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| January 09, 2007 | Tuesday | Zilhaj 18, 1427 |
New option on Iraq
Why this licence to kill?
The imponderables of 2007 elections
AS we enter 2007, Pakistan faces an electoral impasse. On one side is the question whether Pakistanis will ever be allowed a chance of bringing about a regime change through the ballot — an option that has been exercised in almost all South Asian countries several times but which has been denied to the Pakistani nation for the last 50 years or so.
THE findings of the Institute of Peace Studies giving data on the incidence of terrorist attacks in Pakistan are quite shocking. The 657 attacks reported in the research study of the institute took a heavy toll — 907 dead and 1,543 injured in 2006. This is a disturbing trend, especially because the two areas which were worst affected, namely Fata with 144 attacks killing 379 people, and Balochistan with 403 attacks leaving 277 dead, are also politically the most sensitive. This finding also belies the government’s claim that the situation in these areas is returning to normal. This means that stepping up policing in the vulnerable areas has not had the desired impact. Nearly 1,552 people were arrested and yet the government could not trace all the perpetrators or pre-empt further violence. This does not reflect well on the government’s anti-terror strategy. This failure has had a deleterious effect on the country and the people.
In Balochistan, where the most incidents took place, terrorism — as the violence is referred to by the government — is a manifestation of the political unrest that has gripped the province for the last three years and has escalated in the wake of the move to crack down on dissidents and abandon the dialogue process. The killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti left no one in doubt that Islamabad was determined to tackle the Balochistan problem with a firm hand. Apparently, the military leadership has not yet learnt from the country’s history, which has proved time and again that political issues cannot be resolved by military means. Not surprisingly, there is a rise in the incidents of violence. It proves that the sections of the Baloch who feel oppressed and deprived are retaliating and violence is begetting violence. This has serious implications for a country which lost half its people in 1971 when they seceded complaining that they were being discriminated against and robbed of their natural resources. Ironically, the Baloch have similar complaints.
The violence in the tribal areas underlines a problem of a different but equally serious kind. It indicates the presence of militants who have been waging a war against the American and Nato forces in Afghanistan, as well as the strength of their indigenous proteges. Failure to neutralise them has negatively affected Pakistan’s image which has had to bear the brunt of the charges of not doing enough to check terrorism while being accused by the militants of being in the American camp. Some sections of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies are said to have supported the militants at one time. However, the government has now lost its leverage because it claims to have withdrawn support for the militants. The growing violence is indicative of the government’s loss of control in its border areas. This has implications for its foreign policy as well as its ties with its neighbours.
It is important that this critical situation is addressed in earnest and the violence checked immediately. If President Pervez Musharraf is serious about bringing peace and security to the country, he must make it his first priority to address this problem which, if neglected, could also lead to sectarian violence of the worst kind. Obviously, no uniform strategy can be devised. While policing strategies may have to be strengthened in some areas, political negotiations will have to be opened in others to start a dialogue with the dissidents. The government will, however, have to be very judicious about how it proceeds.
IT is a great climbdown. From bestowing on Iraq a “western-style democracy” to “spreading democracy” in the Middle East, the Bush administration now has a more modest aim — to have “a functional government” in Iraq. Arkansas Senator Mark Pryor, who was one of the 13 senators President George Bush met last week, quoted the president as saying that his aim now was to establish a functional government in Iraq with the help of additional troops. A day later, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said his forces would make a new effort, with American help, to wrest control of Baghdad’s neighbourhoods from sectarian groups. His statement is a true indication of the security situation in the country. This means, more than three and a half years after the overthrow of the Baathist regime, the US-led coalition forces and the indigenous security set-up have not been able to pacify even the Baghdad suburbs. No wonder the Democrat-controlled Congress should threaten to block a White House request for more funding needed for 20,000 to 30,000 more troops for Iraq.
The president is evidently determined to go ahead with a troop increase, as demonstrated by his decision to replace the generals opposed to his new policy. John Abizaid, America’s top general in the Middle East who has now been replaced, has already opposed more troops for Iraq, saying such a move ran counter to trying to get the Iraqis to do more. Also expressing doubts about the utility of the Bush administration’s policy is one of America’s major allies in the region. In a newspaper interview, Saudi Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz said Washington should review its Iraq policy and doubted that the continued presence of the coalition forces would produce positive results. He also warned against a possible dismemberment of Iraq. As House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid said in a letter to the president, “Surging forces is a strategy that you have already tried and that has already failed”. It now remains to be seen whether President Bush will listen to Congress, if not to his friends in the Middle East, or send more troops to Iraq to have “a functional government” there.
