THE putative closure of two major issues dominating the political scene for over six months — the Chief Justice’s suspension and the Lal Masjid imbroglio — within a week of each other have completely changed Pakistan’s political landscape.

These issues gained salience when a reference was filed against the Chief Justice while the students of Jamia Hafsa forcibly occupied a children’s library in retaliation to the demolition of some mosques by Islamabad’s Capital Development Authority. The dramatic end of both these episodes have put in jeopardy the Musharraf regime’s strident plans to extend its tenure for at least another five years.

A couple of days before the Supreme Court verdict reinstating the Chief Justice, the president sounded upbeat about his future, emboldened perhaps by the “success” of the Lal Masjid operation. He reiterated his plan of being re-elected “in uniform” by the current legislatures.

It seems, however, that now he will have to press into service Plan B, if one can credit him and his advisers with the uncharacteristic prescience of having prepared one. Such a plan must take into account the changed situation of an emboldened, energised and independent judiciary, supported by a vigilant civil society and an alert media.Additionally, it must take into account the several suicide attacks by militant Islamic groups resulting from the military action against the Lal Masjid.

More than 200 have been killed in a spate of such bombings. Things in this regard are going to get worse as the United States is increasing its pressure on Gen Musharraf to do more to quell the insurgency.

Whether the regime was taken unawares by the Supreme Court’s unwelcome verdict — even a lay observer watching the court’s proceedings could not help noticing the contrast between the weak and half-hearted defence of the government lawyers and the spirited advocacy of Aitzaz Ahsan, which shifted the balance overwhelmingly in the Chief Justice’s favour — or was still being deluded about the righteousness of its case by its sycophants, is yet not clear.

The government remains tight-lipped as to how such a blunder, which would have caused many heads to roll in a self-respecting regime in a “mature” country, came to be committed. The official reaction at the highest level is as if it had lost a cricket match and the government spokesmen tried to put a brave and sporting face on it. The reality, however, is that the government is now deeply in trouble and faces a multiple whammy. By remaining in denial for so long about the problems it faced, it has missed the many windows of opportunity that could have possibly bailed it out of the serious predicament it has landed itself in.

Part of the problem of this regime has been the hubris displayed by its military leader who continues to suffer from an infallibility complex. His unwavering faith in the overarching supremacy of the military in the country’s polity is epitomised in his doctrine of the unity of command, which has been his raison d’etre for wearing “two hats”.

This doctrine has been seriously challenged both domestically and abroad, which has reluctantly made him concede some political space to others at a time of his choosing. He depends crucially on support from the army, which rewards him with loyalty for defending and promoting its corporate interests, and the US, which values his services for the indispensable role of Pakistan as a frontline state.

While he was able to get a questionable endorsement of support from his military commanders recently, US support for his regime is becoming increasingly equivocal.

What has made things even worse for him is that his hope for forging an alliance with Benazir Bhutto (whom he reportedly met in Abu Dhabi for parleys that proved inconclusive), who was willing to lend a helping hand to his “enlightened moderation” agenda in the hope of being considered an acceptable alternative by the US, was dealt a blow in the wake of the Supreme Court verdict.

Gen Musharraf can no longer be regarded as the unchallenged arbiter of the political destiny of his exiled political opponents, as well as his own. (“I will decide when to give up the uniform” may come to haunt him as one of his more injudicious remarks).

The judiciary is unlikely to give up the space earned for it by the struggle of the lawyers and the courage displayed by the Chief Justice by taking on the regime and by his brothers on the bench in delivering the historic judgment. The fact is that Gen Musharraf’s reputation and clout are damaged to the extent that even his political supporters will start deserting as soon as the modalities of a fair and free election under a neutral arrangement are determined by the judiciary.

Unlike the decision of the Supreme Court, it is difficult to unequivocally support or condemn the government’s decisive, if delayed, action to bring the Lal Masjid episode to a close. The affair had turned so ugly that it was causing the military-led government immense embarrassment, both at home and abroad. To see its writ being challenged right in the centre of the capital by armed militants who were virtually mocking at its imbecility to govern, was one of the worst humiliations that even a weak-kneed civilian regime would not have put up with.

