The sectarian divide

WHEN the US invaded Iraq in March 2003, it did so supremely confident not only of achieving a swift and decisive victory but of also carrying out other fundamental changes in the country and region. The first few weeks turned out to be far better than anticipated, encouraging US and British leaders to pronounce not only the success of their plans, but also their determination to recast the entire region in a manner that would protect and promote western interests for decades, if not longer.

They believed that not only would democracy be introduced to Iraq, but that this would result in political reforms in other countries of the region, bringing to them the proven benefits of democratic rule, respect for human rights and the market economy. In the process, it was expected that corrupt and authoritarian regimes that for several decades had oppressed their largely ignorant populations would be swept away.

Sadly for the US and tragically for Iraq, all those lofty goals now lie scattered amongst the ruins of the once glorious edifices built by the great Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar. Not only have more than 3,000 American lives been lost in a poorly thought-out adventure, more than 650,000 Iraqis have also been sacrificed at the altar of the neo-cons’ unbridled ambitions.

A once peaceful and orderly state, though admittedly governed by a brutal dictator, lies in ruins with a civil war tearing the country apart and sending shockwaves all over the region. The country is worse off today than at any time in the past. The biggest proof of the change is the now widely-held impression that the hated Saddam Hussein regime was preferable to the chaos resulting from foreign occupation.

All this became apparent within a fairly short period of time. But one other outcome of the US invasion was largely unforeseen. This was the emergence of the Shia-Sunni divide that is very widespread and vicious. True, there was always a simmering tension just below the surface between the Shias, who deeply resented the minority’s domination and the Sunnis, who traditionally controlled the levers of power. But, given the secular nature of the Saddam Hussein regime and its brutality against all opponents, irrespective of their religious or sectarian orientation, everyone suffered under the dictatorship.

Nevertheless, the Shias felt a sense of relief and redemption at the demise of the regime. Thereafter, as the majority community, they demanded the handing over of power to them on the basis of the majority vote in the country’s first free and fair elections. The Sunnis, despondent and angry at their loss of power and fearful that a historic role reversal was inevitable, began to spearhead the armed resistance against the occupation forces. The Iranians, cognisant of the opportunities available to them for the first time in a millennium, played their cards with great intelligence.

First of all, they “encouraged” the Americans to destroy the Ba’athist set-up. They then played a helpful role in ensuring peace in the Shia strongholds and finally, ensured the emergence of those Shia leaders who had been recipients of Iranian aid and assistance for decades.

These developments, coupled with the perception in the Arab world that the coming into power of Shia politicians in Iraq was likely to strengthen Iran’s influence in the region, became a matter of deep concern across the Arab world.

These states could not fathom the US rationale which had resulted, possibly inadvertently, in a remarkable advantage for Iranian strategic interests.

More precisely, the ouster of the Taliban from Kabul and of the Saddam Hussein regime from Baghdad, brought about an end to Iran’s two major threats on its two flanks. No wonder, Tehran must have looked at US policies with disbelief, for they were diametrically opposite to what Washington would have been expected to pursue.

Resultantly, the region is convinced that the resurgence of Shia power led by Iran is a threat that has to be met firmly and squarely. This sentiment was given expression by Jordan’s King Abdullah when he warned of the emergence of a “Shia crescent” in the region. The Arabs’ worry was primarily on two counts – one political, the other sectarian.

Politically, they were worried because, unlike Iran which holds regular elections, the neighbouring Arab countries are either autocratic monarchies or single-party authoritarian regimes which abhor popular participation in the affairs of the state. The sectarian concern stems from the centuries’ old unbridgeable divide between the Arabs and the Iranians which some trace to the defeat of the Sassanid empire in 637AD.

Other developments in the region too have been helpful to Iranian interests. Its support to the Hezbollah and the latter’s success in putting up a resolute resistance to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon transformed its leader Hassan Nasrallah into a cult figure on Arab streets. Not only was Nasrallah’s growing popularity across the Arab world deeply upsetting to the regimes, even more worrying for them was the perception that Iran alone had the will to challenge Israeli ambitions in the region when it publicly supported Hamas.