IT IS disappointing to note that the prime minister has issued foreign dignitaries licences to hunt the houbara bustard. It speaks volumes for the utter disregard the government has for wildlife, especially when it claims to be its protector. The houbara bustard is considered to be an endangered species and its hunting is banned, but the foreign affairs ministry has powers to grant licences for its hunting — a right that should be given only to the wildlife ministry, even though it too is guilty of disregarding laws meant to protect wildlife. The government may feel obliged to Gulf dignitaries for their economic support but this should not mean violating its own laws. It sets a horrible example for its own people who will then feel no compulsion to obey laws. In 2003, the Punjab wildlife department disallowed locals from hunting the bird but issued licences to Gulf dignitaries, creating feelings of resentment. They could have learnt from the example of their counterparts in the NWFP who launched a limited hunting programme, charging foreigners high fees to hunt a small number of markhors. The money collected from the licence fees was then spent on local communities.
The government must re-examine its own role in endangering wildlife. It must stop granting special licences to the influential, foreign or local, and do away with the notion that by restricting the numbers that are hunted, they are somehow protecting endangered species from extinction. The country is a signatory to many international laws that require it to protect wildlife and no amount of financial benefits must be allowed to detract from its responsibility. It is also time the environment ministry was made the sole authority for granting or denying licences for hunting wildlife, for its reasons will differ vastly from the foreign ministry’s which may only be interested in strengthening ties.
On the other side is the prospect of the nation falling hostage to a predetermined outcome which suits General Musharraf’s plan to rule Pakistan for another five years through a timid Parliament. Well into the 21st century, whose hallmark is democratisation of information and politics, whatever unfolds, one thing is certain — that it will have a far-reaching effect on the future of the Pakistani federation and politics.
It is unfortunate that in Pakistan, which inherited strong traditions of democracy like India and whose founder was a democrat and constitutionalist par excellence, the military has ruled for over 32 years out of the last 50 years. In the last two decades no democratic government was allowed to last longer than two and a half years: all were either dismissed or overthrown. It is quite common to argue that political failures have brought martial laws.
The reality is otherwise. Certainly politicians have their share of mistakes but none ever warranted a martial law. The fact is that military dictators put up a smokescreen to cover the real motives of martial law. In 1958, when General Ayub Khan imposed martial law, elections were scheduled to be held in February 1959 with the prospect of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrwardy likely to become prime minister. If that had been allowed to happen we would not have seen the tragedy of 1971.
What actually triggered martial law was that Iskander Mirza, governor-general, started courting General Ayub Khan’s fellow generals over a cup of tea and General Ayub, a thoroughly ambitious general, had volunteered to be a key ally of the US in its fight against communism.
In 1969, the whole nation was agitating for democracy but when General Yahya Khan felt that power could be transferred to the speaker of the National Assembly, who was from East Pakistan, he snatched power at gunpoint from his benefactor General Ayub Khan. The memory of these events has not allowed subsequent military dictators to shed their uniform. On July 4, 1977, an agreement had been reached between the PNA and the PPP leadership over new elections, which was confirmed by the late Nawabzada Nasrullah and Prof. Ghafoor Ahmad, both members of the PNA negotiating team. What triggered the third martial law was Mr. Bhutto’s decision to change the army chief after the accord.
In 1999, General Musharaf confessed in an interview that if Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif hadn’t dismissed him, he would still be the prime minister, which means that there would have been no corruption, weakening of the federation, and external isolation of Pakistan if General Musharaf was allowed to keep his post. Political crises is a pretext to justify every martial law.
But the real motive behind every martial law, as confessed by General Jehangir Karamat at a seminar, is to protect the military’s corporate interests. Whenever it perceives a threat from the civil leadership, the military acts to preserve the status quo, the bottom-line being that unlike in other democracies it refuses any right and role of oversight for the civil authority in its affairs such as the review of the defence budget, security policies, appointments and postings of senior officers, and any disciplinary action. Unless a workable mechanism is found to address these issues, the promise of democracy will continue to bypass of the nation.
Every election since 1988 was manipulated to get the so-called “positive results” but each time the results defied what had been planned because the electoral process is not mechanical in nature. Once the lid is removed, electoral dynamics come into play. In 1988, the plan was to block Benazir Bhutto’s victory but it didn’t succeed. In 1990, the plan was to install Mr Jatoi as prime minister but the results swayed the tide in favour of Mr. Nawaz Sharif.