With the capital showcased as the country’s most peaceful and least strife-torn city overwhelmed by demonstrations for over three months in favour of the Chief Justice, it had already begun to lose its glitter and the gloss that the CDA was trying to put over by digging up the main avenues and over-building the infrastructure, in an attempt to attract real estate investment from the Middle East.

The Lal Masjid issue could not be allowed to fester any longer, without lowering the esteem of the government further. That marker was provided by the protest at the highest level from Pakistan’s supporter in the last resort, China, whose citizens were taken hostage by the Hafsa brigade for indulging in allegedly impious activities.

Not only was Islamabad’s passive citizenry, the bulk of whom are low-paid civil servants and shopkeepers, facing harassment in their daily lives, the whole country was tired of the unmitigated moral haranguing and vigilantism sponsored by the Lal Masjid mafia.

From the low-level reaction of the general public to the regime’s brutal operation against the Lal Masjid inmates, it seems evident that people breathed a sigh of relief, as anticipated in this paper’s headline, “It’s all over”, after the collapse of the resistance, symbolised by the shooting of its firebrand leader.

The evolution of the Lal Masjid issue from a purely administrative question of its location and expansion into a simmering political cauldron of religious vigilantism and fundamentalism raises many unanswered questions.

As has been repeatedly pointed out, the mosque’s leadership was an inheritance from another military regime, whose remnants continue to have an umbilical relationship with the present regime and maintain close contacts with the military and the ISI.

The Musharraf government, despite the 9/11 U-turn and its trumpeted policy of “enlightened moderation” did little to cleanse itself of such elements. Its unholy alliance with the MMA prevented it from taking any bold action to prevent the extremists from gaining more strength.

This naturally emboldened the mosque leadership to expand its activities far beyond the legitimate functions of a place of worship and religious learning.

The expansion of these activities was by no means unbeknownst to the intelligence and military authorities, given its openness as a public place and its proximity to the headquarters of the ISI, the Pakistan Navy and the CDA, whose officers regularly occupied the privileged front rows at prayer congregations.

It is amazing that the government did not know the number of students enrolled in the madressahs associated with the Lal Masjid and had no influence in setting any norms of instruction or in the recruitment of students.

It is also incredible that the CDA had no knowledge of, much less raised any objection to, the transformation of the mosque into a veritable fortress, whereas its approval is required even for a minor change in the building plan of a house.

The tragic end of this unhappy episode, involving the loss of many young and innocent, if misguided, lives, the exact number of which will remain a mystery, is the result of a conflation of number of policy, administrative and intelligence failures on the part of the present and predecessor regimes.

The major policy failure has been the inability to clearly define the functions of mosques and madressahs and to bring madressah education into conformity with the regular one. A major factor in the growth of madressahs is the failure to evolve a common public educational system. This is a reflection of the government’s inability to integrate the educational system, which is currently fragmented on the basis of class and the ability to pay.

The government needs to pay greater attention to the supervision of both religious and non-religious academic subjects at these institutions and should consider their affiliation with appropriate universities, educational boards and the creation of a higher education commission for religious studies.

It is impossible not to question the strategy and tactics of dealing with both the crises, which were essentially of the government’s own making and that laid bare its incompetence in dealing with sensitive political issues.

Thrice in the last few months the government’s “mishandling” of such situations, including the Karachi carnage of May 12, has proved its ineptitude and incompetence, which disqualify it from holding the forthcoming elections, much less from holding an extended tenure.

The only way for it to redeem its blunders is to stage a retreat and restore the ex ante constitutional status prior to October 12, 1999.

The Chief Justice’s reinstatement and the removal of the red herring of Lal Masjid from the political scene clear the way for such a possibility.

Email: smnaseem@gmail.com