Our relations with Afghanistan
By Tahir Mirza
IT IS strange that the Pakistan government has come out with little specific comment on the recent statements made by President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan. This could be a show of contempt for Mr Karzai, implying that he talks nonsense, or an effort not to publicly say things that would worsen Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.
But Mr Karzai’s remarks, which have been quite stinging, have coincided with a report by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG) that says that the Musharraf government’s appeasement of Taliban sympathisers in Waziristan has resulted in a base in Pakistan’s tribal areas that militants are using to stoke instability both at home and in Afghanistan. One of the ICG’s directors is quoted as saying: “Over the past five years, the Musharraf government has tried brute force, then appeasement. Both have failed. Islamabad’s tactics have only emboldened pro-Taliban militants.”
A State Department spokesman, when asked about the situation in Waziristan and the Taliban infiltration into Afghanistan, was neutral in his comments, and it is absolutely possible that Mr Karzai’s latest remarks have been inspired by the US, which itself is reluctant to publicly criticise Islamabad at this particular juncture.
But on Friday, the Washington Post reported Mr John Negroponte, director of America’s National Intelligence, as saying that with new fighting expected to break out next spring in the border region, Pakistan would have to decide what it could do about the tribal authorities who had not been living up to their agreement to prevent Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters from moving back and forth across the border.
He said a growing Al Qaeda and Taliban presence had de facto sanctuary in Pakistan, a major presence in the east and south, and a growing presence in western Afghanistan.
The position appears to be that the deal entered into by the Pakistan government, primarily of course the military, with the tribals and the Taliban in the tribal areas has now lost credibility although initially it was cautiously supported by Washington and even the Nato force in Afghanistan. There has been a sharp change in the situation although its precise determination is not really clear because of lack of information. The ICG report even said that Pakistan’s tribal region had become a virtual ‘mini-state’ used by the Taliban and foreign militants.
Mr Karzai even linked Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri’s recent visit to meet him with a spate of suicide bombs. There has been no comment on this remark by the foreign office in Islamabad — and one can again presume that this is because what the Afghan president has said is considered too ridiculous to be noted.
What do we make of all this and what is really happening? Of course, Mr Karzai has his own axes to grind and has never been considered a leader of great distinction. He is certainly a protege of the US and the assumption mentioned earlier that the US, disenchanted by Pakistan’s so-called peace deal with the Taliban and militants, is using the Afghan president to speak out its own thoughts — however flawed they may be — may have some validity. The thoughts will be seen as flawed here in the sense that despite a huge infusion of US-led international military and monetary aid and political and military support, the Afghan government’s writ extends not much beyond Kabul.
No tangible security or benefits otherwise are going to the populace. Leaving a large number discontented and disappointed with the existing government and leaving the way open for other, more organised forces to fill the political vacuum cannot be the responsibility of the Pakistan government.
But there is concern among many in Pakistan also at not only the accommodation being made with the militants and the Taliban in the northern areas but also the feeling that the Pakistan Army and political hardliners remain, as ever before since independence, anxious to delve in Afghan affairs and neutralise Afghanistan. The prospect of some peace with India could reinforce thoughts that our influence in Kabul should be increased. There is also a sense among many ordinary persons here that coming to an accommodation with extremists in the tribal regions has led to the creation of a new system by them where they crush education and spread their own version of religious dominance.
No one seems worried about this in Islamabad; nor does anyone seriously consider how the northern areas can eventually be made part of the rest of Pakistan. Giving freedom to elements that hold sway now in the tribal areas and act in totally reactionary ways contrasts with the policies adopted and statements made with regard to Balochistan.
In Balochistan, attacking nationalists and militants, Gen Pervez Musharraf said earlier this month that there was only one “lashkar” in Pakistan, and that was the Pakistan army, and no other lashkars would be allowed. But in the northern, tribal areas, lashkars can be permitted and they can even start running their own states, with the military’s and the government’s connivance. Why let the Taliban have the liberty of lashkars and armed groups and running their own governments?
The reasons should at least be rationally explained so that the people can be convinced of what is happening is right. Why is it that retired seniors of the ISI continue to be accused of patronising the Taliban and seeking to create their own groups in Afghanistan? And no proper denial is made?
The old association with the Taliban, whom we created and supported against the Soviets (and of course with full US backing), has not gone away despite what they did in association with Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. We seem to prefer them to ordinary Afghan nationalist politicians and we want Afghanistan to be run in keeping with our interests. The cultural backwardness of the Taliban and their Pakistani associates doesn’t bother us. We won’t ever be able to live down our refusal to condemn the Taliban attack on the Bamiyan Buddhas.
The military has certainly used force against the militants before entering into the jirga-type agreement and lost many precious lives. But the present compromise with the Taliban type should also be sensibly reviewed — if only because of its repercussions in the political field in these months leading to our elections. Pakistan and Afghanistan must establish relations normal among all neighbours, and Islamabad should take action against people who are fighting against the Karzai government.
Political parties other than the official League do not look greatly moved by what is happening in Waziristan, other northern areas and on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Only the MMA has its quiet links with the parties in those regions.
Perhaps it is time the situation in that region was not seen as the military’s sole concern but other political parties were also involved in offering their suggestions on how to deal with the problem. This is vital if the MMA is to be prevented from now using this card in its election campaign and forcing the Musharraf-led establishment to again come to some arrangement with it rather than with moderate and progressive parties.

