcoming presidential elections — though still 15 months away — but the US foreign policy and national security establishment is getting increasingly concerned with recent events in Pakistan.

This is not surprising given the fact that since 9/11, Pakistan has been America’s major ally in the global war on terror.

Musharraf regime’s no-holds-barred cooperation with the US and its willingness to do whatever was asked of it endeared it to the power centres in Washington.

Consequently, the Bush administration took the initiative of crafting legislation that gave Pakistan exemption against various laws that would otherwise have prohibited US assistance to it, enabling the country to become the recipient of substantial amounts of assistance, both for the country’s economic well-being and for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems.

The Bush administration came to believe that in Musharraf, it had found a person it could hold up as a model of how Muslim leaders were expected to behave — strong and repressive at home, liberal and progressive abroad; but totally committed to promoting the American agenda.

Then on March 9, 2007, Musharraf took the bizarre decision to fire the Chief Justice. That morning the regime appeared unassailable. By the end of the day, it was plain that Musharraf too had feet of clay. Hubris had finally struck him and the country was literally on a roller coaster. Then came the Supreme Court’s judgment on July 20, restoring the Chief Justice to his position that renewed the faith of the Pakistanis in their country.

It was, however, not easy conveying to American officials and scholars the scale and depth of the transformation that had taken place in Pakistan in just a few weeks. For them, the only thing that mattered was the survival of the military regime. Most Americans were convinced that Musharraf was not only a sincere friend of theirs, but that he was the only leader who had the courage and capability to keep Pakistan stable and orderly, and, more importantly, remain committed to the war on terror.

I was repeatedly warned that if Musharraf were to go, Pakistan could disintegrate and its nuclear weapons fall into the hands of the militants — admittedly a nightmare scenario for the Americans.

So the Bush administration decided to craft a new political dispensation in Pakistan wherein Musharraf would keep virtually all his current powers, while the regime would acquire a civilian face, essential to retain support of an increasingly critical Democratic-controlled Congress.

My plea that Pakistanis could no longer be fobbed off with this charade and that they wanted the restoration of a genuinely democratic government was greeted with scepticism.

My interlocutors in the US warned that Washington was very concerned with intelligence reports indicating that Al Qaeda had succeeded in “reorganising” itself. They said that it would not be satisfied with merely ensuring Islamabad’s cooperation in the war on terror, but was determined to keep Musharraf in power, in the belief that no new regime in Pakistan and certainly not an elected civilian government, could be as committed to or as capable of pursuing the US strategic agenda as the general.

This explains the growing desperation with which the Bush administration (and even Congress) has been using its “good offices” to push Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto to “solemnise” the deal. Its emissaries have been asking “friendly powers” to add their voices to its own effort to ensure that their investment in Pakistan can be secured.

For one, Bhutto is considered “emotionally and intellectually” very close to the US, as evident from the fact that she may be one of the few leaders from a Muslim country who has not been critical of the US invasion of Iraq. Her decision to meet the Israeli ambassador to the UN at a dinner in New York last week also earned her quite a few brownie points with the liberal media.

This was reflected in major US newspapers. In a lead story on August 27, The New York Times cautioned the US that “Sharif’s re-entry into politics would overturn its plan to prod the general to share power with Bhutto as a way of keeping him in power.” The Washington Times welcomed the return of Nawaz Sharif to Pakistan, but on the ground that this would “encourage him (Musharraf) to secure a deal with Bhutto.”

But evidence of some rethinking was provided by the Washington Post’s editorial of August 29, which accused Musharraf of being “an unfaithful and at times a meretricious ally of the US, even while accepting some $10 billion in American aid.”

The paper recalled that for eight years the general sidelined the liberal politicians, “preferring to perpetuate his regime through deals with the Muslim extremists, rigged elections, rewrites of the Constitution and simple repression.”

Though the paper was of the view that the general would need the help of both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, American preference for Bhutto was confirmed by Daniel Markey of the Council on Foreign Relations, who told the media that the Bush administration might not be happy with Nawaz Sharif’s return to Pakistan, because in his view “at the very least, he (Sharif) is not a friend of the US.”

