Military rule: then and now
By Zafar Iqbal
THERE is a great deal of clamour that General Musharraf should remove his uniform. He had made an ill-considered promise to do so, but realising this mistake he has sensibly gone back on it. The implication, of course, is that he should lose control over the army. Field Marshal Ayub made this mistake and Yahya Khan took over. What are Generals Tanvir and Moinuddin Haider thinking: are they hoping for another Yahya Khan?
General Zia didn’t make this mistake, but his rule was nevertheless terminated when he was blown out of the sky. The then vice-chief of the army staff decided that he was not in a position to take over and we had four successive civilian governments: BB-NS-BB-NS. Those governments brought to power through elections managed by the “agencies” are now being called democratic. They were barely democratic, they were, in fact, dictatorial, corrupt and incompetent.
We are responsible for bringing military rule upon us. It started right in the beginning. The problem was a simple one: how could the “Western Wing” establishment dominate East Bengal where the majority of the population happened to reside? It could to be done through any democratic process.
After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, Ghulam Mohammad was elevated to governor-general and Khwaja Nazimuddin stepped down to become prime minister. Ghulam Mohammad had got his chance to work something out with the Chief Justice of Pakistan. According to Qudratullah Shahab who worked in the governor-general’s office,the Chief Justice regularly met the governor-general. The defining step was taken with the collaboration of General Ayub Khan, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, and the Nazimuddin government was dismissed. The action was supported by the Chief Justice Mohammed Munir, Justice S.A. Rahman, Justice Mohammed Sharif and Justice S.A.M. Akram. Justice A.R. Cornelius dissented. It also resulted in a cooperative relationship between the executive and the Federal Court, which resulted in the Federal Court being subordinated to the executive.
The process of army rule had been initiated, although a democratic facade was maintained and the politicians were allowed to cobble together a constitution by 1956. When the clamour for elections became a little too loud, there was no choice but for the army to take over — first under General Iskander Mirza, but within three weeks the real ruler, General Ayub Khan, became president and chief martial law administrator on October 28, 1958.
The only chance we have had to get rid of army rule and become a democracy was after the military surrender in Dhaka on December 16, 1971. Z.A. Bhutto had successfully encouraged the army into a no-win situation in dealing with the East Pakistan situation. It was a high-risk gamble, but he won. It seems that after the Dhaka surrender the Pakistan army had also decided to surrender to civilian rule.
General Gul Hasan was the most vociferous supporter that the government be handed over to Bhutto. He was right. Bhutto was easily the ablest politician that Pakistan has produced to date. Besides he had won the majority of seats in parliament from West Pakistan. The general, however, did not realize that the same Zulfikar Ali Bhutto would sack him, practically at gunpoint, after three months. This was inevitable.
Despite his ability, Bhutto had a strong juvenile streak and carried far too many chips on his shoulder. As a result, he was a little too sensitive to imagined slights and always found time for ‘fixing’ people. For instance, I had been awarded the Eisenhower Fellowship for 1972. However, I was so taken in that we at last had a democratically elected prime minister that I gave up the fellowship and preferred to stay back instead of going off on a jaunt to the United States. It was one of my silly mistakes. In about six months I was out for “arrogance, irreverence and impertinence”. I didn’t particularly mind. Despise an addiction to public service it was not possible to work in this environment as one could already feel a mist of fear slowly enveloping the administrative machinery.
Mr Bhutto had begun taking the first steps towards absolute power. He brought the judiciary to the heel, changed the rules for senior government servants to make them easily dispensable. He also convinced himself that the armed forces were at his beck and call. The parliament was under his thumb. Though a combination of charm and persuasion by other means, he had managed enough support to amend the Constitution whenever it got in his way. He did it seven times and thoroughly mismanaged the economy.
My own, rather intuitive, view was that in spite of all multifarious shortcomings, Pakistani society still had the resilience to oppose absolute rule. The crisis was most likely to occur at the time of the next election. When I expressed this opinion my friends were convinced that I had lost my mind. They were sure that Mr. Bhutto would be around for the next twentyfive years. We all know what happened.
The problem that we have inherited is that every single prime minister has had the ambition to emulate Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and secure absolute power. Our Parliament is simply regarded as an adjunct to executive authority. The only hurdle in people’s perception is the role of the military. For instance, Mr Nawaz Sharif had taken all the preliminary steps to acquire absolute power. He had successfully attacked the Supreme Court and the rest of the higher judiciary had buckled under. They had never before sunk so low. His confidence further increased when he easily managed to dismiss General Jahangir Keramat. This encouraged him to make plans for seizing control of the armed services. Fortunately, lightning struck at the critical moment.
If we want democracy, certain prerequisites have to be fulfilled. The first is freedom of expression and freedom of association. This is the first government which has not stood in the way of freedom of expression or and as far as one is aware, freedom of association too unless the association is of a violent nature. The judiciary also seems to have been given the nod to appear more independent. This will probably continue. The issue which has still not been tackled is freedom of information. It is essential in good governance.
General Parvez Musharraf has made a few faux pas such as pronouncing in advance that the captain who was supposed to have raped Dr Shazia in Sui was innocent before an inquiry could be held. The most celebrated was his reaction to Mukhtaran Mai. He proudly announced on a foreign visit that he had put her on the Exit Control List so that she would not tarnish Pakistan’s image abroad. He subsequently got into a spat with a lady in the US on the same subject. The whole thing was counter-productive, and quite unnecessarily presented him as a male chauvinist..
A democratic facade had to be created to appease western opinion. The current ‘politicians’ are probably the same as they have been in the past, except that no ministerial positions probably don’t matter, and that the ‘cabinet’ should be restricted to not more than ten or twelve members, if it is supposed to be a forum for serious discussion on policy. If it isn’t, size is irrelevant.
So far the government has moved a little too slowly on promises of ‘moderate Islam’ — whatever that means. The simplest meaning is being able to revert tot the pre-Zia period. Probably there are fears of political obstacles since such apprehensions are usually subjective; it is difficult to persuade people that they can move much faster, without massive political turmoil.
The question of restoring democracy is a red herring. The problem is about creating a democratic environment which could lead to free and air elections. Some things will improve but the forthcoming elections will probably follow the pattern of those held from 1985 onwards, except that this time there will be a repeat performance in favour of the PML (Q). Devolution was probably designed to help in the process.

