Our flawed Afghan policy

IN the past month, we have had two high-level visits from Islamabad to Kabul. Last month, Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri travelled to Afghanistan, and later Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz rushed to Kabul. Both returned empty-handed after being at the receiving end of President Hamid Karzai’s acerbic diatribe. In fact, the prime minister was given a public tongue-lashing.

Immediately after the foreign minister’s visit to Kabul, Mr Karzai’s office had declared that though the Afghan people desired to have strong and friendly relations with Pakistan, “the continuation of violence perpetrated by terrorists from across the border was a major obstacle”. In a not too veiled warning that escalating violence in Afghanistan could harm Pakistan’s interests, Kabul emphasised the importance of Pakistan appreciating that it could not have “have peace and stability without a peaceful and stable Afghanistan”

These comments were indicative of the fact that Mr Kasuri had failed in his mission to convince the Afghan leadership that Pakistan was sincere in its desire to establish cordial relations with Afghanistan and, more importantly, was doing all in its power to prevent terrorists from crossing into Afghanistan.

As a way to stop the militants from infiltrating Afghanistan, Mr Kasuri had also proposed the swift repatriation of more than 2.5 million Afghan refugees currently living in Pakistan. While there, he had also admitted that militants were making cross border attacks from Pakistani soil but emphasised that Islamabad was doing its best to stop the problem by stationing nearly 80,000 troops on the frontier. He explained that the militants infiltrating from Pakistan were Afghan refugees and that sending them back to their country would help in reducing the violence. He also expressed his disappointment over Kabul’s tendency to hold Islamabad responsible for any incident that took place in Afghanistan. However, he also asserted that if acts of terrorism were taking place in Afghanistan, the “same is happening in Pakistan.”

That Mr Kasuri’s visit failed to bridge the widening gap between the two sides was evident from a warning issued by Kabul immediately after his departure that the “patience of the Afghan people was running out”. Even more dramatic was President Karzai’s breakdown in public when he portrayed himself and his countrymen as helpless pawns who were unable to prevent the “terrorists coming from Pakistan”. Not satisfied with his emotional outburst, the Afghan president charged Pakistan with “wanting to make slaves out of us, but we will not surrender”. Whether this was a genuine expression of his feelings or a demonstration of his acting skills, he appears to believe that such accusations could help restore his credibility and effectiveness that are being increasingly questioned.

Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have been deteriorating by the day. The two countries have been engaged in mutual recrimination and accusations, with the Afghan charges getting indecently harsh and acerbic. This is not serving the cause of either country but permitting powers that are friends of neither to take advantage of the current situation to enhance their own influence in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s latest decision to fence the border with Afghanistan and to lay landmines on vast stretches of the difficult terrain that separates the two countries, in order to halt the cross border movement of the Taliban, has deeply upset the Afghans. Kabul’s reaction has been one of outrage, with Mr Karzai vowing to use “other methods” to resist the proposed plan. But it is not only Kabul that has reacted to this proposal with surprise and disappointment. The international community’s reaction has been no less negative. Many influential governments, the UN and a number of human rights organisations have expressed their serious concern with the decision to mine the border areas.

This should not surprise Pakistan for the simple reason that over the past years international public opinion has swung strongly against the use of landmines to impede movement of people. Pakistan chose not to sign the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty which is considered bad enough. But now it has gone overboard in its defiance of public opinion, by announcing its decision to mine the border areas. This is all the more unfortunate, given the fact that Afghanistan already has millions of landmines all over the country thanks to the long Soviet occupation of that country. Instead of adding to this menace, Pakistan should be offering its services to promote de-mining in that country.

Pakistan’s leaders frequently refer to their desire to establish a trade and energy corridor extending from Pakistan’s coastal areas to the Central Asian Republics. These are highly ambitious projects that are expensive and difficult to execute, but nevertheless desirable. The first and most urgent requirement, however, is to ensure that peace and stability returns to Afghanistan, without which there is no way any of these projects can take off. Admittedly, the primary responsibility for restoration of law and order lies with the occupation forces and the Karzai regime, but in view of the long and historic involvement of Pakistan in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, it is not surprising that the Afghans would want Pakistan to make a genuine effort to withdraw its support for militant groups that continue to find sanctuary in Pakistan and use its territory to regroup and recoup their losses.

True, the Musharraf government has stationed nearly 80,000 troops in the border areas and has also carried out a number of major operations against the extremists. These have resulted in the death of hundreds of Pakistani troops and a larger number of civilians in what is euphemistically referred to as collateral damage. But its long-term impact has been negative. The impression has gained ground among the tribes that we are oblivious to their lives and interests and have turned a blind eye to the frequent forays by American warships, which while claiming to destroy terrorist sanctuaries, are actually causing grievous harm to local residents. The result is that these people, who had always been fervent patriots, have begun to harbour doubts about Pakistan’s commitment to their safety and security.

