Peace process sidelined

THE multiple bomb blasts in Mumbai on July 11 resulted in the death of nearly 200 people. Such a colossal loss of innocent lives is always a traumatic experience and has a powerful impact on the leadership of the country where the tragedy takes place. There is also a tendency, again quite normal, to look around for those that can be cast as villains so that the guilt can be passed on elsewhere.

The state of relations between India and Pakistan being what it has been for the past many decades, India’s reaction was in keeping with its record. The Manmohan Singh government did not have to ponder long over the issue. Within minutes of the tragedy, the Indian media had already unleashed a massive campaign against Pakistan, with some advocating a “suitable response”. Rightwing extremists went further to allege Indian Muslim collaboration.

It was, therefore, no surprise that the Manmohan Singh government should have joined in the chorus of accusations and then announced an indefinite suspension of foreign secretary-level talks scheduled for this week. His government consists of a weak coalition and real power lies with Sonia Gandhi whose nationalist credentials are suspect in the eyes of the Bharatiya Janata Party. Nevertheless, the decision to suspend the talks, notwithstanding the condemnation of the blasts by Pakistan’s foreign office and political leadership, was both a surprise and a disappointment to those who had come to believe that relations between the two countries were on the road to normalcy.

India also sought to capitalise on off-the-cuff remarks by Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri. The timing of these remarks may have been questionable, but he cannot be faulted for pointing out that the failure to resolve an issue as critical as Kashmir had created anger and alienation and that this had bred terrorism. The Pakistan foreign secretary, Riaz Mohammed Khan, called a press conference to express serious concern at India’s decision, characterising it as a “negative development”. It was also pointed out that the joint statement issued after President Musharraf’s visit to Delhi in April 2005 had described the peace process as “irreversible”. The two sides had also emphasised that no terrorist action would be permitted to influence the conduct of the peace process. What then explains India’s action?

Much time has elapsed since that day in January 2004 when our leadership surprised the Indians, and even more so its own people, by agreeing to a draft statement that contained in it a major concession. This was the unprecedented commitment that we would no longer engage in activities that the Indians characterise as acts of terrorism. Even more surprising was the offer that the government would ensure that the country’s territory, as well as areas under its control, would not be used by the militants in furtherance of a policy that had been pursued for years, with the express purpose of creating political pressure for New Delhi.

Notwithstanding the surprise this caused among people, some observers were quite willing to concede that there may be some merit in the government’s explanation that such a concession was essential to bring the Indians back to the negotiating table. Consequently, in the wake of the Islamabad Declaration, the two foreign secretaries were able to pick up the thread of the composite dialogue process that had more or less been shredded in the aftermath of the Kargil episode.

Thereafter, we have had senior officials of various ministries take on the items identified in the composite dialogue agenda, with the foreign secretaries reviewing the entire process. Two full rounds have already been completed and the third was expected to end soon. In contrast to the excitement and expectation of the early months, when hardly a day passed without the claim of impending success, recent pronouncements have been far more measured and cautious. The hype has definitely disappeared.

This is not surprising. Many veterans of the foreign policy establishment had warned that issues bedevilling relations between Pakistan and India, even apart from Kashmir, were extremely complex. It was, therefore, wrong to expect India to make concessions merely because the two countries were engaged in confidence-building measures. Admittedly, the CBMs have contributed to the easing of tensions and have been helpful in creating “peace lobbies” in both countries. But it was shortsighted of us to have confused the CBMs for actual movement on political issues.

The circumstances obtaining in the region after 9/11 were extremely difficult. We were under pressure on multiple fronts — domestically, because of the government’s eroding legitimacy and abroad, because the state agencies were suspected of involvement in nuclear proliferation and terrorism. It was, therefore, right to make every effort to resume the dialogue process with India. But it was wrong of us to have made the concession that we did during Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s visit in January 2004. This voluntary “admission of guilt”, was not only demeaning, but even counter-productive. No less damaging was the assurance given that Pakistan was willing to discuss Kashmir within a framework that ruled out the redrawing of borders. In reality, however, this line of thinking had few takers. As was pointed out by many experts, the policy of offering unilateral concessions, and that too outside the negotiating room, should not have been our favoured approach. In fact, such concessions create distorted perceptions about power equations that have the potential of damaging prospects of meaningful negotiations.

The history of the past 30 months has demonstrated the validity of this statement. Unseemly haste in efforts to normalise relations with India weakened our negotiating position. We were, therefore, left with no option but to give the talks a more positive spin than was merited by actual progress. Having made those claims, we were no longer in a position to call upon friendly capitals to use their influence with New Delhi to urge it to abandon its intransigence in favour of the peace process. Nor could we remonstrate with the Indians.

It is, however, the fallout of our policy on Kashmir which should be of primary concern to us. We ended our support to the militants, which was a correct decision. In this time and age, there is no place for militancy. In fact, support for extremist organisations in Kashmir caused immense damage to the freedom movement and also weakened our case. Conversely, it enabled the Indians to project the struggle for Kashmiri freedom as an extremist movement. But when we decided to abandon the well-established leadership of the Hurriyat and build others in its place, we introduced a “schism” in the movement that has been disastrous for the Kashmiris as well as for us.