Thanks to these misgivings, the US has been able to create widespread hostility against Iran. The Arab media has been vocal in claiming that Tehran is not only providing funds and arms to Shia minority groups in the Arab countries, but is inciting them to organise themselves with the ultimate aim of destabilising their governments. While it is true that Iraq is the only Arab country where the Shias are in a majority, they constitute a significant minority in other countries as well, with Lebanon and Bahrain having them in such large numbers that they could well be the majority.

Even in Saudi Arabia, which is the bastion of orthodox Sunni Islam, the Shias are concentrated in the oil-rich eastern province where recent stirrings of public unrest have been deeply unnerving for the rulers. In Bahrain, the ruling family, which is Sunni, cannot even contemplate having genuine elections, as it would bring the Shias to power.

When it finally dawned on the Americans that their policies had brought about results that were exactly the opposite of what they had desired, they embarked on a course correction. This policy shift derives partly from its recognition that Saddam Hussein’s departure strengthened Iran’s influence in the region, but more importantly, from concerns expressed by its Arab allies that they were deeply worried about a Shia resurgence.

Many credible American journalists confirm that a distinct shift can be detected in Washington’s strategy in the Middle East, though officials will admit to only a “redirection”. First of all, the US has ratcheted up pressure on Iran, both in the context of its nuclear programme and by levelling charges of Iranian involvement in attacks on American soldiers in Iraq. As a consequence, the US has abandoned its earlier policy that favoured the promotion of democratic reforms in pro-US, conservative Arab states. Instead, the US now favours reinforcing their security and intelligence agencies even if this means that the regimes become more oppressive domestically.

More disturbing are reports that the US has taken steps to finance and arm anti-regime elements in both Iran and Syria. This has been done by reestablishing links with extremist Sunni organisations that espouse a militant version of Islam.

This policy change is not a secret, as evident from US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recently, when she confirmed that the Bush administration was promoting “a new strategic alignment in the Middle East”, separating the “reformers” from the “extremists”.

She also referred to the Sunni states of the region as “centres of moderation”, while accusing Iran, Syria and the Hezbollah of being “on the other side of the divide” and of “having made their choice and their choice is to destabilise” the region.

If reports from Washington are to be believed, the US has succeeded in convincing Saudi Arabia that, more than any other country in the region, it is threatened by the rising Iranian influence. An inevitable corollary to this is that Riyadh must accept that Iran, not Israel, represents a threat to the Arab states.

American journalist Seymour Hersh has even claimed that this policy “has brought Saudi Arabia into a new strategic embrace largely because both countries see Iran as an existentialist threat”. If true, this would represent a “sea change” in the region and possibly the most important development since the signing of the Camp David Accords.

In defence of this policy, Vice President Dick Cheney, in a television interview in January, raised the spectre of “a nuclear armed Iran, astride the world’s supply of oil, able to affect adversely the global economy, prepared to use terrorist organisations and/or their nuclear weapons to threaten their neighbours and others around the world”.

Cheney went on to claim that that “if you go and talk with the Gulf states or if you talk with the Saudis, or if you talk with the Israelis, or the Jordanians, the entire region is worried about Iran.”

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s recent decision to travel to Riyadh was definitely a bold move. The Iranian leader was received with unusual warmth and cordiality and his talks with the Saudis reportedly focused on Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. It was heartening to note that they pledged to resist any attempt to spread sectarian conflict in the Middle East, reiterating that sectarianism was a “cancer that could destroy both countries”.

Muslims were called upon to make “efforts to concentrate on countering attempts to fuel the fire of strife between Sunnis and Shias”. Both leaderships deserve to be complimented for rising above transient interests and recognising where the real danger to the Muslim world lies.

