Drama over Hudood laws

MUCH has been written about the official bill once designed to offer some relief to Pakistan’s women and the establishment’s retreat diligently choreographed by its inept frontmen. The future of the bill, which was scheduled to be made into a law before Gen. Musharraf left for his pilgrimage to the US, is now quite unclear.

There is no need to repeat the arguments advanced during the public debate on the pros and cons of the bill except for a brief examination of three aspects of the matter — Islamic scholars’ support for reform of the Zina Ordinance, the causes of the establishment’s flabbiness, and the dilemma the government has created for itself.

It is worth noting that the establishment brought forth its Protection of Women (Criminal and Family Laws) (Amendment) Bill only after an impressive body of religious opinion had expressed itself in favour of changes in the Zina Ordinance, thus taking up a middle position between those who demanded repeal of the Hudood Ordinances and those who opposed any change in the Ziaul Haq edicts. A booklet published by the Council of Islamic Ideology (Hudood Ordinance 1979, an interim brief report prepared by Mr. Inamullah and Dr. Muhammad Khalid Masud (Chairman CII), 2006), a publication anyone working on the subject will find immensely useful, sums up these reform ideas.

In this booklet, a report designed to serve as a status report for the CII found that:

* “The definition of Hadd in the ordinance is not derived from the Qur’an and Sunna; it does not even agree with the definitions prescribed by the jurists.”

* “The jurists use the term Hadd in the meaning of ‘fixed punishment’, regardless of whether fixed by the Quran, Sunna or Ijma,”

* “The identification and division of crimes as Hudud, Qisas and Ta’zir has been done by the jurists and it varies.”

* “Hudood Ordinance has adopted Fiqhi identification and classification of Hudud offences selectively and arbitrarily and thus added to the confusion between Hudud and Ta’zir. It has further confused the concept of Hudud by mixing common law, criminal procedure and Fiqhi procedure, disregarding the need for fine distinctions.”

* “Not all Muslim countries are enforcing Fiqhi Hudud laws. Statistics show that Hudood Ordinance has not been effective in reducing the crimes.”

* Those pointing out the need for amendments in the Ordinance include, from the official side, the Federal Shariat Court, the Council of Islamic Ideology, the Commission of Inquiry for Women (1997) and the Commission on the Status of Women.

* Hudood Ordinance can be reviewed by the legislature as it is not included in schedule 7 which lists laws that cannot be amended without changing Art 270-A.

* “The Hudood Ordinance does not conform fully to the Qur’an and Hadith. Partial amendments to this ordinance cannot bring it to accord with the letter and spirit of the Qur’an and Sunnah. A thorough revision of the Hudood Ordinance is necessary in order to make it more responsive to the philosophy of crime and punishment in the Qur’an and Sunna as well as more effective in a modern judicial system.”

These findings in the review, report, known to the government before the bill under reference was drafted, should have given the government the confidence it required to silence the politico-religious lobby that had ruled out any change in the Zia law. It was significant that the report endorsed the views expressed by a number of scholars in the non-government sector, including Dr. Javed Iqbal, Dr M. Tufail Hashmi, Dr Javed Ghamdi, and Mr. Mohammad Farooq Khan. True, the growing literature on the subject also included many vigorously advocated views on the supposed sanctity of the Zia law.

The essential fact, however, was the emergence of a broad and workable consensus in favour of easing the rigours of a bad law even if its repeal was impossible. A modestly efficient administration could have capitalised on the opportunity presented before it. But this was not to be. Once again the establishment confirmed its genius for botching up its key undertakings.

Considerable consultation is believed to have been held with scholars before the bill was finalised. However, once the document was handed over to the pilots, things started going wrong.

If the government believed the bill was not going to provoke the quasi-religious faction in parliament, that already had its eyes on the coming general election, it will not escape indictment for inexcusable imbecility. If it did anticipate a tough response from the conservative lobby, it will be found guilty of failure to prepare for the event.

That no planning was done to facilitate passage of the bill is borne out by the government’s acts of omission and commission. No attempt to publicise the contents of the bill seems to have been made. (But that is in keeping with the establishment’s tradition of holding matters secret from the people.) An open debate on the proposed measures could have won the government critically needed public support. Those standing for repeal of the Zia Ordinances of 1979 as well as those holding them above human engineering would have reiterated their position, but middleroaders would have perhaps welcomed whatever relief to women was promised.

Mr. Ejazul Haq’s choice as head of the selection committee was quite inappropriate. Anybody could have anticipated the reaction to his selection. He was no doubt replaced but the damage had been done. The passage of the bill through the select committee was taken for granted. One does not know how the ministers offloaded from Gen. Musharraf’s flight to America addressed their assignment to get the bill enacted in a day or two, but apparently matters were left to the limited devices of two ministers. Finally the establishment chose to bank on its love-hate relationship with the MMA high command.