Also, by abandoning our historic adherence to the UN resolutions and by repeated references to the need for “out-of-the-box” solutions, we added to the confusion, not only in Pakistan but in Kashmir as well. Then, in offering to bring the Northern Areas into the political equation, we injected an unsettling issue in our strategic relationship with China. Diplomatic negotiations are never pleasant, one-shot exercises, but involve months and years of excruciatingly painful give-and-take.

From the manner in which the Indian government has reacted to the blasts, it is not unlikely that it may have come to the conclusion that with CBMs having been virtually exhausted, there would now be pressure from us for negotiations on political issues, including Kashmir. But with a weak coalition in power and with nationalist parties breathing down the Indian prime minister’s neck, Manmohan Singh’s government is in no position to start discussing the core issues.

In any case, India has no reason to relent. It has not suffered defeat on the battlefield, it has not lost international support for its stand on Kashmir, its economy is booming, its image improving and its influence increasing. In such a scenario, there is no reason why India should give us that which we failed to get either on the battlefield or through the United Nations.

By linking the Mumbai blasts to 9/11 and London’s 7/7, India has tried to position itself alongside advocates of the right of preemptive action. This is clear from inspired stories that India is exploring the possibility of a surgical strike on camps of so-called terrorists. The Indian media has also reported that New Delhi is contemplating using the Indian Air Force in counter-insurgency operations on the basis of a document known as the Low Intensity Conflict Operation (LICO). It was, therefore, appropriate for the Foreign Office spokesperson to describe reports of hot pursuit “as highly irresponsible”, and warning India that such an adventure could lead to a holocaust.

In this context, it was heartening to note that the Bush administration has not only debunked reports of Pakistan’s involvement in the blasts, but also expressed its concern at the postponement of the composite dialogue. It would now be opportune for us to urge Washington to use its influence with New Delhi to bring it back to the negotiating table, while pointing out that India’s intransigence could possibly be on account of its newfound confidence, gained from its strategic relationship with the US.

The suspension of the composite dialogue process appears to have unnerved us. Foreign Minister Kasuri, in his usual exuberance, has reiterated his hope that the dialogue process would soon be back on track. He has also revealed having received a “non-paper”, just before the blasts, containing proposals on Kashmir. But there is no need for us to show such anxiety. In fact, it should be taken as a period for reflection and introspection and a welcome opportunity to review what modifications we need to make in our approach to India.

No one will advocate that we go back to the hostility and tension of the past, but we do not need to create a false sense of bonhomie and cordiality, when there has been no meaningful headway on the core political issues. Of course, the people of Pakistan support the policy of normalisation with India. This has been the goal of earlier elected governments as well. But there is no support for normalisation if it involves unilateral concessions by us. In fact, the concessions have already distorted perceptions about power equations and these could well damage our prospects in negotiations with India. In such a scenario, it would be advisable to stick with the status quo, till such time that there is a change in the correlation of forces.

The writer is a former ambassador.

India losing out on N-deal

IN principle I am against the bomb. When India exploded it, I paraded on the streets of Delhi, along with 5,000 people, to register my protest.

On Pakistan following suit, I met the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Islamabad to express my horror. He defended himself by pointing out that he would not have exploded the bomb if Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee had not done so.

Probably so. India’s own stand has changed in the last four decades. Mahatma Gandhi was firmly opposed to the bomb. So was Jawaharlal Nehru. In his fortnightly letter to state chief ministers, Nehru said that he was against all nuclear arms tests, overground or underground. In a preface to a book by D.S. Kothari, a scientist, Nehru criticised nuclear weapons and the havoc they could cause.

Still, the Congress government went ahead to produce the bomb while the BJP-led coalition exploded it. What has revived the debate on its use or control after several years is the Indo-US nuclear agreement which is taking the shape of a law. I wish we had been leading a movement on nuclear disarmament the world over. But we have got stuck in a bilateral agreement with America. The treaty is appearing more and more unequal as it is unfolding itself.

There are no two opinions that India’s needs for energy are immense and immediate. Whether Nehru would have gone through Washington as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has done is difficult to imagine because India represented the non-aligned world. Nehru was, however, clear that “whatever policy we may adopt and whatever laws we may frame, the basic fact is scientific and industrial progress,” not nuclear weapons.

That Manmohan Singh chose Washington to help New Delhi overcome its energy problems is not wrong. What is wrong is to allow America to shape and reshape the agreement to suit its own policies and perceptions. President Bush’s undertaking was to give India exactly the “same rights and privileges” as five recognised nuclear powers have. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has reminded us that India will never be a member of the nuclear club. We knew this from the beginning and did not mind the undefined status so long as the same “rights and privileges” were given to us.