In 1993, the plan was to block both Mr Nawaz Sharif and Ms Benazir Bhutto’s return and install Mr Chattha as prime minister but the results brought Ms Bhutto to power for the second time. In 1997, the plan was to create a hung Parliament but the results turned the tide in favour of Mr Nawaz Sharif who won with a two-thirds majority. In 2002, under the facade of a general election, a new political architecture was designed to cobble up a coalition of opportunist and corrupt politicians, which would give a free hand to the military leadership in running the affairs of the state and advancing its interests.
To realise this objective, the military leadership resorted to the tactics of rigging and manipulation of the electoral process.
The following factors favoured Musharraf’s stealing the elections in 2002. First, he enjoyed unqualified western support in the wake of 9/11 with the US administration completely shutting its eyes to all reports of rigging in the elections. Secondly, there was the fear of the military in the minds of the administration and the people as martial law was relatively new. Thirdly, a section of the population wanted to give him a chance to fulfil his seven-point agenda. Fourthly, the opposition parties were totally in disarray.
Fifth, Musharraf’s arch opponent, Mr Nawaz Sharif was in Jeddah from where he couldn’t participate in the election campaign in any form and Mr. Javed Hashmi, acting president of the party, was behind bars. Therefore, the PML-N, a major opposition party, was without any leadership. Sixth, a large number of MNAs from the PML-N were swayed into entering the fold of the King’s party, the PML-Q, just before the elections, making it difficult for credible alternative candidates to emerge in the constituencies in question in such a short time. Seventh, the Election Commission was headed by a judge whose reputation for impartiality was questionable.
Eighth, the federal and provincial governments were fully involved in the election campaign of the PML-Q and doled out millions of rupees during the election campaign. Ninth, the newly-created district governments played a pivotal role in prodding the voters towards the PML-Q. Tenth, the civil and military security agencies were fully involved in harassing opposition candidates, selecting potential candidates for the PML-Q and manipulating the electoral process.
Looking at the prospects in 2007, one finds that while a few factors still remain favourable for the government, most have become unfavourable. Much water has passed under the bridge in the war on terror since 2002 and the international community is becoming a little more sensitive towards the holding of fair and free elections in Pakistan. The fear of the military in the eyes of the public and the bureaucracy has receded considerably because of its favouring the discredited Q League and its excessive interference in civil matters. There is strong resentment against the Musharraf regime over the price hike, growing inequality and unemployment, rising crime, and controversial Balochistan and tribal area policies.
In the last four years, considerable coordination has developed among various like-minded opposition parties which will result in better seat adjustments to face government-backed candidates. Mr Nawaz Sharif, after moving to London, has become a major player in politics and has bolstered the PML-N’s position. Many credible choices have emerged in the constituencies where some PML-N and PPP candidates had deserted their parties. The Election Commission, though still very weak, will come under greater scrutiny for its role and functions. There will have to be care-taker governments in both provinces and Islamabad according to Musharraf’s own Seventeenth Amendment, meaning that regardless of their level of neutrality, these governments will be somewhat more restrained.
It is clear that there is no magic which can produce better results this time for the regime than in 2002. Despite Musharraf’s best efforts, his political apparatus has failed to win legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Both the PML-N and the PPP still retain the status of the nation’s two major mainstream parties. In the wake of this, what are the options of General Musharaf who is in his eighth year of power?
His first option is to seek a replay of 2002, rigging polls in order to keep him in power at all cost which is otherwise unlikely to give the two-thirds majority he desperately needs to further amend the Constitution. The danger is that such an effort will involve great domestic and international cost. The second option is to try to seek accommodation with one of the major mainstream parties to have a smooth continuity. The problem here is that no major party will be willing to serve on Shaukat Aziz’s terms and General Musharaf will not give up any of his powers.
Nawaz Sharif’s clear and strong stand for not compromising with the military government makes it hard for any party to betray the democratic cause. His third option is to break this impasse by finding an escape route away from the election option on some pretext on another and try to seek refuge in a system change such as a presidential system. This seems more likely if his attempt is to seek a post-election deal requiring a mainstream party to join a coalition government under Musharraf. But it may fail.
There is also another option, which looks least likely and may not suit General Musharraf’s personal agenda but is in our best national interest. It is to make history by being the first military ruler to seek an exit strategy by holding fair and free election under a neutral caretaker government and independent election commission formed in consultation with the opposition parties. It is in such moments of choice that destiny is either made or unmade.
The writer is former deputy chairman, Planning Commission. email:betterpakistan@gmail.com