If this is evidence of their common realisation that sectarianism is a cancer that could destroy the entire Muslim world, it should be welcomed and encouraged. Happily, the fallout of the Abdullah-Ahmadinejad meeting has been seen as positive in most Arab capitals. It is in the promotion of these sentiments that our leadership should be engaged in as well.

Given our generally good record of inter-sectarian harmony and the absence of any discrimination on the basis of sects, we should be at the forefront of efforts to promote cordial and friendly relations between Iran and the Arab states. Pakistan’s relations with both are critical and it cannot be a party to the designs of those who wish to benefit from Arab-Ajam differences.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Gandhians versus Naxalites

THEY were there, 100 of them, aged and weathered, followers of Mahatma Gandhi, fasting for 24 hours opposite the Raj Ghat where he was cremated. They were hailing the centenary of Satyagraha, a non-violent struggle against oppression. Each one of them had participated in one Satyagraha or another. Yet none has been included in the all-India committee that the Congress has constituted for the celebrations.

“We met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh soon after he was sworn in to offer him our unconditional help to fight for basic priorities,” says Bhai Amarnath, chairman of Sar Seva Sangh which strings together thousands of Gandhians across the country. “We have not heard from him since. We sense that our government and the people sitting in the place of power are completely cut off from the pain and problems of the common man.”

The Gandhians tried to meet the prime minister recently as well. They faxed their request for an appointment because they wanted to give him the feedback of feelings at the grassroots level at which they work. Their experience was that “the soul of democracy in the country is dead.” They did not get any appointment with the prime minister but they sent a letter to him and all the members of parliament – 800 odd – to urge them “to fight against all the forces sustaining the current” economic, social and political system.

Nobody met them from even the Congress, not even a junior functionary. They wrote a letter to party President Sonia Gandhi who, they complained, never gave them an opportunity to meet her. Yet they have appealed to her: “It is up to you and your government to decide on what kind of relation you want to have with us.”

In contrast is the politics of brimstone and gunfire of the Naxalites, also called the Maoists and supporters of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist). They hog the headlines because the media hardly bothers about the Gandhians. The union home ministry has a special section to follow Naxalite activities because they “control” 125 districts in 10 states, trying to prove that power comes from the barrel of a gun. Unlike the Gandhians’ passive resistance, the Naxalites advocate that “India’s liberation will be achieved by the people’s war creating small bases of armed struggle all over the country by waging guerilla warfare.”

In the corridor from Hyderabad to Kathmandu, which they have carved, they extort money, levy taxes and even administer rough and ready justice. They do not like the bourgeois parliamentary system and feel sorry for Nepal’s Maoists, once their colleagues, who have forsaken arms for the ballot box.

The Naxalite movement did not begin at Wardha, the Gandhian centre of inspiration. The Naxalites started their agitation from Naxalbari, a village in West Bengal, in 1967. The local peasantry took over the land belonging to zamindars in the wake of bloodshed. China then under Mao Zedong lauded the clash and considered it a step towards creating a “liberated” base for backing armed revolution in India. Subsequently, the movement went through many ups and downs. It got a new lease of life with the formation of the People’s War Group (PWG) in Andhra Pradesh in 1981.

Some days ago, when Naxalites killed a Lok Sabha member, they said they were retaliating for the force used by the police that killed 12 of their colleagues. How different they are from the Gandhians. Why should revenge be visited on an innocent person? Murder is murder, whatever the rationalisation. No amount of hatred in the name of class war justifies the killing. Whether it is for forcible occupation of land belonging to the Kulaks or for preparing the ground for revolution, violence eliminates something basic.

What the Naxalites do not realise is that man is not an economic but a moral being, moved by ideals and aspirations. True, the system which is taking over the world dehumanises man by reducing him to a potential source of profit.