Attempts to secure consensus on sensitive legislative proposals through unconventional parleys are quite in order. Had the objective been a secular compromise, the government’s supplication to the MMA for help would not have attracted criticism, but the exercise was done to seek an ulema committee’s verdict on the bill’s repugnancy (or otherwise) to Islamic injunctions.

This amounted to a serious blunder on three counts. First, the government offended the Council of Islamic Ideology, a constitutional body created for this kind of advice. Secondly, it gave the impression of allowing a small group of ulema the monopoly of interpreting Islamic injunctions, a dangerous thing to do in any circumstances. And, finally, once the bill had become parliament’s property, it was wrong to question its competence to decide all matters related to it.

There is visible unanimity in the country that the governments has again confirmed its policy of surrender to any challenge from conservative clerics. This happened on the question of entries in new passports. The retention of separate electorates system for the Ahmadies was another instance. The end of bold announcements on madressa reform is known. And nobody can forget how the promise of a procedural change in the blasphemy law was withdrawn from a long distance.

The common citizens wonder as to why all-powerful military governments are in a hurry to raise a white flag whenever they are threatened by conservative clerics. Many explanations have been offered for this frequently recurring phenomenon — that the military and the pseudo-religious zealots share retrogressive ideas about democracy, federalism, women and peace or that the present government cannot abandon the proteges advanced during the 2002 polls, or that authorities cannot forget that most mass agitations in Pakistan have been carried out under religious banners. There is an element of truth in each of these explanations but the real reason of the government’s flabbiness is rooted in the political philosophy authoritarian regimes in Pakistan have unfailingly followed.

Starting with Ayub Khan, authoritarian rulers have concentrated on suppressing democratic politics. They have consistently vilified political parties and demonised political leaders. Since they are incapable of representing the people themselves, they have left the clerics free to occupy the political space. The only way to ensure that political and legislative matters should be decided on merit and in the people’s interest is to allow the emergence of progressive social forces through free political activity. For instance, if the police stop beating up women demonstrators, they can carry their standard to victory. They may still do that in spite of the police terror.

It is in the nature of an authoritarian regime that the political props it raises to present a democratic facade, that is king’s parties under various labels, wither away under pressure. In the women’s bill case, too, the regime has been let down by the party it has raised in defiance of historical evidence. The establishment’s dilemma is that its capacity to deal with organised adversaries has been undermined by its unwise counsel.

Thanks to the latter the government has isolated itself from all the parties concerned — the reformists, the status quo advocates, the middle-roaders, and all women of Pakistan — an unaffordable price for suppressing normal, democratic politics, What did the poet say? Issi baais tun qatl-i-aashikan say man’a kartay thay.

Making NAM more relevant

SINCE the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was a creation of the Cold War, some political analysts argue that it has lost its relevance after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This contention is not, however, tenable.

Non-alignment is a dynamic policy that continues to be relevant in world affairs by adapting itself to the changing international environment.

The emergence of unipolarity has set a trend of unilateralism that has given rise to new challenges and threats that has made NAM even more relevant than it was during the Cold War era. The United States, that has no obvious major adversary and enjoys unrivalled military power, is attempting to impose its coercive order on other countries in order to advance its geopolitical interests and also to assert its authority as the sole superpower. The United States, however, is oblivious to the fact that the end of the Cold War meant the defeat of totalitarianism.

The destruction of the World Trade Tower Centre on September 11 was a despicable act that outraged the international community and united it to counter the menace of terrorism. Regrettably, however, President Bush deliberately exploited this tragedy and fostered the fear of terror in the minds of the American people so that they could line up behind him and support his so-called international war on terrorism. It is generally believed that under the guise of its war on terrorism the US is pursuing its foreign policy objectives that predated the September 11 tragedy.

The invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq has been justified by the United States as an attempt to liberate the people of the two countries from the scourge of violence and terror. The evidence, however, shows that it was all a ploy to distract attention from Washington’s real aims.

The menace of terrorism has to be eliminated, root and branch, in all its forms and manifestations. The struggle against terrorism cannot, however, be allowed to de-legitimise the just struggles of people for the restitution of their legitimate rights or against the occupation of their lands by alien powers. It would most certainly be a misguided and dangerous attempt to do so and would carry the risk of simmering tensions developing into something far worse as is being witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq. NAM, as a symbol of hope for the oppressed people throughout the world, must, therefore, support a holistic approach to defeating terrorism by addressing its root causes and ensuring inter-religious harmony.

NAM should also support multilateral cooperation under the auspices of the United Nations to combat international terrorism. The evidence thus far suggests that the fight against international terrorism by the US-led coalition is proving counterproductive. NAM should also make a strong plea that terrorism is not associated with any religion, nationality, civilisation or ethnic group as otherwise it would weaken the resolve of the international community to wage a collective fight against the scourge of terrorism.

