Eight years of missed opportunities
By S. Akbar Zaidi
MANY people may have forgotten the fact that Mr Shaukat Aziz is Pakistan’s finance minister, and has been for almost eight years under the same leader, and is now Pakistan’s longest serving finance minister. It is very probable that by this time next year, Pakistan will have a new prime minister and a new finance minister (and many hope, a new president). Hence it is an opportune moment to examine the economic record of the Musharraf regime.
Although we have had a finance and prime minister for some years now, we know that the policy, with regard not just to the economy but more or less everything else that relates to Pakistan, comes from President Pervez Musharraf.
If one were to go by the huge advertisements placed in the press by the government about its achievements, it seems that the last almost eight years, have been Pakistan’s best ever, and that this has been an era of plenty. For those who are old enough to remember, they will recall a similar campaign celebrating the ‘decade of development’ in 1968. They will also remember that the government of Ayub Khan was toppled following mass protests soon after. With so many parallels between 1968 and 2007, one would have hoped that the media campaign managers would have read their history before embarking on this self-congratulatory exercise.
The half-page advertisements of the campaign, ‘When Pakistan prospers … Pakistanis prosper’, or its Urdu version, ‘Kahani naheen, haqiqat’, presents 10 carefully selected indicators related to the economy, all of which make the government look very good. The advertisements show a set of statistics for the year 1998-99 and compare them with figures for 2006-07.
For example, the main advertisement, shows that the size of Pakistan’s economy has almost trebled, exports doubled, remittances gone up five-fold, and so on. On every count, the government looks very good. However, in order to understand the nature and impact of these numbers, one needs to go well beyond a set of carefully chosen, highly favourable set of numbers, and also examine them in a context where some more substantive comparisons can be made. Let us just take a handful of the prosperity data presented by the government.If one looks at exports, for example, the data suggest that exports have risen from $7.5 bn in 1998-99 to $17.5bn in 2006-07, clearly a substantial achievement as depicted in the charts. However, this hides the fact that today, as in 1998-99, the composition of exports has hardly changed and Pakistan still exports around 62 per cent of cotton-related products.
Moreover, the expectations that following the end of trade-related restrictions Pakistan’s textile exports would surge have been proven wrong. Pakistan’s exports continue to stagnate and have not diversified. Besides, any figure showing exports needs to be seen in the light of imports and a country’s trade and balance of payments, and on both counts, Pakistan’s statistics are far worse than they have ever been.
Similarly, the much touted $14bn foreign exchange reserves figure, while the ‘highest ever’, is exposed for its real worth, i.e. its ability to buy imports. In 2002-03, for example, following the 9/11 bonanza which the government received, Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves were lower than what they are currently but were equivalent to 33 weeks of imports. Today, the record reserves are worth a mere 18 weeks of imports, about the same as in 2001-02. No prosperity on this front.
Exactly the same logic can be used to show that most of the figures being paraded as indicators of prosperity, are false, or hide far more than they reveal. Remittances, for example, while the highest ever at around $5.5bn, are supply driven and governments cannot claim any credit for their increase. Because of the huge rise in the price of oil and surging incomes in the Gulf resulting in an economic boom, there has been more money available to be given to migrant workers, who are remitting it in huge amounts and numbers. This has happened globally over the last five years and Pakistan is no exception.
Moreover, the more interesting question worth asking the ministry of finance is, what has happened to the nearly $23bn remitted to Pakistan since 2002? Why have foreign exchange reserves risen by a mere three billion dollars in the last four years? These questions lead on to the missed opportunities which would really have made Pakistan prosper.
In terms of economic possibilities, no government could have had it as good as General Pervez Musharraf’s following 9/11. With the economy’s biggest problem throughout the 1990s – that of its huge debt – being dealt with by it being rescheduled and partly written off a few days after 9/11, no government could have hoped for a greater windfall.
Debt repayments had been the biggest constraint on the economy in the previous decade and were the main reason for the economy performing poorly in the 1990s. Following 9/11 sanctions, too, were lifted or relaxed, and aid, which had been curtailed during the 1990s, came back in unprecedented amounts. Moreover, on account of 9/11 and due to the boom in the Gulf, remittances touched astronomical proportions easing the pressure on Pakistan’s current account deficit. If only previous governments had been so fortunate.
It is this embarrassment of riches in a flawed policy framework, by a government which, until very recently, has been in full control for more than seven years, that makes one suggest that much ‘prosperity’ that has taken place has been due to fortuitous circumstances, rather than to active engagement with key problems in the economy. In fact, by avoiding serious and urgent issues, this government has ridden its luck, passing the buck on to the next government.
Key failures, and there are many, include the inability to expand the tax base, despite growth in incomes, in terms of numbers, revenue collected, and more importantly, by not being able to diversify the tax base. It is difficult to believe that even now, highly lucrative forms of earning wealth – such as the stock market – are exempt from substantive taxes, as is agricultural income. Health expenditure is still a mere 0.7 per cent of GDP, and education spending continues to be the lowest in South Asia. This despite unprecedented fiscal space created after 9/11. Regarding the power sector, all there has been is talk, and no urgent measures have been taken, the absence of which is beginning to undermine the ‘prosperity’ of recent years.
Perhaps the government’s biggest failure on the economic front has been its blindness to address questions of growing disparity, both in terms of incomes and regions. While its advertisements show that per capita income may have risen to $926 per capita, they hide the fact that this prosperity has been unequal and uneven. Some regions and individuals may have prospered, but all research shows that the differences between individuals and regions have grown markedly. Inflation too, is at its highest in many years.
These are exactly the same truths which were hidden in the advertisements when the government was celebrating its decade of development in 1968, at a time when a popular movement was gaining momentum. Are we on the cusp of a repeat performance?