It is, therefore, all the more ironic that notwithstanding its major efforts, Pakistan continues to be blamed for the recent revival in Taliban fortunes. There is little international appreciation of the efforts it claims to have made in aid of the US-led war on terror. In the meanwhile, India has succeeded in becoming a major player in Afghanistan. Diplomatic observers are impressed at the frequency of high-level exchanges between Delhi and Kabul, with both leaderships expressing their determination to take their relationship “to new heights”. India has provided Afghanistan with more than half a billion dollars for infrastructure and development projects and has provided other grants and credits to promote trade and investment between the two countries.

Scholarship to nearly a thousand Afghan students every year will also go a long way in creating a pool of pro-Indian Afghans in key sectors of the country’s administration and economy. There may be some merit in India’s claim that its growing presence in Afghanistan and involvement in that country’s economy is not meant to dilute or damage Pakistan’s historic relations with that country. It is nevertheless, placing India in a strategic position to take advantage of the growing trade and investment opportunities coming up in Central Asia as well as increasing access to that region’s massive energy resources.

The current tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan is primarily because of Mr Karzai’s own weaknesses. He just does not have it in him to develop into the strong and assertive leader that Afghanistan requires. He has also failed to tackle the growing influence of strong warlords and powerful drug barons, both of whom continue to gain greater power and autonomy with the result that the government has failed to extend its writ outside Kabul.

Recently, Pakistan’s policy has come in for a hammering from the International Crisis Group. In a report titled ‘Pakistan’s tribal areas: Appeasing the militants’, it claimed that “over the past five years the Musharraf government has tried first brute force, then appeasement: both have failed.” Charging that Islamabad’s tactics have only emboldened the pro-Taliban militants, the report calls upon western governments “to realise that democratic civilian government, not military rule, is the basis and natural ally against extremism and terrorism”. More significantly, the report counselled the US and the EU to link their economic and diplomatic support to Pakistan to its return to democratic rule through free and fair elections in 2007, implementation of institutional reforms and verifiable commitments to take effective steps against extremist elements.

Around the same time, Carlotta Gall in the New York Times wrote an equally damaging article in which she accused the Islamic militants of “using a recent peace deal with the government to consolidate their hold in northern Pakistan vastly expanding their training of suicide bombers and fortifying alliances with Al Qaeda and foreign fighters”. She also quoted Nato officials as saying that “since the September accord, cross border attacks by Pakistan and Afghan Taliban and their foreign allies have increased”.

As regards the much heralded understanding with the tribal elders, the report accused the army of conducting military operations in Fata that “were badly planned, poorly conducted and are responsible for the rise of militancy in the tribal belt where the loss of life and property and displacement of thousands of civilians have alienated the population”.

So we are in that unenviable position where notwithstanding all that we claim to have done, there is no understanding of our policy at home, nor appreciation of it in Afghanistan or in foreign capitals. Even US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who stated publicly that she cannot envision Pakistan without Musharraf in power, appears to be losing faith in Pakistan’s military ruler. In such a situation where Islamabad’s Afghan policy appears to have won no kudos either at home or abroad, is it not time to carry out a rigorous reappraisal, to determine what remedial action we need to take?

For one, Islamabad will have to sever all links with the Taliban and refrain from looking upon them as a fallback option. I was told in Beijing this week, that the Chinese government remains extremely worried by pro-Taliban activities, especially in the Pak-China border areas. I was told of the massive anti-terror operation carried out in Xinjiang that resulted in the death of a large number of militants described as members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.

Secondly, we need to curtail the entry of young foreign nationals who find our territory so very convenient for the promotion of their terrorist activities. Thirdly, we should crack down on the militants, shutting their training camps and ending the flow of money and weapons to them. Fourthly, we should encourage the Afghan refugees to return. Fifthly, we must abandon the fencing and mining options, while cautioning Kabul’s friends that the Afghan president too has to show courage and leadership at home and not try to blame Pakistan for all his failures. Finally, the people of Fata need to be brought into the country’s mainstream, by introducing the rule of law and extending to them civil and political rights, along with investing in their education, health and economic well-being.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Bangladesh at war with itself

THE tragic hero, so wrote Aristotle, suffers a change in fortune because of a mistaken act to which he is led by an “error of judgment” or his “tragic flaw”. Such a man moves us to pity because his misfortune is greater than he deserves. That tragic hero, writes an author from Dhaka, was Sheikh Mujib-ur Rahman, the father of Bangladesh. He liberated his country but did not take strong action against counter-revolutionary elements.

I feel the real tragic figure is his daughter, Sheikh Hasina Wajed. All her life she has been fighting fundamentalism and keeping her distance from anti-liberation forces. But for the sake of votes, she shakes hands with the Bangladesh Khelafat Majlish, a fundamentalist and counter-revolutionary organisation. What a failure she is to boycott the same election for which she sullies her reputation.

Sheikh Hasina is correct when she says that the caretaker government has failed to create a “free and fair” environment for election. But she is wrong when she signs a pact with the Majlish to recognise the principles of fatwa (religious edict) and promises to bar any enactment which goes against Quranic values. There is nothing wrong in upholding Quranic values. But she does not realise she is mixing religion with the state.

This is not what the liberation forces had in mind when they seceded from West Pakistan. Nor would Sheikh Mujib have imagined his daughter might one day shatter his dream of a pluralistic country. He had declared secularism as one of the pillars on which the structure of Bangladesh would rest. The country’s constitution underscores secularism as one of its fundamental objectives.