But an eye for an eye or tooth for tooth is a mediaeval way of extracting revenge. We have reached a stage in the affairs of man where violence will lead to annihilation and ultimately oust whatever good there is in the world in the shape of music, art or literature. The society we aim for cannot be brought about by any kind of violence, big or small. It produces an atmosphere of conflict and disruption.

It is absurd to imagine that socially progressive forces will emerge victorious from the conflict. In Germany both the Communist Party and the Social Democrats were swept away by Hitler. In India any appeal to violence is particularly dangerous because of its inherently disruptive character. We have too many fissiparous tendencies for us to take risks. Even otherwise India has put its faith in the ballot box. There is no place for violence in a democratic parliamentary system.

Other communist parties in the country have adopted the ballot box to come to power or to oust the rulers. And they have done quite well within the system. The backwardness of the area and the people is the breeding ground for the Naxalites. No doubt the mere threat of the gun makes people fall in line. Yet the ideology that gives free land to the landless and a better life to the poor brings around many.

The government is beginning to think in terms of welfare. But bureaucrats, the middle men and the greedy in the police are appropriating most funds which should be reaching the targeted population. Still some dent is being made in the Naxalites’ following. The documents which the authorities have seized recently show that the revolutionary spirit of the 1980s has “dipped” considerably.

The Naxalites’ own analysis is that they should recruit more sections of society that are “discontent”. Their new recruits are the Dalits, the lowest caste, as their activity in Maharashtra shows.

I do not know why the best of movements go off the track and lose the people’s confidence. The stir for autonomy in Punjab ended up in terrorism and lost popular support. Similarly, the movement for autonomy in Kashmir acquired a communal edge, alienating Jammu, Ladakh and the rest of India. Both the state and the militants lost their way and adopted the path which was far from conciliatory.

The same is more or less true of the Naxalites. They once represented the poor and the landless. Today the struggle is degenerating into senseless killings.

The Naxalites should learn from experience. The Soviet Union, which once preached violent methods, has collapsed. The Chinese have stopped helping non-conformist forces in the world. And the terrorism of Al Qaeda and the Taliban has made many people question their type of violence. The basic thing is that the wrong means will not lead to the right results. This is all that the Gandhians preach.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

The long road to peace

DO the details of history matter, if the outcome is the right one? In one sense, Peter Mandelson's revelation that Tony Blair wanted him to write a secret letter to Sinn Féin offering a limited amnesty to IRA fugitives, and that the then Northern Ireland secretary refused to do so, is water under the bridge.

True, it provides historians with an insight into how Northern Ireland can divide two men who are otherwise at one on the New Labour project. But with 12 days to go before a much greater prize is there for the taking –- the prospect of a power-sharing deal in Stormont –- the letter is now history.

The fact that it is just another episode from the past is in itself significant. It shows how far everyone has travelled on the rocky road to peace since then. In the intervening years, the IRA has disarmed. It said in July 2005 that the war is over, and a Sinn Féin special conference agreed this January to let its leaders participate in the province's policing and justice structures. Sinn Féin now faces a deal that has eluded nationalists for over three decades. For the DUP leader Ian Paisley, now at the head of the largest unionist party, the choice ahead of him is just as portentous. By saying yes for once in his life, and sitting down with his archenemy Martin McGuinness as his deputy, he could still prove himself capable of a last redemptive act, after a long and divisive political career.

In the broad run of history, it has taken the efforts of at least three British prime ministers, to consider only London's role, to get to this point. Strategically, Mr Blair was right to argue with Mr Mandelson that the process was the policy, even if he made promises he could not keep (the amnesty offer was shelved).

The sensitivities today to Mr Mandelson's revelations - he said that his remarks were taken out of context and we publish extracts of the interview today which suggest that they were not - reflects the government's anxiety as the deadline for a deal approaches. Will Mr Paisley sign up to it, or produce yet more objections? Mr Paisley was sounding more optimistic than he has for some time about the prospect of agreement by March 26. Pressed to say what more he wants from Sinn Féin, he says it is a question of delivery.

— The Guardian, London