Whatever changes the US Senate has made in the original bill go beyond the agreement. New Delhi has kept its people in the dark because of drumbeaters and vested interests in the country. My suspicion is that the US administration expected its legislative bodies to recommend what they had in view and what New Delhi was reluctant to concede.

The closed-door briefings to senators and congressmen were for that purpose. But it has left New Delhi in the lurch, at a stage where it cannot gulp down all that America wants it to do. At the same time it cannot leave whatever it is getting because it needs energy badly.

It is apparent that Washington has changed the goalposts, although President Bush denies the allegation. I shall go by what our top scientists say. They are worried and irritated because what is emerging will come in the way of independent-Indian action. One eminent scientist has gone to the extent of saying that India would have been better off signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Former Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha has pointed out how a deal for nuclear energy has turned into an exercise in non-proliferation.

Manmohan Singh’s “concern about certain aspects,” the phrase he used at the G-8 summit in St Petersburg before talking to Bush, indicates that America has led us up the garden path. It is good that we discovered this before our parliament adopted any legislation. We should ask America to implement the joint statement made by Manmohan Singh and Bush last July in letter and spirit. That the US Congress and the Senate have passed different bills, contrary to the undertakings given, is America’s problem, not ours.

India was promised that none of our facilities would be placed under international safeguards scrutiny until all trade and technology restrictions on Delhi were lifted. Now “full civil cooperation” is not on the plate because the US senate has ruled out the export of different nuclear technologies except under tightly controlled circumstances.

The Americans had agreed to India’s discretion to separate its civilian nuclear facilities. Now New Delhi has to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a “complete” declaration of civilian nuclear facilities and materials. The agreement with the IAEA will not be India-specific but one that conforms to its “standards and principles.”

Now that parliament is discussing the deal it should be examining it word by word, rejecting what has been added after the joint statement. The Manmohan Singh government should realise that many fears have been aroused because of the observations made by the US administration and its two Houses.

The prime minister should take the country into confidence to allay people’s apprehensions. Transparency is also the best way to meet criticism that there are certain underhand dealings. He should also be attending to the new development that Pakistan is building a powerful new reactor for producing plutonium.

India should not be in the arms race and should be concentrating on getting energy fast. It is willing to cooperate with America for “restructuring of the international system” but not on conditions which are out of the joint statement. Manmohan Singh has reportedly complained to Bush about additions and he has promised to do something. My hunch is that Bush too wants most of the restrictions which Congress, the Senate and the State Department have placed. I hope I am wrong.

Whatever the outcome, the nuclear deal will have an impact on India-US relations. The deal is the first major step that America is taking for proving that India is its “strategic partner” in this part of the world. Yet the manner in which the agreement is being anvilled indicates that the US administration remains the same grasping, unrelenting power and knows no bounds to serve its interests.

New Delhi has yet to contradict the CPI-M’s allegation that CIA has penetrated our intelligence system. Rabindra Singh, the missing RAW man whom America helped cross Nepal, is now living in Virginia. New Delhi made no fuss about it. One US third secretary had intimate relations with certain RAW and IB officials and had returned to America safely.

Our problem is the presence of Washington ‘patriots’ in our midst as we had Peking ‘patriots’ during the 1962 war against China. They are spreading the impression that the nuclear deal was the best thing that had happened to India. I hope the government realises that they represent the interest of America and not that of India.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

Taliban in Africa

IT has been observed THAT when the world’s policemen are distracted by front-page conflicts, minor tyrants seize the opportunity to go on rampages. Thus, while news cameras dwell on the latest carnage in Lebanon, Somalia may be collapsing into a militants’ haven comparable to Afghanistan under the Taliban.

At first blush, the takeover of Mogadishu by Sunni militiamen last month might seem like the best thing to have happened to Somalia since it dissolved into anarchy 15 years ago. The Islamists disarmed a pack of US-backed warlords — who overthrew dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991, only to unleash their own reign of terror and corruption — and imposed something like law and order on a capital city that had seen neither for nearly a generation.

Yet that discipline is looking increasingly like the kind Afghans remember all too well: the harshest form of Sharia, or Islamic law. As one example, two men were shot to death in Mogadishu for the crime of watching the World Cup on television.

The Islamic militia is headed by a known terrorist; its aims are unknown, but there are ominous indicators of trouble. Newsweek recently got hold of a militia training video in Mogadishu in which masked fighters refer to Somalia as the new Afghanistan and urge disaffected Muslims to gather there. The militia’s internal newspaper featured a headline on July 3 saying terrorism was compulsory.

Last week, the Islamists began encroaching to within 20 miles of Baidoa, the headquarters of a warlord-controlled “government” created two years ago with help from the United Nations in a failed attempt to gain some semblance of order. Officials in neighbouring Ethiopia, vowing to protect this shell of a governing body, rashly moved troops into Baidoa. Given that majority-Christian Ethiopia and majority-Muslim Somalia have been warring off and on for more than a century, this has served only to increase support for the militia by mainstream Somalis.

— Los Angeles Times