Despite their abundant resources, including oil and gas, the developing countries have not been able to escape the vicious circle of poverty, hunger and disease. These countries have apparently not reaped the benefits of globalisation as has been the case with developed nations. This is attributable to the fact that the international trade regime, far from being a level playing field, is heavily tilted in favour of the developed world.

NAM should, therefore, focus its attention on this issue that is vital to the well-being and future prosperity of its members and should make concerted efforts to introduce equity in the international financial system. At the same time, it would also be necessary that the developing countries transform their economic and social sectors in order to optimise the utilisation of their resources.

Unfortunately, many NAM members have been encumbered by disputes and conflicts among them. There have even been armed conflicts between some of them. As a result, the Movement has been marked by the lack of cohesion and solidarity that has debilitated its ability to play an effective and meaningful role on the international stage, thus undermining its prestige.

Needless to say, the policies of hegemony and domination being pursued by some NAM countries are contrary to its philosophy. It is, therefore, important that NAM not only focus on promoting a just and equitable solution to existing conflicts and disputes among its members but also evolve a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes if they erupt in future.

NAM has long-standing principled positions on nuclear disarmament and related issues of non-proliferation. An indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, at the instance of the United States, without specifying any deadline for fulfilling the treaty’s obligation by the nuclear-weapon states towards the elimination of the nuclear arsenals was actually aimed at legitimising the possession of nuclear weapons and their retention by those who possessed them.

This is a material breach of the treaty by these states. NAM should, therefore, attempt to reach a consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation issues. It should reject discrimination and double standards and uphold the principle of equal security of all states.

The NPT that establishes a political and legal barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons allows the member states to engage in research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Regrettably, however, undue restrictions, affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT have been placed at the instance of the United States. NAM must stress that this right constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the NPT and, therefore, should not be denied to its adherents.

NAM attaches great importance to strengthening the role of the United Nations that despite its many shortcomings and pitfalls remains the last hope for world peace. Unfortunately, the most powerful members of the world body have made it subservient to their whims to advance their national interests. NAM should make a concerted endeavour to ensure that the United Nations plays a pivotal role in protecting the rights of all the nations and preventing the powerful members from imposing their political, economic and military designs on weaker nations.

As the principal forum representing the interests of the developing world and to play its role at the international level, NAM must continue to work on expanding and reinforcing its ability and capacity to preserve and promote the centrality and sanctity of the founding principles. It is necessary to make NAM strong so that it may successfully address the emerging challenges facing developing nations.

The writer is a former ambassador.

The Cold War inside the Pentagon

BOB WOODWARD’S new book, “State of Denial,” has political junkies everywhere chattering. Along with its gossipy insider revelations, the book casts light on at least one important substantive issue: the abysmal state of relations between the nation’s top generals and the Pentagon’s senior civilian leaders, most notably Secretary of Defence Donald H. Rumsfeld.

The debacle that is Iraq today has many sources. Among them, civil-military dysfunction may well deserve pride of place. At the pinnacle of the U.S. national security establishment, mistrust and mutual manipulation rather than candour and mutual respect form the basis of interaction between civilian and military chiefs.

This has been true for decades, although the generals and the politicians have pretended otherwise. Now Woodward has let the cat out of the bag.

An anecdote from “State of Denial” makes the essential point. Marine Corps Gen. James Jones was asking fellow Marine Gen. Peter Pace, at the time the leading candidate to become chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if he really wanted a job that had become so emptied of authority. “You should not be the parrot on the secretary’s shoulder,” Jones reportedly said.

Jones accurately described the role of generals like Pace (now perched compliantly above Rumsfeld’s lapels) and the other Joint Chiefs. In determining the conduct of the Bush administration’s global war on terror, the civilians in the office of the secretary of Defence call the shots. Apart from being trotted out on ceremonial occasions, the Joint Chiefs have become all but invisible. Certainly, on questions related to basic national security policy, they have become irrelevant.

Some of this qualifies as payback. During the 1990s, in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, the Joint Chiefs were riding high and used their clout to show their civilian “masters” who was really boss. During the largely contrived controversy over gays in the military, the Joint Chiefs publicly humiliated the newly elected president, Bill Clinton.

When the Army botched the raid leading to the famous Mogadishu firefight of 1993, leaks coming from within the armed services quickly foisted blame on Secretary of Defence Les Aspin. No generals lost their jobs over Mogadishu, but Aspin lost his. Throughout the Clinton era, the Joint Chiefs continued to exercise a quasi-veto over matters related to national security.