Admittedly, the US is facing a serious dilemma, with Musharraf — its closest ally — having lost his “aura of invincibility”. With Iraq spinning out of control and things not going too well in Afghanistan either, the last thing it wants is to be confronted by another crisis and that too in a nuclear-armed and extremism-prone country such as Pakistan.

While it would be only fair for it to monitor closely current developments taking place in Pakistan and add its voice to those asking for the restoration of a genuinely democratic dispensation, it would be making a horrible mistake of the kind that has long been its proclivity if it seeks to impose its wishes on Pakistan.

History is littered with tales of American diplomacy gone “wrong”. The reason simply is that Washington has immeasurable faith in its capacity to micro-manage political transitions in foreign countries and to tell Third World states who should or should not be running their affairs. In fact, such a policy creates a reaction exactly the opposite of what is desired.

The US would, therefore, do well to refrain from its increasingly farcical effort to ensure a subservient political set-up in Islamabad. It would do Pakistan and itself a lot of good if it were to allow the current crisis to resolve itself in accordance with the laws of the land and in conformity with the wishes of its people.

In fact, much too close an identification with any foreign power and certainly one as unpopular as the US cannot be a source of strength and legitimacy for any government. Pakistani politicians, too, need to remember that the destiny of this country should be determined by its people, not by US policymakers.

Adjustments must be for the people

THE ‘deal’ has emerged as a critical issue. The PPP-Musharraf dialogue is not only of topical importance in politics, it is also a hot topic in the media. There are also reports about meetings between Musharraf’s aides and the Sharifs.

After initially maintaining a silence on the Benazir-Musharraf meeting, both confirmed it. Benazir’s version was that a meeting was held but no agreement was reached. While speaking to PML-Q members at the CM Punjab House, Musharraf said that if the opposition was strong, it would create problems for the government. He asserted that as a result of his meeting with Benazir, the opposition has been divided. But political analysts interpret the meeting as an indication of his weakness.

Meanwhile, mistrust between Nawaz Sharif and Benazir has deepened as a dent has been created in their grand alliance. Musharraf who is facing a crisis has had to take the initiative. He admitted that his meeting with Benazir was a political strategy which has brought him success.

Musharraf lamented that his B team had deserted him. The team, which negotiated with Benazir, comprised his non-political subordinates. A patch-up with Benazir suits him. Notwithstanding his earlier claim that Benazir’s and Nawaz Sharif’s political role is over, Musharraf has had to make a move to seek an understanding with the PPP…

We do not say that the government should not have political contacts with any party or the PPP should not attempt a reconciliation with the government. But these adjustments should not have a restricted discourse.

This adjustment should not be for them to accommodate each other. It should be in the larger interest of the people. .— Aug 29

Why foreigners decide our political fate

SAAD Hariri, son of a former Lebanese prime minister, brokered the deal between Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf as a result of which the former lived eight years as a royal guest instead of languishing in jail.

As the situation in the country changed and the apex court allowed the Sharif brothers to return home in keeping with the law and the Constitution, a shadow was cast on the deal.

There are many influential foreign personalities who are engaged in bringing about a settlement among Musharraf, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir.

In the case of the Benazir-Musharraf deal, officials of the US State Department … and former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw had also played a role.

Interestingly our intelligentsia who are deadly opposed to the influence and intervention of the US in Pakistan’s domestic affairs and consider it as negating our sovereignty, do not adopt a stand when it comes to guarantees, reconciliatory efforts or deals involving a Muslim country.

It is regrettable that whenever a political understanding or deal is concluded it is through foreign intermediaries. This amounts to deciding each partner’s share in the power cake and this is settled outside the country.

Later, this is formalised through elections. This exercise is just a ritual. How can one describe this but as a deplorable state of affairs?

The people of Pakistan have no role in the political change that is brought about through these foreign intermediaries. Political changes in Islamabad are decided in Washington DC, with Saudi Arabia being the guarantor and are stringed from Lebanon.— Aug 28

–– Selected and translated by Sohail Sangi