When Sheikh Hasina heading a main party, the Awami League, and Khaleda Zia heading another main party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, ally themselves with fundamentalist parties they turn their back on secularism. Democracy has already the stamp of cantonment because of the Khaleda Zia rule. Whom does the nation turn to when even the country’s basics are sought to be changed? I recall the scene at Dhaka airport a few days after the liberation: passengers were shouting the “Jai Bangla” slogan. They looked like people returning to the promised land. What happened to their dream?

The nation has been at war with itself from day one. On the one hand, there are forces which, although weaker in ideology than before, are fighting against those who are taking the country back to the divisions and despondency witnessed before liberation. On the other side are the people who want the days of communal and combative politics to come back. In their own way, the two sides pay only lip service to the ideals of Bangladesh. They pulled the country to such depths that even the most optimistic person wonders if and when it will start to climb out of the abyss.

This dismal picture has damaged the dream of Sonar Bangla which inspired the liberation struggle in the sixties. Still, hopes soar when a Bangladeshi gets the Nobel Prize for working among the poor. Suddenly, there is light but it is only for a short time. Doubts and fears then take over. The country has been wracked by a succession of strikes and violent demonstrations.

Anxious donors are worried because neither persuasion nor threat has worked. They face a strange predicament. They cannot afford to quit but at the same time they loathe living with the ever-increasing disruption of work. India’s homilies make little sense when Sheikh Hasina Wajed, on whom New Delhi has invested the maximum, has defiled the very ethos of Bangladesh.

It is strange that New Delhi should have no inkling of her pact with the Majlish. People in India are hurt over Sheikh Hasina’s volte-face because of the feeling that they stood by the side of Bangladesh when the war was fought and lost hundreds of soldiers.

That Khaleda Zia and her son have been elected unopposed underlines the farcical way that elections in Bangladesh will be conducted. On the other hand, the caretaker government inducted the army to suppress the strike. What does it add up to? Elections, which have been postponed, will take place but could be devoid of legitimacy if the opposition sticks to its decision of not participating. It would be one-sided. The British High Commissioner to Bangladesh has warned that “participation of all major political parties in a parliamentary election is required to form a legitimate and credible government.”

The question that faces Bangladesh is not election but how to begin the process of conciliation. This cannot be done by Khaleda Zia saying that the boycotting parties will be responsible if the election becomes “less acceptable”. The matter does not end there. The credibility of election is at stake. Elections are part of the political process. They are meant to choose representatives who participate in the process of constituting a government. The voters are the masters. If a substantial number among them does not go to the polling booth, the election ceases to serve any purpose. It may not be acceptable anywhere in the world.

A few years ago the Awami League did not participate in elections. Khaleda Zia had a walkover. Still she had to quit for lack of credibility of the polls. New elections were held. Prior to his decision on Thursday to quit the caretaker cabinet, the person who was most to blame for the mess is President Iajuddin Ahmed, Khaleda Zia’s appointee. He also combined the post of caretaker government when Justice K.M. Hasan refused to assume the office of chief adviser.

Ahmed should have gone to the person who was constitutionally eligible in order of priority. Thus the court of appeal became the court itself. Ahmed should have at least seen to the revision of the electoral rolls which have reportedly nine million bogus voters. No amount of objection by the Awami League was considered, much less entertained.

Instead of finding a way out, Ahmed was insistent on holding election on January 22 even after the announcement of Hasina and her allies that they would continue the strike until polling day. Violence has escalated. Had elections been held in this situation what message would they have conveyed? Could Khaleda Zia have credible governance in the absence of the Awami League and other parties?

Both sides have to sit across the table and hammer out a settlement. Without that the country is in for unending trouble. My fear is that conditions may develop in a way where military takeover becomes inevitable. I wonder if Mohammad Ali Jinnah ever envisaged that the “independent states” that the Lahore resolution demanded in March 1940 would one day lose democracy which he said was the cornerstone of Pakistan after having hewn it from India.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

US ‘viceroy’ to the UN

ZALMAY KHALILZAD is not the kind of soft-spoken diplomat who goes over well at the United Nations. President Bush’s choice for US ambassador to the UN, dubbed “the viceroy” during his stint as ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, is a neoconservative hawk known for his autocratic style. Yet he is also charismatic and can be charming; certainly compared to his predecessor, he’s a breath of fresh air.

Former Ambassador John R. Bolton was a spectacularly poor choice for the UN, given that he was appointed at a time when the US should have been focusing on mending fences with the international community after ignoring its reservations on the invasion of Iraq. His arrogant refusal to compromise in a forum in which compromise is a necessity for progress only exacerbated American isolation. Bush’s decision in 2005 to install him as a recess appointment when it became clear that he wouldn’t be approved by the Senate was an unconscionable end run around constitutional checks and balances.

Khalilzad is a polished and experienced foreign service official who is quite capable of flexibility, as he proved during tough negotiations over the governance of both Afghanistan and Iraq. Insiders expect him to sail through the Senate confirmation process.—Los Angeles Times