When Rumsfeld took office in 2001, he was intent on shoring up the principle of civilian control. He has done that — although Rumsfeld’s idea of control amounts to emasculation. He has bludgeoned generals into submission, marginalized or gotten rid of those inclined to be obstreperous and selected pliable replacements such as Pace.

Assuming — not without reason — that professional military advice frequently comes tainted with extraneous considerations, he has treated that advice with disdain. Flawed decisions have resulted, adversely affecting everything from war planning to dealing with the Iraq insurgency. Perhaps worse still, Rumsfeld’s de facto silencing of the most senior generals has induced a strategic paralysis. Because the secretary of Defence is not inclined to entertain fundamental questions about Iraq, no one else dares even to pose such questions.

Again, Woodward lifts the veil, recounting the concerns of former White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card that the administration might not be exploring the full range of alternatives for dealing with the war. “Card put it on the generals in the Pentagon and Iraq,” Woodward wrote. “If they had come forward and said to the president, ‘It’s not worth it’ or ‘The mission can’t be accomplished,’ “ options other than simply staying the course might have gained a hearing. But Rumsfeld’s generals know better than to venture such opinions.

The issues on which military success or failure in Iraq will turn fall squarely within the realm of military expertise. These matters — related to the size, the proper employment and the sustainability of U.S. forces — lie largely beyond the competence of civilians such as the secretary of Defence.

The restoration of an effective civil-military compact — one based on honesty and forthrightness rather than dissimulation — promises to be a daunting task, the equivalent of restoring trust to a marriage after both parties have committed serial infidelities. No doubt Rumsfeld’s removal from office stands as a necessary first step. But we should not kid ourselves into thinking that his departure alone will suffice.

A state of denial nicely describes the Bush administration’s attitude about Iraq. But “state of denial” also describes our attitude toward a long festering civil-military discord. As long as that discord persists, the likelihood of more Iraqs will loom large. —Dawn/Los Angeles Times Service

The writer is a professor of history and international relations at Boston University. He is writing a history of US civil-military relations.

Why Rice is averse to enter the Red Zone?

US SECRETARY of State Condoleezza Rice is in the Middle East this week, trying to bolster America’s allies to confront an enemies list that includes Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas and the all-party anarchy in Iraq.

My worry is that Rice is becoming a travelling version of Baghdad’s Green Zone, talking about hopeful strategies that are disconnected from events on the ground.

The focus of Rice’s trip is to talk with moderate Arab governments — Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states — about how to form a united front against Iranian-backed extremism. In recent weeks, European diplomats have offered various formulas to finesse the West’s demand that Iran suspend uranium enrichment as a precondition for talks, but so far the leaders in Tehran have not budged.

Talking to allies is always a good idea, but consider the parties Rice isn’t engaging on this trip: Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran — the sources of the trouble. The idea of travelling to a Middle East in crisis and talking only to your friends is, I’m sorry to say, the equivalent of meeting Iraqi leaders in the protected Green Zone and imagining that you are thereby stopping the brutal killing out in the “Red Zone,” which is the term US officials in Baghdad have been using to refer to the real world.

US officials talk hopefully about how the recent war in Lebanon “clarified the fissures” in the region and encouraged the moderate Arab states to finally take decisive action to curb Iran and its allies. They hope the squeeze on the Hamas government will embolden Palestinians to embrace the moderate leadership of President Mahmoud Abbas and resume negotiations with Israel. To which a cynic would respond: Are you kidding? This is the Middle East.

The lesson for Rice should have been clear after the war in Lebanon: Left to themselves, America’s moderate Arab allies will make the deals that are necessary for their survival. They will quietly cheer for America in Iraq and Israel against Hezbollah — until it’s clear that the extremists are winning. Then, for self-protection, they will lean in the other direction. I’m told that Sunni women from Bedouin tribes in Jordan were carrying amulets of the Shia militia leader Hasan Nasrallah at a wedding in Amman last week. That’s a small sign of which way the wind is blowing.

America needs to break out of its diplomatic Green Zone, or it will become a prisoner of events beyond its control. What’s needed is aggressive, innovative policy that, to use a favourite Israeli term, “creates new facts on the ground.” To me, that means a process of engagement — especially now, when the mullahs in Tehran and their allies in Damascus and Beirut seem so afraid of it.

We should send an ambassador back to Damascus, tomorrow. We should encourage the widest possible contacts with Iran, leading to an eventual resumption of diplomatic ties. We should treat reconstruction of postwar Lebanon with the urgency we should have applied to postwar Iraq. We should deepen our contacts with a Lebanese government that includes two Hezbollah ministers. We should designate a special presidential envoy for the Middle East — the obvious choices would be former secretary of state James A. Baker III or former president Bill Clinton.

Absent more aggressive action, the situation will keep slipping away from the United States, day by day.—Dawn/Washington Post Service