The misunderstood war
By M.P. Bhandara
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander must make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature’.
— Carl von Clausewitz, ‘On War’
IF only imperial US seeks wisdom in the above words, it would save itself and both Pakistan and Afghanistan from a host of troubles. To begin with, let’s try and understand what kind of war the US and Nato have embarked on and likewise the Taliban. The reference here is not to the instruments of warfare but to respective perceptions.
The Taliban of the ’90s, under the influence of the financier ideologue, Osama bin Laden, were gung-ho in creating a so-called Islamic state which was rejected by the majority of the world’s Muslims. The Taliban today assume the mantle of Afghan nationalism, the true heirs of the Pashtunwali, are giving battle to expel the foreign invader.
What kind of war is it five years after the invasion of Afghanistan? The objective then as now of the US was to bring Bin Laden to justice and establish a ‘democratic’ polity. The Taliban today do not consider Osama bin Laden to be an issue. Mulla Omar’s interview of January 4 needs to be read closely, between the lines. You do not expect him to make a volte face but his distancing from Bin Laden is unmistakable. The Pashtunwali ‘zeitgeist’ does not promise democracy but a sort of personal autonomy and equality to each member, which might be a better democracy than the prescriptions of the US; and in its external aspects, a fierce nationalism, which is intolerant of foreign domination. The Pashtuns, who constitute about half of Afghanistan’s population of 30 million, have been the standard bearers of Afghan nationalism ever since the state came into being about 250 years ago. To understand the kind of war that the Taliban are fighting, we need a brief glimpse of the Pashtunwali culture.
This fierce Pashtunwali culture can be summed up in one word — honour, but with very special connotations and nuances. For the Pashtun, it is an eye for an eye, a life for a life or in lieu thereof monetary or other compensation such as girls and women given in payment of blood debts, as may be determined by a jirga of Spingeeri — literally, white beards. The jirga has undergone change with the times, particularly since the Bin Laden era of the ’90s to make its decisions more Shariah compliant. An appeal from the jirga lies with a Shariah court, which functions as a sort of supreme court. The jirga is the protector of the Pashtunwali culture and customary laws.
It is mandatory in the Pashtun code of honour for an insult to be avenged. As the saying goes, “A Pashtun waited 100 years, and then took his revenge, it was quick work”.
The more attractive part of this culture is ‘malmastai’ — hospitality to one and all, and ‘nanawatai’ — to give sanctuary to one in need, who knocks on the door seeking refuge. ‘Nanawatai’ is best explained by a true story. A Talib in the Zadran tribal area of eastern Khost province killed a man with a knife. The Talib knocked on the nearest door and said to the woman who opened it “I have killed a man. Shelter me”. It later turned out that the man killed was the son of the woman giving shelter. Her husband and other family members were furious to which the woman responded, “I am a Pashtun and have given this man refuge. Take him away to safety.”
A Pashtun in gross violation of the Pashtunwali code is regarded in utter contempt. Such persons are best advised to leave the society in which they live, and migrate. (The writer acknowledges his debt to the London Economist issue of December 23 on the Pashtunwali, for the above quotes).
In the context of the above it is easier to understand Mulla Omar’s refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden, as demanded by the US after 9/11. It would have been a fate far worse than death. If he did, Omar, his family and tribe would have lost face for generations to come. Do you think the Americans who judge the world by the bottom-line of what is best in their interest can understand this? It is tempting to speculate on how different would have been the evolution of events if no invasion had taken place. Could Omar have survived a Pakistan economic blockade in the months following 9/11? Iran coming to the rescue of a Shia-hating Mulla Omar and Bin Laden will not understand the sectarian polities of the Muslims.
Let’s take the case of the September North Waziristan agreement. Locals and foreigners in their protection are said to be violating the agreement. Since anti-American feelings are at fever pitch at the moment, the Pashtunwali code in respect of affected persons will give primacy to revenge — ‘badal’ over the agreement. Honour has to be redeemed for the insults showered by the Americans on Afghan prisoners of war in Kabul and Guantanamo Bay.
If Pakistan attempts to stop it, Bajaur-like incidents will happen again, the whole of Fata will be ablaze — a large part of the Pakistan army will be needed to quell a civil war, not of our making. Patience is required and turning a blind eye to minor infractions and holding the Wana Jirga to account for major ones might be better than an abrogation of the agreement, as demanded by some rightist circles in the US. But there are other ways to make the agreement workable: Enter into negotiations to compensate for lives and dishonour done to the deceased, the maimed and the insulted, this is within the Pashtunwali cultural norms. Herein lie the seeds for getting to talk to the adversary.
Eventually a jirga, in which the Taliban, Kabul and Islamabad governments and our Fata tribes have equal representation must begin a dialogue towards a ceasefire agreement. The Taliban are not likely to come to the jirga meeting unless the agenda includes a timetable for the withdrawal of US/Nato troops. This is the only road to peace. The alternative: the next five years are likely to be more gruesome and destabilising than the last five years assuming that the West has the temerity and public backing for its forces to stay in harm’s way in Afghanistan.
President Karzai comes from honourable Pashtun stock and has a good record behind him, but ever since he became a ward of the US protected by American dogs and guards, he has lost all credibility in the Pashtun areas. It would be in Afghanistan’s interest (and America’s) if he were to give way to a Pashtun with better lines of communication with the Taliban.
Bin Laden, if alive, has been smoked out. There is no way he can finance or mastermind terrorism from a remote cave. Militant Islam as espoused by Bin Laden today finds its roots among the alienated, dispossessed Muslim youths living in the ghettos of the great western cities in Paris, Amsterdam, Madrid and Birmingham. Consider: not one Afghan has been associated with any terror attacks in the West. Militant Islam today is an internal problem of the West.
The Afghan war has some similarities with the Iraq war in that the basic premise of both wars has turned out to be incorrect. Wars once unleashed have a momentum of their own. Thousands of lives and billions of dollars later, can one see any logic in America’s Vietnam war? Today, American businessmen are queuing up in Saigon to make multi-billion dollar deals.
George Soros in his latest book The Age of Fallibility sums it up as follows: “Who would have thought”, he asks “the oldest, most well established and most powerful open society in the world (the US) could pose a threat not only to the concept of open society at home but also to peace and stability in the world? Yet that is what has happened in the aftermath of the terrorist attack of 9/11”.
The sheer bone-headedness of successive Washington administrations on the denial of justice to the Palestinians and letting the Israeli tail wag the dog has led directly to the calamity of 9/11, and its tragic aftermath. Afghanistan, small and insignificant, has already become the graveyard of one great empire, now threatens to become the graveyard of the remaining one.
The writer is an MNA.
murbr@isb.paknet.com.pk

